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Abstract 
 Contemporary police departments are facing immense pressure to preserve public safety 
while also remaining fiscally accountable. As a response to economic pressures, police services 
are turning to intelligence led policing (ILP). ILP promises ‘smarter’ and more efficient policing 
with the use of advanced technologies and data analysis for decision-making. The present study 
examines ILP implementation in one urban Canadian police department. Through in-depth 
interviews with fifteen patrol and middle-management members, fifty-five hours of observation, 
and an analysis of organizational documents, I examine how ILP reform has been understood 
and enacted by patrol officers on the ground. From this analysis, I uncover how officers’ 
perceptions and practices are loosely coupled from organizational claims surrounding ILP.  
I argue that this loose coupling allows the organization to acquire social legitimation while 
allowing patrol work to remain largely unchanged. Further, I argue that patrol officers’ 
perceptions and practices of ILP can perpetuate the policing of usual suspects and raise a number 
of concerns about implications of ‘intelligence’ practices involving citizens.        
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Chapter One: Introduction  
  In a time of fiscal restraint, law enforcement agencies are under increasing pressure to 
justify immense operating costs and reduce resource consumption wherever possible. Recently, 
the Canadian Summit on the Economics of Policing attested that “governments and police 
services must find more efficient and effective methods to sustain current levels of policing 
services to ensure public safety” (Public Safety Canada, 2013: 5). Meanwhile, heightened public 
expectations of safety and security measures further complicate this interplay of pressures. 
Pervasive feelings of insecurity, anxiety, and anticipation of danger characterize our 
contemporary hyper-vigilant ‘risk’ society (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Murphy, 2007). Since the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, fear of extreme behaviour by radical individuals or groups has remained 
at the forefront of public safety discussions. Recent tragedies such as the 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombing and the 2014 slaying of a Canadian solider on Parliament Hill have contributed to 
rampant fear of radicalized violence. Fear has bolstered an interest in identifying and anticipating 
the conditions that precede such occurrences. As such, police services are turning to 
technological innovation for effective resource management and enhanced public safety (Public 
Safety Canada, 2013).   
  Increasingly, gauging ‘pre-crime’ indicators to reduce risk is given precedence over 
post-incident responses (Zedner, 2007, 2010; Mythen & Walklate, 2006; Wall, 2010; McCulloch 
& Pickering, 2009). This pre-crime ideology was ushered into law enforcement policy on the 
back of counter-terrorism procedures at the national security level amidst the ‘War on Terror’ 
(McCulloch & Pickering, 2009; Zedner, 2007). The recent enactment of Bill C-51 has further 
expanded police powers in regards to information collection and sharing, allowing and 
facilitating precautionary detainment based upon suspicion of impending behaviour. Anticipating 
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occurrences rather than responding post-hoc is regarded as a means to save lives, but also to 
preserve resources. Pre-crime ideology has penetrated law enforcement beyond the scope of 
national security issues, and is increasingly sought by municipal and regional police services as a 
means for approaching street crime (Boyd-Caine, 2007).  
In response to growing threats to public safety and the economics of policing, police 
departments are turning to “smart policing strategies” such as intelligence-led policing (ILP) 
(Public Safety Canada, 2013). ILP emphasizes stringent performance management, efficient 
allocation of resources, and a rational, objective approach to decision-making. It refers to a 
management-by-objectives approach to governing contemporary police services (Ratcliffe, 2008, 
Sheptycki, 2013), as well as to a set of organizational practices involving rampant expansion of 
technological infrastructure, and an increasing reliance on information gathering and data 
analysis (Ratcliffe, 2008; Cope, 2004). Crime analysis is a central function within the ILP 
philosophy, providing the means of gathering, sorting, interpreting, and disseminating 
information that is intended to impact decisions (Ratcliffe, 2008). In the vision of ILP, engaging 
analysis to “identify patterns and relationships between crime data and other relevant data 
sources” enables the most informed and targeted allocation of police resources. From this, 
officers are said to engage in more ‘proactive’ rather than reactive policing styles (Cope, 
2004:188).  
Despite the rhetorical attractiveness of an ILP strategy, there is a lack of empirical 
knowledge about the efficacy of this approach when translated into practice by police 
departments. Even less knowledge exists on how ILP is enacted on the ground by patrol officers 
in their daily interactions with citizens and communities. Patrol officers are responsible for initial 
decisions which determine the trajectory of response to an incident. These decisions can hold 
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significant consequences for the individuals involved (Manning, 1992). For this reason, an 
analysis of how ILP shapes both perceptions and practices of patrol officers is vital for 
understanding how this reform may impact police-public interactions.     
 The present ethnographic case study provides a meso-level analysis of institutional 
reform in one large urban Canadian police department. Crypton Police Department (CPD)
1
 has 
vocally attested their commitment to policing under an intelligence-led framework, and has taken 
several strides to implement ILP. The purpose of the present study is to explore both the 
organizational adoption of ILP as well as patrol officers’ perceptions, understandings and 
enactment of ILP on the ground. To inform my analysis, I draw upon official organizational 
documents, fifteen in-depth interviews with patrol officers and middle-management personnel, 
and fifty-five hours of fieldwork observation. Employing new institutionalism, I explore 
organizational change as it is externally influenced by the social and political environment 
surrounding the organization. Using sensemaking as an analytical device, I explore the meaning-
making processes employed by patrol officers to understand and interpret how ILP relates to 
their role.  
 At the time of ILP adoption, CPD was the subject of significant negative publicity and 
was in need of a reform that could rebuild legitimacy for the organization. ILP, I argue, was 
organizationally adopted as a means to acquire legitimacy by demonstrating accountability and 
‘responsibilization’ (Garland, 1996). In practice, however, ILP operates as a ‘rationalized 
institutional myth’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) wherein the formal organizational claims concerning 
ILP are ‘loosely coupled’ to the everyday practices of policing.  Patrol officers engage selectively 
in ILP practices, such as appeasing calls for tickets and street checks, without meaningfully 
                                                          
1
 Name has been replaced with a pseudonym in order to protect the privacy of the organization. 
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changing their everyday approach. This selective adoption, I argue, raises a number of 
sociopolitical concerns regarding the policing of the “usual suspects” and low-level offenses. 
 
Chapter Outline  
 Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework begins with an outline of 
current literature on ILP’s theoretical application, detailing the rationales which drive this 
policing reform. I then provide an outline of the theoretical framing which informs this 
institutional analysis, describing how new institutionalism and sensemaking are employed to 
deepen our understanding of organizational change. I end this chapter with an overview of 
existing studies which have examined policing reform from an institutional theoretical 
perspective.     
 Chapter Three: Methodology provides an overview of the epistemological, ontological 
and methodological approach of this study. I provide a chronological account of the research 
process, from gaining access to the police department to data collection and analysis. I conclude 
this chapter with a self-reflexive account of my fieldwork experience.    
Chapter Four: The Organizational Adoption of Intelligence-led Policing provides an 
analysis of how ILP has been presented and rationalized by the organization, situating this 
innovation within its social, historical and political contexts. This chapter illustrates how the 
claimsmaking rhetoric of ILP is used to infer accountability and acquire legitimacy.  
Chapter Five: Intelligence-led Policing and Patrol Work provides a micro-level analysis 
of how patrol officers have made sense of ILP and the integration of crime analytics in the 
operations division. In this chapter, I illustrate how (1) the situational nature of patrol work, (2) a 
lack of organizational buy-in, and (3) cultural divergence have shaped the way that patrol 
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officers perceive crime analytics and new technologies. These insights suggest that patrol 
officers understand ILP and crime analysis not as a tool that was meant for their benefit, but one 
which predominantly serves an accountability function for the organization. The current state of 
ILP implementation has left patrol to embrace aspects of ILP which align with present 
occupational schemas while discarding those which do not.  
Chapter Six: Intelligence-led Policing and ‘Proactive’ Patrol Work explores patrol 
officers’ reported and observed practices under an ILP strategy. In this chapter, I provide an 
account of ‘intelligence’ practices and ‘proactive’ patrolling carried out by CPD patrol officers. 
This account illustrates how the present enactment of ILP may promote an emphasis on usual 
suspects and low-level offenses. I conclude with a discussion of the potential implications of 
such practices occurring under the pretense of ILP.  
Chapter Seven: Conclusion provides a summary of the key findings and discusses the 
practical and theoretical contributions arising from the study. I conclude with a discussion of the 
limitations encountered in this research, and provide a number of future research directions to 
build upon the foundations of this study.  
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Chapter Two:  Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
In what follows, I provide a description of the literature on ILP. I begin with an 
exploration of its theoretical form and proposed application as a guide for tactical and strategic 
decision-making within police organizations. ILP adoption has attracted notable scholarly 
attention which is both theoretical and practical in nature (Ratcliffe, 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2008; 
Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001; Cope, 2004; Sheptycki, 2004; Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005; 
Carter & Carter, 2009; Sanders, Weston & Schott, 2015; Sheptycki, 2013). Next, I provide an 
outline of institutional theory which I use in my analysis to provide a deeper understanding of 
ILP implementation within the institutional environment of policing. Finally, a history of works 
that have examined policing from an institutional theoretical perspective is provided. 
 
Intelligence-led Policing: The Adoption of an Organizational Philosophy 
Intelligence-led policing as a management philosophy and organizational strategy of 
contemporary policing has been widely adopted across many countries (Ratcliffe, 2008). 
Although technical definitions vary, ILP can be defined “as a collaborative enforcement 
approach combining problem-solving, information sharing and police accountability, with 
enhanced intelligence operations” (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2007; as quoted in Carter & 
Carter, 2009). With a focus on gathering, compiling, and anayzing data to inform decision-
making, ILP “aims to achieve crime reduction and prevention and to disrupt offender activity; 
[it] combines crime analysis and criminal intelligence, [...] uses crime intelligence to objectively 
direct police resource decisions, [and] focuses enforcement activities on prolific and serious 
offenders” (Ratcliffe, 2008: 87). A key tenet of ILP is the rationale that integrating data analysis 
practices to inform decision-making results in evidence-based decisions which are likely to be 
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more effective, longer-term solutions (Ratcliffe 2008). This approach to decision making is 
regarded as appropriate and legitimate among present societal schemas about how organizations 
should operate (Scott, 2003).  
 Legitimacy is in part contrived through a cultural emphasis on knowledge as capital for the 
making of “rational” and informed decisions, wherein police “are employing information 
technology to turn police officers into problem solvers and to leverage their intellectual capital to 
pre-empt crime” (Brown & Brudney, 2003:30). This shift towards creating “knowledge 
worker[s]” can be seen throughout public and private sectors (Brown & Brudney, 2003). 
Technological advancement has paired crime data with sophisticated software, allowing for 
graphic visual displays and algorithmic analyses of incident and socio-demographic data. The 
discipline of crime science places an emphasis on assessing patterns and trends in order to target 
crime through spatial and situational elements (Clarke 2004, 2009; Laycock, 2005).  
A central component of ILP practice is the use of crime analytics to examine trends, 
identify concerns, and inform decision making (Cope, 2004). Crime analysis can be defined as 
the “collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to 
crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in 
developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing 
threats” (Carter & Carter, 2009: 317). Crime analysis draws together several data sources which 
may include police records of official criminal incident data, calls for service and occurrences of 
disorder that may or may not have resulted in an official charge, as well socioeconomic data 
including race and unemployment distribution (Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2004). In the vision of 
ILP, synthesizing, linking and spatially distributing the vast amounts of data compiled and stored 
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by police organizations will allow for the most informed and targeted allocation of police 
resources (Cope, 2004).  
A common practice of crime analytics is the spatial plotting of recorded incident data in 
order to identify “hot spots”, or areas of concentrated criminal activity (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 
2001). The identification of these areas lends itself to a patrolling strategy commonly used within 
an ILP model - a ‘hotspot policing’ approach - which distributes resources and surveillance in 
conjunction with the areas demonstrating a ‘need’. It is touted that hot spot policing allows for 
“focused police interventions, such as directed patrols [and] proactive arrests [...] [which] can 
produce significant crime prevention gains at high crime ‘hot spots’” (Braga, 2007: 4). This 
method of resourcing fits well with an ILP ideology, given that “the accurate targeting of police 
resources to the right problems at the right time is a fundamental aim of a proactive intelligence-
led police service” (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001: 339). Calculated and purposeful allocation is 
believed to make best use of the limited resources at hand. 
Fiscal responsibility and careful use of resources lends itself to a second central theme of 
the ILP movement, which is illustrating accountability for financial investment, action and 
behaviour. The collection and tracking of crime trends for analytic purposes serves the additional 
function of a comparative gauge, allowing trends and spikes to be identified and compared over 
time. This comparative measurement of crime trends and emphasis on statistics, commonly 
implemented under the name of a CompStat approach (Eterno & Silverman, 2012), meshes well 
with the data-driven values of ILP. CompStat (Comparative Statistics) is a philosophy which 
partners the close monitoring of crime statistics with monthly ‘accountability meetings’, during 
which district inspectors must answer for increases or spikes and provide a plan to address any 
issues ([Crypton Police Department], 2005). It is important to note that CompStat is arguably a 
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reform that is distinguished from ILP, and while this management philosophy may be used in 
conjunction with ILP, it can be adopted as a management philosophy of its own. While not all 
services adopt a CompStat system in the form of the original model implemented by the NYPD 
or Boston Police Department (Eterno & Silverman, 2012), the emphasis on tracking and 
comparing trends lends itself to adoption, in some form, in intelligence-led departments. 
Through the close monitoring and probing of crime spikes and declines, data analysis offers the 
ability to “hold officers accountable for implementing problem-solving strategies to control hot 
spot locations” (Braga, 2007: 6). Further, the police service as a whole is able to show “tangible 
objectives”, illustrating needs and successive outputs to the public (Weisburd et al., 2008: 1).   
The key components and principles of the ILP movement illustrate the wider penetration 
of private sector management techniques into law enforcement agencies. As Eterno & Silverman 
(2012) explain, “the language of managerialism and economic rationalism has accompanied this 
application [...] lock ups and convictions [are] supplanted by business plans and performance 
management, targets, and key performance indicators (Forward, xvii). The dominant cultural 
shift toward output-based policing places additional demand on management to assign priorities 
and coordinate action among patrol officers (Vito & Vito, 2013).   
  In a time when the rising costs of policing are unsustainable alongside public sector 
budget cuts, “law enforcement agencies face formidable organizational problems, the most 
important being how to justify their claim to more and more of the tax payer’s dollars” 
(Chambliss, 1994: 191). Garland (1996) discusses how one adaptive strategy used by 
contemporary law enforcement challenges has been to ‘responsibilize’, or assign responsibility 
for crime control to those outside of the standard purview of law enforcement. This strategy 
centres on empowering non-state actors to take an active role in controlling and preventing 
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crime. As I will argue, this same process of ‘responsibilization’ can also be seen within policing 
organizations. 
 The aim of this thesis is to build upon empirical understandings of how ILP as an 
organizational philosophy has been implemented on the ground. Specifically, my analysis 
focuses on how ILP has been integrated into patrol work. Given that ILP represents an 
institutional shift for police organizations, I adopt an institutional theoretical perspective for my 
analysis of this reform.      
 
Institutional Theory  
Contemporary organizations face constant pressure to remain current, legitimate, and 
accountable in the eyes of the public(s) they serve. To this end, organizations engage in various 
modes of reform, including restructuring formal policy and ideology, implementing new rules 
and processes, and embracing technological innovation. Institutional theory emerged as an 
alternative to technical/rational models of organizational analysis, which predominantly assumes 
that rules, processes and innovations are adopted and applied rationally and literally as a means 
of improving performance and outcomes. Assessment through a technical/rational perspective 
emphasizes improving functionality and best practices, and does not ultimately question the 
motivation, purpose, or aim of rules or policies (Hoque, Arends & Alexander,2004). 
Contemporary institutional theory challenges this “assumption that organizations function 
according to their formal blueprints” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 342) and instead proposes that 
“institutional rules function as myths which organizations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, 
resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 340). Institutional 
theory stresses the need to consider how the prevailing institutional, societal, and environmental 
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culture which surround an organization shape the rules and practices which it must adopt in order 
to remain viable.  
Organizations adopt formal rules and structures which align with dominant societal and 
institutional beliefs about organizational work and how it should function. Yet in practice, these 
institutionalized rules often contradict with the conditions which produce efficiency under 
present organizational conditions. Thus, actual daily work activities often vary, or are “loosely 
coupled” to the formal rhetoric surrounding organizational practices (Weick, 1976; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). In order to navigate the tension between an image which ensures survival, and 
processes which would create contradictions or tensions if applied literally, institutionalized 
environments may intentionally and strategically  maintain such “gaps between their formal 
structures and their ongoing work activities” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977:341) and in practice, “rules 
are often violated, decisions often un-implemented,...have uncertain consequences,...problematic 
efficiency, and evaluation and inspection systems are...rendered so vague as to provide little 
coordination” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 343). Hallett (2010) found that an attempt to more strictly 
coordinate activities in order to facilitate a closer degree of  “coupling” between formal programs 
and daily work activities lead to a state of “turmoil” amongst organizational actors. This turmoil 
created such disruption within the organization that even still, the efficiencies promised by what 
was once a rationalized institutional myth could still not be realized in practice (Hallet, 2010).  
Although not always conceived of under the rhetoric of rationalized institutional myths, a 
number of works have identified how ‘knowledge’, ‘intelligence’, and information technologies 
often serve symbolic rather than literal functions within organizations. Brown & Brudney (2003) 
examined the use of information technology for decision-making purposes in police 
organizations who were heavily investing in this area as part of the ‘learning organization’ 
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paradigm. Although the role of IT in guiding the decision process is championed in the rhetoric 
of would-be “knowledge organizations”, its practical capabilities and uses within the 
organization proved to be largely symbolic and ground-level functioning appeared contradictory 
to the aim of investing in these technologies. Feldman & March (1981) identify that the mass 
collection of information by organizations surpasses what can realistically be used or considered 
in decision making processes. This holds even greater relevancy as technological advancement 
has magnified the ability to both gather and store data. Despite impracticality, “the gathering of 
information provides a ritualistic assurance that appropriate attitudes about decision making 
exist” and are held by the organization (Feldman & March, 1981: 177). The significance of 
external perceptions about processes surpasses their literal translation.   
Institutional theorizing has predominantly occurred at the macro-level, examining the 
wider cultural and societal forces which shape the form and adoption of institutional myths. 
Hallett (2010) identifies the analytic value of moving beyond the study of organizations’ 
external, symbolic compliance with institutional myths, encouraging an inhabited approach in 
order to explore how these myths take tangible form on the ground.  Employing a micro-level 
inhabited analysis of ILP allows us to “both analyze how external myths, such as accountability, 
pressure organizations and to examine the internal manifestation of myths in organizations and 
their substantive (in addition to ceremonial) implications” (Hallett, 2010:53, emphasis added). 
Powell & Colyvas (2008) stress the need to advance institutional theorizing with micro-level 
inquiry, identifying that “institutions are sustained, altered, and extinguished as they are enacted 
by individuals in concrete social situations. We need a richer understanding of how individuals 
locate themselves in social relations and interpret their context” (Powell & Colyvas, 2008: 276-
13 
 
277). Thus, it is the way that organizational actors understand and interpret institutional rules 
and reforms which most significantly shape their manifestation.   
 
Sensemaking  
 Undertaking organizational analysis through an institutional theoretical lens applies a 
social constructionist approach to understanding institutional behaviour (Quaid, 1993). Social 
constructionism posits that is it the social processes which individuals engage in that shapes the 
way they define reality and ascribe meaning to phenomena around them (Loseke & Best, 2003). 
This perspective takes interest in how organizational actors make sense of rationalized 
institutional myths and various states of coupling between formal rules and actual practice within 
their role. It is this production of meaning through social interactions which facilitates this 
“sensemaking” process, wherein organizational actors give meaning to events and actions (Choo, 
1996).  In fact, “organizational actors have to first make sense of what is happening in their 
organizational environments in order to develop a shared interpretation that can serve as a 
context for organizational action”(Choo, 1996: 329, 332; Manning, 1997). During times of 
change and uncertainty, such as an institutional paradigm shift, organizational actors must “try to 
make sense of uncertainties and disruptions and ‘enact’ their interpretations into the world to 
give it a sense of order” (Chan, 2007: 323). Sensemaking occurs in a social context; meanings 
are shaped through interaction with others. Such understandings also shape the way that 
technology is utilized in practice, independent of its stated or ‘intended’ uses (Oudshoorn & 
Pinch, 2005). Given the significant technological component of ILP, it is vital to consider how 
officers’ understandings shape the way they engage with information technologies as part of ILP.  
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Institutional Analysis of Policing 
Police institutional research has largely maintained a macro-level focus, placing emphasis 
on the symbolic function of institutional myths at work in police organizations (Crank & 
Langworthy, 1992; Crank, 1994; Crank, 2003; Burruss & Giblin, 2014). Crank & Langworthy 
(1992) assert that the concept of innovation itself serves as an institutional myth, and note the 
tendency of contemporary law enforcement to - at least outwardly - embrace a multitude of 
innovations. It is suggested that practices such as rapid response systems, preventative patrolling 
strategies and police internal review boards have been widely implemented based on perceived 
efficiency or accountability improvements, despite lacking empirical support for these functions 
(Crank & Langworthy, 1992). Kochel (2011) reaffirms this assertion, noting that “policing 
reforms appear to spread...without any theoretical grounding or scientific evidence about 
effectiveness, if the approach appears anecdotally to produce positive results or is simply well 
liked” (p. 352).  
A small number of scholars have conducted analyses of police organizations which offer 
empirically-driven, ground-level accounts of the tangible functions of institutionalized myths. 
Institutional theory has been applied to empirical analyses of the community policing movement 
(Manning, 1997; Maguire & Katz, 2002; Chapell, 2009). Instances of loose coupling were found 
between community policing in philosophy and in practice (Maguire & Katz, 2002; Chapell, 
2009). Chappell (2009) found that while “the administration has adopted at least the rhetoric of 
community policing... their beliefs (or rhetoric) have not trickled down to the patrol officers” (p. 
23). Experiences of officers on the street indicated a struggle to negotiate and make sense of their 
role in this new policing context (Manning, 1997; Maguire & Katz, 2002). Empirical 
assessments of CompStat management techniques have revealed a selective adoption of elements 
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which conferred legitimacy, over an actual shift to the philosophy in its entirety (Willis, 
Mastrofski & Weisburd, 2007; Weisburd et al., 2008; Dabney, 2010). Similarly, Hoque et al. 
(2004) found that the accountability structure (accounting control systems for resource 
management) in an Australian police service predominantly served a legitimating function to 
appease external constituents rather than a technical-rational function of actually increasing 
accountability in practice.  
Carter, Philips and Gayadeen (2014) used a ‘loose coupling’ theoretical perspective to 
assess the how closely ILP recommendations made by the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan resembled practices in local and state law enforcement agencies. As they 
appropriately identify, to date there has been a lack of both empirical assessment and theoretical 
application employed in the examination of intelligence-led policing. While their findings 
suggest that adoption closely resembles, or is ‘tightly coupled’ to ILP philosophy (Carter et al., 
2014), I argue that the self-report survey research design was ill-equipped to study this 
phenomenon. Study participants were key individuals responsible for representing intelligence 
functions within their services who had received specific training in ILP, presumably having a 
vested interest in illustrating the success of a program they were tasked to implement. Officers 
performing police work on the street were not included in this sample. Carter et al. (2014)’s 
sample constitutes only higher level organizational claims, not participants who are directly 
carrying out ILP implementation on the ground. Assessing the degree to which practices are 
coupled with official claims requires an inhabited approach which can account for how a reform 
is functioning in practice. This gap is illuminated in the present study, offering an alternative to 
the conclusions made by Carter et al. (2014).  
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
Epistemological and Ontological Framework 
 In this chapter, I provide a personal account of my experience throughout the research 
process, from conceptualization to the collection and analysis of data. I describe my 
methodological decisions, the rationales behind structuring the study in this manner, and the 
challenges I encountered in the field. 
 As described in the literature review in Chapter one, this study aims to uncover how 
frontline patrol officers make sense of and enact intelligence-led policing. My goal was to 
uncover how patrol work had been affected amidst the introduction of intelligence-led practices. 
I wanted to learn about how patrol officers perceived this shift in organizational philosophy, and 
what this meant for the way that they carried out their day to day work. Chan (2007) explains 
that the understandings of those on the frontline can subvert and shape the practical outcomes of 
police reform. For this reason, I felt that a focus on officers’ understandings could shed valuable 
insight on the organizational realization of ILP. Given that my emphasis was on how patrol 
officers understood ILP and its relevance to patrol work, a social constructionist framework 
(Loseke & Best, 2003) provided an appropriate lens.  
 Social constructionism is interested in individuals’ perceptions or understandings of 
reality, positing that ‘truths’ are dependent on the individual, situation, and context that they 
occur within (Holstein & Gubrium, 2008). It regards notions of ‘reality’ as contextual, 
constructed through social processes which serve to “develop, transmit and maintain” human 
‘knowledge’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 15). It pays “empirical attention to the ordinary, taken-
for-granted reality-constructing process of every life”, placing its focus on meaning making 
processes which shape one’s perception of the world (Holstein & Gubrium, 2008: 3). At a micro-
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level, constructionism takes interest in how meaning is “created, negotiated, sustained and 
modified” through interaction in social contexts (Schwandt, 1994: 120).  
 Neo-institutional theory employs a social constructionist approach to the study of 
organizations (Quaid, 1993), providing a suitable fit for this study of organizational reform. 
Social constructionism is well suited to the study of organizations (Samra-Frederick, 2008). An 
organization as an entity presents a continually shifting set of claims which construct its 
meaning, purpose and processes (Samra-Frederick, 2008; see also Parker, 1997). 
Constructionism is attentive to the claimsmaking of organizations, interrogating the social, 
political and cultural context of claims about purpose and practice (Loseke & Best, 2003). 
Attending to the language used by organizational actors contributes to an understanding of “the 
construction of workplace identities....occupations or tasks”, and how workers make sense of 
their role in relation to others (Samra-Frederick, 2008: 132). Of interest to constructionism are 
the processes that create this ‘knowledge,’ as this knowledge guides conduct and individuals act 
in accordance to meanings they have assigned to various phenomena (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966). Further, in an institutional context, these meanings have the potential to become 
habitualized, “embedded as routines” and taken for granted as part of a specific role or action 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 71).  
Exploring how officers have ‘made sense’ of ILP and crime analysis as part of their role 
contributes to an understanding of not only their current perceptions and dispositions, but how 
these perceptions have been shaped. Under ILP, officers find themselves encountering reports, 
expectations, and technologies that were not previously part of their role and engage in sense-
making to integrate these new experiences into their daily reality. Thus, in order to understand 
how ILP has taken shape in patrol work, I examined how officers have ascribed meaning to ILP 
18 
 
and crime analysis within their daily routines. As such, an ethnographic case study provided an 
appropriate methodology for uncovering the perceptions, experiences and practices of patrol 
officers in an intelligence-led department. When drawn together, these insights illuminate both 
meanings and consequences of ILP within an operational patrol context.  
 In what follows, I provide a brief description of the case study location. I then describe 
the initial conceptualization of research questions, and the process of gaining access and 
preparing to enter the field. Next, I outline the data collection process. I then provide a reflexive 
account of how I analyzed the data, how insights emerged from this process, and how the 
research aims shifted in an emergent form within the circular data collection and analysis process 
of inductive qualitative inquiry (Warren & Karner, 2010). I conclude with a personal reflection 
on the interpersonal dynamics and challenges of conducting fieldwork with police, including the 
implications of these challenges on the construction of research findings.         
 
Case Study Description: The Crypton Police Department 
The CPD is a large urban police force which employs approximately 1300 sworn 
members and 400 civilian personnel. As a municipal force, CPD is responsible for maintaining 
public safety and law enforcement in a Canadian city with a population of 600,000. The 
department consists of three major divisions, including operations, investigations, and support 
services divisions (Crypton Police Department, 2014). The core values of CPD are identified by 
the organization as integrity, professionalism, accountability, and respect (Crypton Police 
Department, 2014).  
The City of Crypton is comprised of a unique interplay of features which impact the 
policing environment. As a major urban center, the number of individuals within the city is often 
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much higher than the official population; both business and tourism draw many people into the 
city (Crypton Police Department, 2012). When compared to areas with more extreme variations 
in temperature, the moderate climate of the city lends itself to a more endurable environment for 
homeless individuals. As such, the City of Crypton is home to one of the largest concentrations 
of homeless individuals in Canada, and subsequently a significant number of individuals 
suffering with both addiction and mental health issues (Wilson-Bates, 2008). These 
demographics contribute to an array of criminogenic factors which often lead to the involvement 
of law enforcement. 
In recent years, the service has announced a commitment to being intelligence-led, and 
has invested significantly in the development and implementation of ILP infrastructure. Further, 
as will be described below, the service embraced the opportunity to discuss their organizational 
adoption of ILP.  As such, The Crypton Police Department provided a suitable location to 
conduct a case study of ILP adoption. 
 
Gaining Access and Preparing to Enter the Field 
Crypton Police Department was selected as the case study site for this research study for 
two central reasons. First was the organization’s purported prominence regarding ILP practices 
in the nation (Prox, 2013). CPD appeared to have taken vast strides toward both technology and 
personnel to support an ILP approach. The philosophy was prominently touted by the 
organization and, as such, the state of ILP reform in CPD appeared to be further along than other 
services in Canada. The second major reason for studying CPD was the ability to attain 
organizational access. Research access to Crypton Police Department was acquired through my 
thesis supervisor, who secured access through a superintendent to study ILP implementation 
20 
 
across the department. The superintendent supported the study and informed individuals working 
within the department that various units would be participating. Attaining the support of this 
significant gatekeeper facilitated a large degree of access, and encouraged the participation of 
organizational members (Warren & Karner, 2010).  Research has found that securing support 
from those in charge of an organization is especially necessary in settings such as police services, 
which operate under the centralized control of a paramilitary structure (Fox & Lundman, 1974). 
Marks (2003) identified an increased willingness to accept external researchers during times 
when an organization is seeking to illustrate accountability measures. When considering that this 
condition may be conducive to the executive-level support of research access, the political 
context surrounding the CPD at the time (see Chapter Three) may have contributed to this 
receptive attitude toward the study. 
Before entering the field, I developed a number of research questions to guide my 
inquiry: 
I) How do patrol officers define and understand crime analysis? 
II) What education and training do patrol officers possess in regards to using crime analysis in 
their role? 
III) How is crime analysis ‘valued’ by patrol officers? 
IV) How do patrol officers perceive the ‘organizational fit’ of crime analytics? 
V) How, if at all, are analytical products being used by patrol officers? 
 
In keeping with the emergent nature of qualitative inquiry (Charmaz, 2006), these questions were 
changed and refined as I collected data and followed interesting leads. The details of this analysis 
process and subsequent final research questions will be outlined in the data analysis section of 
this chapter.  
I received ethical clearance for the study from the Wilfrid Laurier University Research 
Ethics Board (REB# 3927) prior to entering the field. Both anonymity and confidentiality 
measures were employed to protect the identities of participants of this study. While anonymity 
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cannot be fully maintained due to the interview/observatory nature of the methodology, several 
steps were taken to protect the confidentiality of the individuals who engaged in interviews or 
observation. As with much qualitative fieldwork, “case study research shares an intense interest 
in personal views and circumstances” (Stake, 1994: 244). Due to the nature of the research and 
its focus on organizational practices and behaviours, participants were asked to share their 
personal views and experiences of their place of employment, risking formal and informal 
repercussions should unfavourable viewpoints be revealed (Warren & Karner, 2010). Employees 
risk potential backlash from superiors and colleagues if they were to speak negatively about their 
position or organization. This creates an ethical risk of potential professional and peer 
consequences (Warren & Karner, 2010).   
In order to mitigate the risk of identification, interviewees were provided with a number 
at the outset of the interview, and were thus identified only by this number on the digital 
recording and subsequent transcript. Digital files and transcripts were stored on a password-
protected computer, and voice recordings were destroyed immediately following transcription. 
Consent forms containing identifying information were stored in a locked filing cabinet. 
Anonymity is protected in this thesis as all participant references and quotes refer to their 
position and participant number, with no identifiable information.  
Given that this research provides a case study of one specific organization, the name of 
the organization was replaced with a pseudonym in all references within this thesis, as well as in 
the bibliographic entries for organizational documents. Descriptors which provided identifiable 
information were rendered vague in order to disguise the organization and city of focus. It must 
be noted that the case-study nature of this study, and organizational selection of some 
participants maintains some level of risk that others within the organization, namely those who 
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selected participants, may be able to infer their identify (Warren & Karner, 2010). This risk has 
been mitigated through the anonymization of quotes, and participants were made explicitly 
aware of this risk prior to participating. Participants were provided with both a letter of 
information and verbal prologue which explicitly outlined the motivations, areas of interest, 
privacy measures, participant rights and potential risks of engagement. Officers were required to 
sign an informed consent document prior to engaging in an interview, or allowing me to observe 
them on a ride-along. 
The first time I entered the field was on a week-long research trip that had been organized 
in conjunction with the organization. Myself, my supervisor, and my supervisor’s research 
associate spent several days with CPD. Seven interviews with patrol officers and middle-
management personnel in operations were scheduled for me ahead of time by the department, 
and snowball sampling was used to recruit additional participants through contacts made within 
the department. I had been provided with the name of an administrative staff member of the 
operations division who met me in the lobby of the station, and took me upstairs to a boardroom 
that had been booked for my interviews. Officers had been directed to meet me at this location at 
scheduled times throughout the day. I conducted ten interviews in-person during this trip, and 
five telephone interviews once returning home. Permission to conduct observation ride-alongs 
was provided by CPD, following a review of the research objectives, and a background check of 
my criminal record history and any recorded incidents with police. I participated in one ride-
along during this initial round of data collection.  
Thanks to a contact that was made during the interview process, I was able to enter the 
field once again one year later to conduct additional participant-observation data. As will be 
described in my section on data analysis, this gap in fieldwork time allowed me to analyze my 
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data and return to the field to ask follow-up questions and clarify emerging insights. I engaged in 
a circular process of data collection and analysis, returning to the field to collect additional data 
to support or refute developing theories. This method of inquiry is central to the emergent nature 
of qualitative inquiry (Charmaz, 2006).         
 
Data Collection 
The level of organizational access allowed the opportunity to conduct an ethnographic 
case study of patrol work in an intelligence-led service. This ethnography draws on 
organizational document analysis, in-depth interviewing and observation. These three data 
sources were chosen with the intent to allow for an analysis of the official claimsmaking 
surrounding ILP innovation, as well as for an inhabited micro-level analysis of institutional 
change (Hallet, 2010). Drawing upon these data sources addresses both macro and micro 
components of the ILP paradigm. This triangulation of data sources “serves also to clarify 
meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen” (Stake, 1994: 241). As 
such, the comparison of organizational documents to the interview and field data allows for an 
analysis of the varying ways that this phenomenon is presented, understood and enacted. 
Triangulation, a “process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning”, is frequently 
employed in the case of qualitative case studies, to “reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation... 
[and] verify the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” (Stake, 1994: 241). Theoretical 
sampling was employed to select the documents, interview participants, and observation settings 
that I used as data sources to inform this research. A theoretical sampling approach means that I 
selected data that was directly relevant to informing the area of interest of this study (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). For example, given my interest in exploring how intelligence-led policing has 
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impacted patrol work, I conducted interviews with patrol officers and managers responsible for 
overseeing patrol units. In contrast, interviewing individuals from investigative units, for 
example, would have provided little insight into answering my research questions.  
 
Organizational Documents 
This study drew upon several publicly available organizational documents concerning the 
adoption of ILP, such as technological development initiatives, implementation, and success 
stories. Strategic planning documents and recent government inquiries and recommendations 
relating to the service’s conduct were also incorporated. Document analysis is “particularly 
applicable” to qualitative case studies as part of creating a “rich description” of the organization 
of interest (Bowen, 2009: 29). For example, the documents offered rich background information, 
context, and supplementary data about CPD that provided an opportunity to interrogate the 
claims being made within CPD and the meaning contained within these claims (Loseke & Best, 
2003; Bowen, 2009). Analyzing the organizational documents was particularly relevant given the 
constructionist, institutional theoretical orientation of the study because institutional theory is 
attentive to the degree of alignment, or ‘coupling’ between official organizational rhetoric and 
the day-to-day realities within organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).    
Words, such as those contained within the organizational documents, are recorded “to do 
things as well as to say things – they have practical and social impact as well as [a] 
communication function.... meaning does not reside in a text but in the writing and reading of it” 
(Hodder, 1994: 394, emphasis added). These documents constitute part of the official public 
rhetoric surrounding the service’s engagement in ILP. From an institutional theoretical 
perspective, the analytical value of organizational documents extends beyond the claims made 
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about the organization’s adoption of ILP, and directs consideration towards the external value of 
the way that ILP innovation is presented in official organizational releases. While the documents 
were used to understand the organizational presentation of ILP, I conducted in-depth interviews 
with patrol officers to understand how they make sense of ILP reform.  
 
In-depth Interviews 
In-depth interviews were conducted with fifteen members of the police department. 
Although the focus of this study was on patrol officers’ perceptions of and experiences with ILP 
adoption, the service also arranged a number of interviews with middle-management personnel 
from the operations division who are responsible for supervising patrol officers. These 
interviews remained focused on ILP practices as they relate to patrol work, shedding light on 
how ILP is perceived to fit within patrol operations from the perspectives of those managing 
patrol units. The complete sample (n=15) is made up of ten patrol officers and five middle-
management personnel. Patrol officers’ years of service range from less than five years (n=5), six 
to ten years (n=4), to over ten years (n=1). Middle-management participants (n=5) include four 
sergeants and one district superintendent, with all but one having worked in policing for over 
twenty years.  
Qualitative interviewing provided me with an opportunity to learn about the observations 
and experiences of others, providing rich description of their daily lived realities, including the 
routines, processes, encounters, and challenges they face (Weiss, 1994). I used a semi-structured 
interview guide to conduct the interviews
2, asking questions pertaining to both officers’ 
understandings of, and experiences with, ILP and crime analysis as part of their service. The aim 
of the semi-structured interviews is to elicit detailed narratives that can inform us about 
                                                          
2
 See Appendix A for complete interview guide. 
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occupations or existences that we ourselves have never experienced or felt, such as the 
expectations felt by patrol officers or the considerations and dynamics of patrolling the street. 
Thus, the interviews provided insight into people’s “interior experiences...what people perceived 
and how they interpreted their perceptions...how events affected their thoughts and 
feelings....[and] the meanings to them of their relationships...their work, and their selves” (Weiss, 
1994: 1, emphasis added).  
Interview questions were initially designed around existing literature on ILP at a patrol 
level, aiming to address gaps in knowledge about patrol officers’ perceptions and engagement 
with ILP and crime analysis. Additional questions were added following the receipt of 
organizational documents which provided case-specific information, including the solely civilian 
make-up of the analyst team, and the recent installation of a crime-mapping dashboard into the 
patrol cars. Initial interviews provided information - such as the organization’s use of CompStat - 
which led to the addition of questions surrounding this process. Further, questions which 
appeared to cause confusion, or elicit minimal response by officers, were re-worded or removed 
as the interview process continued.  
The semi-structured nature allowed me to direct the conversation toward topics of interest, 
such as how officers use crime analysis, while allowing flexibility for additional questions to be 
asked when officers’ accounts contained new insights.  The interviews ranged from twenty 
minutes to one hour in the length, with the average interview lasting about forty-five minutes. 
Ten interviews occurred face-to-face, and five were conducted over the telephone. In-person 
interviews were conducted individually, in private, in the boardroom of the police station. With 
the consent of participants, interviews were digitally voice recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
While interviews provide valuable insight into the processes by which officers make sense of 
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ILP, they did not provide insight into their ‘in-situ’ practices. As Warren & Karner (2010) 
explain, interview narratives “are embedded in temporal, geographical, political, cultural and 
social fields – all of which lend shape and form to the story” (p. 27). These narratives are 
constructions of events and experiences informed by the context, obligations and culture which 
surround the participant. Thus, I used observation to supplement my understanding of patrol 
officers’ use and engagement with ILP and crime analysis.   
 
Observation 
 Observation allowed me to learn about and record descriptions of events and behaviours 
as they occurred with participants in their natural settings, offering a look at day-to-day or 
routine activities and practices (Kawulich, 2005). I completed approximately fifty-five hours of 
observation for this study, including attending the organization’s monthly CompStat meeting, 
and five police ride-along shifts. Ride-along shifts ranged from six to twelve hours in length. 
While conducting this research, I adopted an observer-as-participant level of participation in the 
setting (Gold, 1958). My presence and intentions as a researcher were known to the officers with 
whom I attended shift briefings and participated in ride-alongs. Although I joined officers on the 
ins and outs of their shifts and attended calls, my presence was not “natural or normal” (Gold, 
1958) as part of the setting. In addition to providing the opportunity to directly observe officer 
engagement with ILP and crime analysis, conducting field research with officers helped to 
contextualize the daily realities of patrol work. This was of significant value for myself as a 
researcher - having never personally engaged in patrol work - as this provided depth and context 
to an analysis of officers’ described experiences within the interview data. Following the initial 
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round of data collection, I began to analyze the data gleaned from the three data sources outlined 
above. 
 
Data Analysis: Constructivist Grounded Theory and Sensitizing Concepts 
I utilized a constructivist grounded theory method (Charmaz, 2006) to approach data 
collection, analysis and theory development. Built upon the foundations of Glaser and Strauss’ 
(1967) grounded theory, constructivist grounded uses an inductive analytical approach which 
allows theory to emerge from the data itself (Charmaz, 2006). The research process was not 
rigidly defined from the outset, but was guided by notable concepts and themes which emerged. 
Consistent with a theoretical sampling approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), data collection and 
analysis occurred as a circular process. Initial themes guided areas of inquiry for further data 
collection, directing the questions that were asked and the topics that were pursued. This 
approach to data collection and analysis allowed for me to refine and clarify concepts for theory 
development (Charmaz, 2006).  
Constructivist grounded theory draws upon existing literature and theoretical frames to 
shape project design and analysis in an emergent fashion (Charmaz, 2006). Blumer (1954) first 
referred to the use of existing theoretical schemes to inform inquiry as “sensitizing concepts”. 
Sensitizing concepts “give the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching 
empirical instances. [...] [Rather than] prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely 
suggest directions along which to look” (Blumer, 1954: 7). Sensitizing concepts are not meant to 
be definitive but exploratory (Charmaz, 2006). They are used as analytical devices, and may be 
refined, changed or discarded, depending on their congruency with the data at hand (Blumer 
1954; Charmaz, 2006).  
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As I conducted preliminary analyses, I found that my data were aligning with previous 
work that asserted ILP had not been operationalized in practice in the way, or to the extent, that it 
was claimed to be (Ratcliffe, 2004; Cope, 2004; Sheptycki, 2004; Manning, 2008; Innes, 
Fielding & Cope, 2005; Taylor, Kowalyk & Boba, 2007). At the suggestion of my supervisor, I 
looked to literature on institutional analysis to see if I could locate existing theoretical insights 
which could inform what I was seeing in my findings. Through immersing myself in literature on 
organizational and institutional analysis, I identified several concepts which I came to employ as 
sensitizing concepts in my data analysis. The concepts of “rationalized institutional myths”, 
“loose-coupling” and “sense-making” (complete descriptions are located in the literature review 
in Chapter Two) provided a way of analyzing the disconnect between ILP’s philosophical claims 
and ground-level manifestation. These concepts contributed to an analysis which moved beyond 
a critique or an assertion that this indicated a failure to fully implement ILP. Instead, this 
discrepancy between organizational claims making and officers’ practical experiences was 
analyzed for how it may be strategic on the part of the organization. I looked to organizational 
motivations such as establishing accountability and legitimacy to explain why ILP appeared 
under-implemented on the ground. Thus, I refined my research questions to align with the 
findings that were emerging, having adopted an institutional analysis framework. The new 
research questions were:              
I) How closely aligned, or “coupled”, are ILP’s theoretical applications to the 
perceptions and experiences of patrol officers working within the service? 
II) How do patrol officers understand and ‘make sense’ of the organizational philosophy 
of ILP? 
III) How do patrol officers define, understand, and experience their engagement with 
‘proactive’ policing practices as part of an intelligence-led service? 
IV) What concerns or potential implications arise when considering the practical 
application of ILP practices illustrated in this study?  
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Collecting additional field research one year after my initial data collection allowed me to 
identify supplementary questions, and seek clarification about emerging ideas. For example, 
much of crime analytic and statistical dissemination to patrol officers seemed to be about 
redistributing responsibility for crime control to frontline officers (See Chapter Four). Several 
officers mentioned that districts were divided into “geographic areas of responsibility” (GARs), 
which they were assigned as their ‘own’ to manage. During the second round of data collection, I 
had the opportunity to ask officers if and how they experienced this responsibility, what were the 
consequences (if any) of controlling crime in their GAR, and to probe further about how GARS 
are implicated in their daily work. The findings which emerged from my data contained concepts 
which I could not have anticipated while drafting initial research questions. The emergent nature 
of a theoretical sampling approach (Charmaz, 2006) allowed me to pursue prominent concepts in 
greater depth and re-shape my research questions to better reflect the resultant findings.    
 
Coding 
Data was organized and analyzed with the use of Nvivo 10 Qualitative Data Analysis 
software. Interviews transcripts, typed field notes and organization documents were imported 
and organized within the program. I began initial coding by using the incident-to-incident coding 
method (Charmaz, 2006) for the first four transcripts, and reflected on the prominent and 
recurring codes that emerged in this process to create a number of focused codes. I 
operationalized each of these codes, creating a definition which outlined the parameters of what 
each code described or contained. For example, the code “disseminating crime analysis to patrol” 
captured any instances of analytic data being distributed to patrol, whether it be through email, 
posters, verbal communication, etc. A related but distinct code, “interacting with the analyst”, 
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conversely captured instances of actual interpersonal contact or communication between the 
analyst and the officers, and excluded report dissemination that was one-directional and 
electronic.  
I then coded all of the interview transcripts and field notes using the focused codes that 
had emerged from the initial coding process, adding new codes when incidents arose that did not 
fit into a category, and removing codes if they no longer made sense or held significant  
relevance to the data. Several in-vivo codes (Charmaz, 2006) that captured the participants own 
language, such as “going hunting”, “cops on dots”, “paper gangsters”, and crime mapping as a 
“history report,” emerged. Organizational documents were coded into separate focused codes 
which denoted that they were broader organizational claims rather than reported experiences. 
Although some of these codes overlapped, such as “engaging in proactive policing”, creating a 
distinction in these bucket categories allowed for comparison between how participants 
discussed these elements of ILP in relation to how they were discussed in a public nature by the 
organization. For example, “proactive policing” in the organizational rhetoric was portrayed as 
frequent and commonplace, enabled by the analytic and technological advances of ILP, and 
informed by crime analysis. For participants, “proactive policing” was a luxury rarely found 
amidst the situational pace of responding to the call board. When “proactive policing” did occur 
for participants, it referred to ‘going hunting for usual bad guys’ and pursuing crime categories 
which ‘interested’ individual officers, with little regard for information from the crime analyst.      
Following focused coding, I used axial coding (Charmaz, 2006) to connect and draw 
links between codes, creating a number of prominent themes which were comprised of several 
focused codes. For example, the theme of “analyst credibility” emerged upon analyzing several 
focused codes which all seemed to be related to how analyst credibility was constructed by 
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officers. Codes including “interacting with the analyst”, “analyst location”, “data quality” and 
“storytelling about the analyst” all tied into the larger theme of how analyst credibility was 
shaped in the minds of patrol officers. The links that were drawn between codes during axial 
coding provided a basis for exploring the nature of the relationships among concepts, and a basis 
for beginning to reflect upon and understand these relationships.    
 
Memoing and Concept Mapping 
Once I had completed axial coding, I began writing memos about the themes, drawing in 
the words of participants to define and operationalize them. I began creating rough memos 
containing initial thoughts and ideas that came up while playing back the interview recording 
during transcription. These initial memos were underdeveloped, noting possible preliminary 
trends. For example, the following was written in a memo while transcribing interview #11,  
…descriptions of what intelligence led policing means to the officers in both 
interview #10 and #11 suggests that they see intelligence-led policing and even crime 
analysis as information sharing between officers, between squads, and externally 
when necessary. It is viewed as the officers making a conscious decision to share 
among one another; it is largely not analyst-centred or analytic, but an increased 
sharing of subjective incidents/experiences. It is them choosing to share intelligence 
when appropriate (Analytic memo)  
  
As I began focused coding, I wrote memos that were more detailed and thorough, digging deeper 
into codes to explore similarities and differences within the way that participants referred to the 
concept. For example, those of different ranks - patrol versus middle-management - shared 
notably different accounts on the importance of crime analysis in the service. While middle-
management saw it as essential to their role, patrol saw crime analysis largely as an optional tool 
that was not encouraged or enforced. This led me to reflect on the differing motivations and 
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expectations placed on middle-management versus patrol, and why bolstering crime analysis 
may serve the interests of one over another. Notable differences were identified when analyzing 
the way ILP was discussed in official organizational rhetoric versus personal accounts of 
individuals working with the service. In Figure 1, I outline the multitude of claims made about 
ILP practices in organizational documents, and contrast these with their related claims as made 
by organizational actors. This exercise proved useful for creating an integrated picture of how 
the organization presented ILP, and theoretically developed the notion of which daily 
experiences were ‘decoupled’ from their official blueprint (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Analytically, this assisted me in developing an empirical argument which could illustrate both 
the strategic purpose of these ‘decoupled’ claims (Chapter Four) as compared with the micro-
level practical experiences of officers (Chapter Five).  
   
 
Figure 1: Organizational Claims Versus Participants’ Experiences 
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In addition to memoing, I created a number of concept maps to draw links between 
interrelated codes and themes. Concept maps assist me in focusing on meaning, as they reduced 
large amounts of data to a conceptually manageable form, and provided a visual illustration of 
how officers have inferred relationships between concepts which contribute to their own 
meaning-making about ILP (Daley, 2004). Figure 2, is one of my concept maps that explores the 
questions: “How do patrol officers make sense of the analysts’ role, function, and value?  How 
have patrol officers created a shared understanding of the analysts’ value?” In answering these 
questions, I concluded that the value (or lack thereof) attributed to the analyst was linked to the 
low level of credibility that officers’ ascribed to crime analysts. From here, I linked codes and 
themes which had been implicated in constructing notions of credibility, including interactions 
with the analyst, the perceived accuracy and utility of analytic reports, and notorious ‘horror 
stories’ that were told among officers about analysts’ errors. These larger credibility-producing 
(or inhibiting) concepts were broken down further. For example, interactions with the analyst 
have the ability to shape credibility, yet officers found that they had very minimal interpersonal 
contact with the analyst, and thus the ability to build rapport was diminished. 
 
 
Figure 2: Concept Map - Making sense of the analysts’ function and value 
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Using concept mapping to visually display prominent themes and codes allowed me to decipher 
relationships among concepts and determine three overarching ways that officers’ 
understandings are shaped. The concept map above illustrates that officers’ perceptions are 
shaped by spatial dynamics which inhibit integration and interpersonal relationship development. 
A lack of interaction with the analyst paired with informal discussion and storytelling among 
officers about the analysts’ abilities contributes to understandings about analyst credibility. 
Reflecting on and analyzing my research data also led me to reflect back on the research process, 
and how my role as a researcher shaped the interpretation of my data. In what follows, I describe 
some of the challenges I faced while completing my data collection in the field. I then discuss the 
implications of such challenges to the analysis and interpretation of data and, ultimately, the 
construction of knowledge.  
 
Emotionality, Dissonance, and Containment in the Research Process 
Ethnography enabled me to observe, learn, feel, and understand an unfamiliar world.  
Immersing myself into patrol policing provided me with an opportunity to observe contexts, 
cultures and perspectives shaping the officers’ understandings and experiences. While there are 
many benefits to adopting an ethnographic approach, there were also a number of challenges. For 
example, Gary Alan Fine (1993) discusses the ‘underside’ of ethnography - the interpersonal 
facets which are seldom mentioned when discussing this methodology (p.228). These lesser 
acknowledged features draw attention to how the researcher may shape the environment and 
outcomes of a research study.  
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The police organization is a closed setting
3
 (Warren & Karner, 2010) and therefore access 
is a negotiated privilege that can be withdrawn at any time. I felt acutely aware of the importance 
of how I presented myself throughout the research process. In what follows, I provide a reflexive 
account of how my positionality (Rose, 1997) as a researcher influenced this study. I will 
describe the challenges of crafting a self-presentation congruent with the attitudes of some 
participants in the field. This necessity became challenging at times when observing the realities 
of police work elicited difficult or negative emotions. I then discuss the potential research 
implications resulting from the challenges I faced while conducting fieldwork in a police setting.  
Constructivist grounded theory purports that researchers play a role in constructing the 
theories which emerge, “offer[ing] an interpretive portrayal of the studied world, not an exact 
picture of it” (Charmaz, 2006: 10; Shwandt, 1994). A researcher’s positionality – their age, race, 
gender, socioeconomic status, political stance, motivations, assumptions and personal 
experiences – exert influence on the research site and the individuals who are being studied 
(Rose, 1997; Widdowfield, 2000). These aspects have the power to shape the degree of 
acceptance, openness, honesty, and behaviour of participants. What is said, shared, indulged, or 
masked, can be vastly swayed by who the researcher is, and how they present themselves (Rose, 
1997).  When considering my position as a young, female student with little experience in the 
daily realities of police work, my status as an ‘outsider’4 (Brown, 1996; Warren & Karner, 2010) 
in the environment was evident. My presence infringed on the usual privacy of the patrol parade 
room and patrol cruiser. There has been significant recognition that the researcher’s presence 
affects the environment in question, as participants naturally respond and adjust based on the 
                                                          
3
 Closed settings are locations that are not accessible to the general public. Researchers must acquire access through 
a ‘gatekeeper’, an individual with the power to grant permission for the researcher to enter the environment. 
4
 An ‘outsider’ refers to a researcher who is not a member of the group being studied, for example, I have no 
personal policing experience, or experience working within a police organization.  
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characteristics regarded to the outsider (Fine, 1993). Horn (1997), Marks (2003), and Diphoorn 
(2012) have written on conducting police research as a female in a hyper-masculine 
environment, and how this role elicits both positive and negative outcomes. Females are often 
perceived as trustworthy but powerless.  As I noted in one fieldnote,   
An officer asked sharply, “if you find we don’t use it [crime analysis], are they 
gonna take it out?” I was caught a little off guard and said “no, it doesn’t mean that 
they’ll get taken out.” (Field notes, Ride-along)  
 
Admitting to this officer that my research findings may not initiate such a concrete change felt 
like I had failed to sell the purpose of the study to this officer, suggesting the lack of influence 
this research may have on the organization. Yet at the same time, I believe this perceived 
powerlessness allowed officers to let their guard down a bit. Many officers were readily willing 
to share their critiques of crime analysis within the organization.  
Police culture’s marked male dominance has been widely illustrated, and even female 
officers face presumptions of weakness and reduced credibility until they prove their abilities 
(Horn, 1997). Like Horn (1997), I found myself laughing along with sexist jokes that I would 
have objected to in another setting. The need to build trust and rapport exceeds that to object or 
debate. Horn (1997) discusses how police assumptions about women can be used strategically by 
female researchers to garner more information, but questions the ethics of this approach.   
Fine (1993) called attention to the roles played by ethnographers to build trust among 
participants, but also to the idea that this relationship is reciprocal. Just as the researcher impacts 
the setting, the environment affects the researcher, with part of this effect being the generation of 
feelings or emotions regarding what is taking place in the observed setting (Kleinman, 1991; 
Rose, 1997; Widdowfielfd, 2000). This effect influences how we understand, analyze and write 
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the outcomes, shaping the production of knowledge (Kleinman, 1991, Widddowfield, 2000; 
Pellatt, 2003; Diphoorn, 2012). 
Establishing credibility and earning trust is essential to police research. The power is in 
the hands of the organization to end access at any time, or prevent future access. The researcher 
must display congruence with the participants’ opinions and behaviour, proving their support and 
trustworthiness (Fine, 1993, Bakker & Heuvem, 2006). During one particular interview, I found 
that laughing along felt especially difficult as the officer referred to people persistently as 
‘creatures’. I feigned strong enthusiasm toward their ILP endeavours, and nodded favourably 
when asked by a district inspector if I was enjoying the CompStat meeting. Often, researchers 
must adopt various personas and roles in order to mediate their relationship with the participants 
(Fine, 1993). Expressing enthusiasm and awe toward the department’s progress encouraged buy-
in from middle-management personnel. This enthusiasm to learn about how they have 
implemented ILP at a more ‘advanced level’ than many services (Prox, 2013) was, in some 
ways, misleading them about my research intentions (Fine, 1993). I neglected to mention my 
growing apprehension about how well-integrated ILP truly was in the organization, or my 
interests regarding the sociopolitical implications of what the department was doing. 
Interestingly, I found my approach to be opposite when spending time with patrol officers. 
Rather than expressing enthusiasm about ILP, patrol officers appeared skeptical about its value. 
Thus, I found that adopting a stance which supported their skepticism about crime analysis 
evoked more open conversation.               
Police officers are expected by society to present a detached, impersonal and matter of 
fact attitude that constrains and suppresses expression (Bakker & Heuven, 2006; Martin, 1999). 
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While we stood waiting in a rundown single room occupancy building for an ambulance for one 
resident, I remarked to one officer, 
‘It seems like this job would be very emotionally draining.’ He said, ‘you know, my 
wife thinks I’m a horrible person, but I just don’t give a shit. You can’t, you’d go 
crazy.’ (Fieldnotes #5, Ride-along) 
 
I found myself trying to align my reactions during ride-alongs to be congruent with the 
indifferent attitude displayed by officers. This management of displayed emotions, or emotion 
work (Hochschild, 1979), can create emotional dissonance within a researcher (Bakker & 
Heuven, 2006; Diphoorn, 2012). Emotional dissonance “refers to the structural discrepancy 
between felt emotions […] and the emotional display that is required and appropriate in the 
working context (Bakker & Heuven, 2006: 426). Emotional displays are expected to “comply 
with organizational rules concerning emotional expression” (Bakker & Heuven, 2006: 426; see 
also Grandey, 2000).   
 Emotional dissonance in policing often involves suppressing passionate or negative 
emotions, in favour of indifference (Bakker & Heuven, 2006). While smiling and nodding along 
became commonplace, one ride-along incident struck an emotional chord which proved 
challenging to contain and process. I reflected on my feelings toward the incident in a journal 
entry following the ride along: 
A call came over the radio that a young male and female had been seen taking 
clothes from a clothing donation bin in the neighbourhood. As we drove to the scene, 
the officer I was riding with commented that “stealing from the charity bin isn’t 
really theft”. The officer triggered the cruiser lights as we approached a young male 
walking away from the bin. The male was respectful and cooperative as the officer 
took his ID and ran it through the system. Inside the car, the officer told me that he 
had come across this individual before, and that he was an Armenian orphan with a 
traumatic past of extensive abuse. The officer ordered the young man to empty out 
the duffel bag and backpack he was carrying, and a number of sweaters, dress shirts, 
and jeans were pulled from the bags. The young male admitted he had taken them 
from the donation bin. The male appeared transient, and from my perspective would 
likely have qualified for donations from wherever these clothes were headed. The 
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officer told the man he would need to return the clothes, and proceeded to follow him 
in the cruiser back to the large metal bin located on the edge of a park. The young 
man fumbled as he pulled clothes out of the bags and threw them back. He paused 
and told the officer that several remaining items, including the backpack, had not 
come from the bin but already belonged to him. The officer proceeded to order him 
to throw all of these belonging into the bin as well, leaving the man with nothing but 
the clothes he was wearing. The young man cooperated, and apologized to the officer 
as he walked away from the scene. The officer commented, ‘with a background like 
his, how could you not be messed up’. The man waved as he walked away, and the 
officer muttered ‘yeah, fuck you’ under his breath from inside the car.     
 
This interaction was difficult not just to watch, but to absolutely avoid letting on that it bothered 
me. I went on to write, 
I felt horrified watching this young man forced to throw everything, including his 
own prior belongings into this bin, knowing he was walking away empty-handed and 
with nowhere to go. I thought about the level of desperation that one must feel to 
climb into a donation bin for clothes, and sadness that it ignited such a response 
from law enforcement - these were donations, after all. I felt anger and disgust that 
the officer – knowing the individual’s difficult background – could make him throw 
away everything that he had.  
 
Despite the objections that I felt to this interaction, I knew that I needed to disguise my 
discomfort and maintain a supportive appearance. If I were to object to the situation, I could 
jeopardize the positive relationship which facilitated research access to the setting. The officer 
could end the ride along at any moment he chose, and the organization could provide as much or 
as little access as they feel comfortable. As such, I felt pressure to please the gatekeepers and 
‘play the game’ (Fine, 1993).  
 Interestingly, the dissonance between felt and displayed emotions is also experienced by 
officers (Bakker & Heuven, 2006). Many officers likely object to some behaviour that their 
superiors, colleagues or even they themselves engage in as part of police work, whether it is a 
mandated or a culturally produced response. As I recorded in my field notes, 
While out for coffee, one officer shared that he’d just given a ticket. He mentioned 
that the sergeant had been on his back to increase ticket numbers. I asked what the 
ticket was for, and the officer hesitated and said ‘failing to signal a lane change’, he 
41 
 
paused and said ‘I know, I was so embarrassed, I walked away with my face hidden 
in my coat’ (Fieldnotes, Ride-along) 
 
Officers too are expected to constrain such feelings of discomfort. While sharing this experience 
of dissonance surely does not mean that I could fully understand what it is like to be a police 
officer, the chance to experience this containment process allowed me to better understand the 
daily realities of these officers. The emotional discomfort of observing the donation bin incident 
was different from the emotional labour I am familiar with from my professional experience in a 
social work environment. As I wrote in a journal entry,  
Maintaining composure is also expected as a social worker, but presenting 
indifference is not. Expressing compassion is encouraged, and emotions are treated 
as something to be addressed, not hidden away. The culture among colleagues is 
more accepting of emotion – as staff, we regularly debrief our feelings with one 
another as we work with clients navigating significant hardships. Police do not seem 
to have this opportunity or freedom. The dissonance is magnified and with no outlet.   
 
My positionality as a researcher, and my own experience with emotional work of a different 
kind, allowed me to identify difference in the emotional containment performed by police 
(Bakker & Heuven, 2006). Background professional experience has the power to impact how 
research is carried out, and the role a researcher assumes (Pellatt, 2003). A journal entry about 
the influence of my own professional background reads,  
I felt upset and emotionally triggered by the incident with the orphan. While I knew 
that reacting was out of the question to protect my professional interests, the 
officer’s response struck a feeling of such discomfort that I struggled to maintain the 
appearance of support. I have worked closely with many individuals on the other 
side of the system, individuals who have faced difficult pasts and homelessness just 
as this orphan faced. I’ve had the chance to get to know many of these individuals, I 
have heard their stories, and met their families. My own organizational culture 
breeds an attitude of acceptance and empathy toward individuals in such 
circumstances. They are humanized in my mind, exacerbating the emotional strain of 
observing the officer’s behaviour toward this young man.      
 
42 
 
As became quite clear from my experience, fieldwork with police has the potential to elicit 
significant elements of emotionality for the researchers involved. Yet, it is important that we 
consider how these emotions shape the way that we collect, interpret, analyze and present 
findings (Kleinman, 1991; Widdowfield, 2000). As Becker (1967) notes, researchers necessarily 
give precedence to one voice over another, placing greater emphasis on the story of either the 
dominant or underdog in an organization. As I discovered, a researcher’s background and 
disposition may shape ‘whose side they are on’ as incidents are interpreted, remembered and 
documented.  
 
Reflections and Conclusion 
Reflecting on my research approach and experience I realize how vital it is to remain 
reflexive and cognizant of how our inner objections influence the research process, as “emotions 
play an important role in situating knowledge” (Widdowfield, 2000: 205). Emotions have the 
power to shape how we interpret a scene, and the actors within it. We may hold pre-existing 
dispositions toward police behaviour, or the individuals in question. The validity and 
generalizability of uncovered ‘truths’ must be considered in relation to the role that emotions 
may play in the interpretation of findings (Fine, 1993). Validity in qualitative research refers to 
making interpretations which align as best as possible with the meaning conveyed by the action 
(Warren & Karner, 2010). If negative emotions skew perceptions about the participant, their 
subsequent behaviour may be interpreted more negatively as well. In remaining mindful of 
validity, we must be aware of this implication as we interpret and document.    
This emotion work - specifically the containment of expression (Bakker & Heuven, 
2006) - branches into the way that findings are presented as well (Van Maanen, 1979). While 
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emotional reactions may paint a negative light over another’s intentions, containing this reaction 
becomes essential (Van Maanen, 1979; Kleinman, 1991; Fine, 1993). Findings, especially when 
researching powerful groups such as the police, may be presented as gentler or more ambiguous 
claims than what was observed (Fine, 1993). Police officers constrain emotion to adhere to 
career expectations (Bakker & Heuven, 2006) as must police researchers in order to protect 
concerns about future research access and subsequent career vitality. The institutional power of 
police organizations shapes what is written about them, as researchers must write with the 
organizational gatekeepers as a potential reader in mind. The gatekeeper must be pleased to 
secure ongoing and future access, and to facilitate connections. Given that I was conducting my 
first police research study, and intending to continue in the field for my doctorate, I knew that 
carefully navigating relationships and being tactful about the way things were written was 
essential to maintaining approval for future research. This reliance thereby shapes the knowledge 
that is produced about policing. Knowing the implications of breaking this respect places 
boundaries around what I write about (Van Maanen, 1979).  
Now that I have provided a detailed account of my data analysis and illustrated how the 
theoretical position is both connected to and compatible with the methodology employed, I move 
on to an analysis of how ILP has been presented and rationalized by the organization.  
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Chapter Four: The Organizational Adoption of Intelligence-led Policing 
In this chapter, I explore how CPD has presented and rationalized the implementation of 
ILP in the department. At the time of adoption, CPD was facing significant negative publicity for 
their involvement in a serial murder investigation. As such, I argue that embracing ILP was a 
means through which CPD could demonstrate accountability, responsibility, and restore trust. 
Drawing on an analysis of organizational documents, published articles, news media releases, 
industry trade magazines, and five interviews with management personnel from the operational 
patrol division, I examine the organizational claimsmaking surrounding ILP. Employing Strauss’ 
(1982) work on social legitimation processes, I demonstrate how organizational claimsmaking 
around ILP, including claims of worth, distancing, purporting professionalism, and boundary 
setting, provide a means of acquiring legitimacy. 
For CPD, there are several audiences from whom it is vital to acquire legitimacy. These 
include various levels of government, other law enforcement agencies, community stakeholders, 
and the public at large. The documents and articles drawn upon in this analysis are authored by 
or contain statements from CPD staff or associates. These documents illustrate organizational 
claims which promote CPD’s ILP adoption in a publicly accessible format, available from the 
organization’s official website, or through industry web pages. Further, statements from 
management personnel represent claimsmaking of a public nature to government and community 
members, as well as internal claimsmaking to CPD officers about ILP and its purpose.    
I begin with a discussion of organizational rationality and accountability as they relate to 
acquiring legitimation. I then provide a description of the social and political contexts 
surrounding the implementation of ILP. I then move to an analysis of CPD’s claimsmaking 
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activities. I conclude by discussing how the organizational claimsmaking places increased 
responsibility on patrol officers to prevent future incidents.   
      
Defining Organizational Rationality, Accountability and Legitimacy 
 As outlined in the literature review in chapter two, institutional theory examines how the 
prevailing institutional, societal, and environmental culture shapes the rules and practices of an 
organization. Organizations adopt formal rules and structures which align with dominant societal 
and institutional beliefs about organizational work and how it should function (Weick, 1976; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). ILP refers both to a management philosophy for governing 
contemporary police departments (Ratcliffe, 2008; Sheptycki, 2013), and to a set of 
organizational practices involving rampant expansion of technological infrastructure to support 
an increasing reliance on information gathering and data analysis for decision-making (Ratcliffe, 
2008; Cope, 2004). ILP advocates for improving resourcing decisions, economic efficiency, and 
accountability while simultaneously promising heightened crime control and community safety 
(Ratcliffe, 2008).  
 Given that ILP is an example of a change in institutional paradigm, neo-institutional 
theory provides a framework for exploring this shift. Neo-institutionalism (Weick, 1976; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977) argues that organizational reform activities are used as a means for acquiring 
legitimacy by aligning the organization with processes and values perceived to be legitimate. For 
instance, contemporary reforms often emphasize rationality and accountability as desirable 
organizational qualities. Rationality is defined as “the extent to which a series of actions is 
organized in such a way as to lead to predetermined goals with maximum efficiency” (Scott, 
2003: 33). It is understood as an orderly, systematic, and calculated approach which prevails 
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over decisions driven by emotions, feelings or personal insights (Swidler, 1973). In a rational 
organization, action is believed to be controlled, intentional, and purposeful (Scott, 2003). 
Rational organizations function with strong “authority, control, coordination, rules, directives 
and performance programs,” with organizational actors coordinated and constrained by directive 
processes with clear limits (Scott, 2003: 34).    
These tightly controlled processes are governed through both goal specificity and the 
formalization of roles (Scott, 2003). Goal specificity refers to the use of detailed performance 
gauges to guide behaviour toward specific goals. Goal specification controls decisions regarding 
action and consequences (Scott, 2003). Formalization involves implementing “precise and 
explicit” rules designating task and behaviour expectations of organizational actors (Scott, 2003: 
35). The formalization of a role distinguishes conduct and responsibility, attempting to render the 
behaviour of organizational actors standardized and predictable (Scott, 2003). Formalization 
infers objectivity of organizational structures, roles, and relationships, suggesting that behaviours 
are regulated by the role one holds, and are “external to the participating actors” themselves 
(Scott, 2003: 36). It is within goal specificity and formalization that notions of accountability 
emerge.  
Accountability “…implies an obligation to explain to someone else, who has authority to 
assess the account and allocate praise or blame for what was done or not done (Jones & Stewart, 
2009: 59).  Establishing expectations for both role-specific behaviour and performance suggests 
that deviating from these structures would be both detected and addressed. Organizations are 
expected to enact both internal and external accountability mechanisms by monitoring the work 
of those within the organization through supervision and oversight, while also maintaining 
accountability to the groups served by the organization (Haas & Shaffir, 1977). Organizations 
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make claims about the rationality and accountability of their policies and practices in order to 
acquire social legitimacy.   
Legitimacy is constructed through determinations such as: who has the right or obligation 
to carry out certain activities, how they are to be carried out, and when this behaviour is 
acceptable or expected (Strauss, 1982). For example, police officers possess the right to make an 
arrest when a citizen has broken the law. They are obligated by citizens to intervene in situations 
of disruption or danger. There are formal rules for arrest behaviour such as acceptable levels of 
force and clearly articulating rights upon arrest. When an officer makes an arrest which defies 
standard guidelines, the legitimacy of the arrest may be questioned. In the context of policing, 
legitimacy involves perceptions around “the right to exercise power” (Tankebe, 2013: 103). The 
police hold a considerable level of power over average citizens, and citizens must perceive that 
police power is being used appropriately in order for a department to acquire legitimacy.  
Issues of legitimacy may pertain to technological, spatial and organizational facets 
(Strauss, 1982). Where technology has become commonplace to accomplish a desired end, an 
organization that does not use such tools is regarded as less legitimate. For example, police 
reports are entered electronically into a database system. If a police organization were to revert to 
pen and paper reports stored in filing cabinets, this would damage perceptions of organizational 
legitimacy. Legitimacy promotes a sense of worthiness and value, attributes that - if lacking - 
may threaten the viability of an organization (Strauss, 1982; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Acquiring 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public is essential for police departments who depend on support 
and active cooperation from citizens (Tankebe, 2013).  
Strauss (1982) identified how legitimacy is acquired through a set of social processes. 
These processes of legitimation include discovering and claiming worth, establishing distance 
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from past practices, and conveying an image of professionalization through standard setting, 
boundary setting, and evaluation. The process of discovering and claiming worth involves 
identifying different or nascent activities or strategies, and establishing that they are worth doing. 
That is, that they are distinctive from other approaches in a positive way. It also involves clearly 
asserting that “we”, the organization, are engaging in said worthwhile activities (Strauss, 1982). 
This legitimation process is used to “mark distinctiveness, argue for resources,” and illustrate 
“legitimacy for its activities, ideas, [and] technologies” (Strauss, 1982: 175).    
The act of distancing builds upon discovering and claiming worth, involving claims that 
an organization’s activities are not only legitimate and worth pursuing, but they are even more 
legitimate than others’ (Strauss, 1982). This process of distinguishing oneself from others can be 
both internal (claiming distance from past management, past organizational actors) and external 
(claiming distance from other organizations). Quaid (1993) discusses how promoting change to 
institutional processes requires the organization to discredit past methods in order to justify the 
need for a new approach. This degradation process, discrediting the ‘old’ to bolster support for 
the ‘new’, helps to facilitate this distancing (Quaid, 1993). Distancing can be used to convey 
notions of competence over others who may have been regarded as ineffective (Haas & Shaffir, 
1977). New policies, practices, and behaviour are promoted as superior to those of the past, and 
of other organizations.  
Finally, an organization can bolster legitimacy through professionalization and 
formalization which is accomplished through the creation of formal definitions and boundaries 
around roles and responsibilities (Haas & Shaffir, 1977; Strauss, 1982; Scott, 2003; Sanders, 
2014). This means distinguishing who has a ‘legitimate’ right - and a responsibility - to act, and 
what the appropriate action is (Strauss, 1982; Scott, 2003). Expanding and heightening 
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responsibility for crime control has been a prevalent adaptive approach taken by contemporary 
law enforcement agencies (Garland, 1996). Formalizing roles within an organization facilitates 
official assignment of such responsibility. Further, professionalization and formalization 
involves setting standards to measure actions and results, and subjecting both organizational 
actors and the organization itself to evaluation criteria (Strauss, 1982).  
 
Organizational Context: Embracing ILP in a Time of Need 
  Having defined the theoretical concepts that frame this chapter, I now move to a 
description of the social and political contexts surrounding the implementation of ILP. The 
decision to restructure policies and programs, invest in new tools or information technologies, 
and even reconfigure ideological aspects of organizational functioning is often motivated by an 
interplay of external forces which institutions operate within. At the time of ILP implementation, 
CPD was the subject of significant negative backlash because of their involvement in a highly 
publicized serial murder case. The case received notable attention as allegations of mishandling 
led to a public inquiry into CPD’s conduct. The organization also faced responsibility for 
maintaining public safety and security during a major upcoming international sporting event. 
These factors, I argue, placed pressure on CPD to restore public confidence in the department’s 
competency.  
 Prior to implementing ILP, CPD had been investigated for its involvement in a notorious 
serial murder case. The handling of the case was subject to a public inquiry that pointed to a 
number of errors and oversights. Significant public criticism centred on the many victims who 
had been reported missing yet minimally pursued (Parsons
5
, 2012a). In a review of the 
                                                          
5
 A pseudonym has been used in place of the public inquiry report in order to protect organizational anonymity.  
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investigation the inquiry asserted that technical, procedural, and cultural circumstances in the 
CPD contributed to the mishandling of the case (Parsons, 2012a).  
 The inquiry claimed that technological limitations hindered the department’s ability to 
manage the case. It pointed to unimplemented Major Case Management (MCM) technologies, as 
well as a failure to follow MCM procedures once a serial offender was suspected (Parsons, 
2012a). Inadequate technologies were implicated in the department’s failure to link disparate 
information sources and identify that a trend was emerging. The report argued that the systems in 
place were not able to handle such a complex case (Parsons, 2012a). During the course of the 
investigation, the use of information technology was becoming increasingly prominent in police 
work. However, initial notes for the case had been taken by hand, and email was used 
inconsistently for communication. The report drew attention to the fact that the lead investigator 
for the case was not equipped with sufficient technology – or even a computer – during the early 
period of inquiry (Parsons, 2012a).  
From a procedural standpoint, the inquiry cited poor report taking, including issues of 
timeliness and comprehensiveness, during initial documentation when individuals were reported 
missing (Parsons, 2012a). The details, or lack thereof, contained in these reports were seen as 
contributing to delays in detecting similarities between cases. According to the report, this 
insufficient reporting coincided with inadequate risk assessment procedures which failed to link 
the incidents, or trigger early concern of foul play. Without a systematic process to determine 
risk, "patrol was only deployed based on the perception of urgency of the person taking the 
report" (Parsons, 2012b: 26, emphasis added). Incidents were either not followed up on, or 
investigations were deemed to be low priority, proceeding slowly and with minimal effort. It 
appeared that responsibility for the case, and decisions made throughout, was indistinctly 
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defined. The report asserted that responsibility became contentious within the hierarchical 
organizational structure and ownership offhandedly passed between ranks and titles. Many 
officers who were interviewed by the inquiry believed that it was beyond their realm of 
responsibility to have questioned actions or responded differently (Parsons, 2012a). Further, the 
review identified a lack of proactive behaviour by the department to cultivate awareness among 
at-risk individuals (Parsons, 2012a). 
 The significant delay establishing concern was also linked to information sharing 
procedures, specifically a lack of information sharing between police jurisdictions (Parsons, 
2012a). Incidents had arisen across several police jurisdictions in the area and a failure to share 
information between departments was argued to contribute to insufficient detection and a 
hindered investigation. The management of information, including both reporting and sharing 
practices were cited as contributing to a flawed risk assessment and delayed suspicion of a serial 
killer in the area (Parsons, 2012). 
Cultural factors within the organization were also identified as a contributing factor to the 
delay in resource allocation for the case (Oppal 2012). The report attributed a lack of information 
sharing not only to procedural failures, but also to behaviour rooted in a culture that values 
secrecy (Parsons, 2012; see also Sanders & Henderson, 2012; Sanders et al., 2015). Beyond the 
failure to detect a crime spree, it was suggested that systemic bias toward the socio-
demographics of the missing individuals contributed to a lack of concern over and attention to 
the case (Parsons, 2012). The inquiry stated that "the [police departments involved] relied on 
preconceived notions [of the individuals] rather than seeking out available information. This 
stereotyping contributed to a faulty risk assessment, which in turn delayed suspicion of foul 
play" (Parsons, 2012b: 231). Discriminatory views related to the socioeconomic background and 
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lifestyles of the missing individuals was argued to have contributed to decisions regarding 
resource allocation, or lack thereof, for investigating these disappearances (Parsons, 2012a). The 
extended length of time over which incidents remained uninvestigated led the inquiry to 
conclude that basing priority on perception meant that "the investigations [of the missing 
individuals] were not treated as urgent" (Parsons, 2012b: 24). This inadvertently allowed a much 
greater span of time over which more and more victims were targeted. The department faced 
harsh critique that community safety was left in jeopardy and many individuals lost their lives as 
a result of police inattention, discrimination, and neglect.   
In light of findings of systemic discrimination, the inquiry went on to discuss perpetual 
issues of distrust between members of marginalized groups and the police. Of particular concern 
was the fact that certain groups, such as those who were victimized in this case, feel hesitancy to 
report information or suspicious occurrences to the police (Parsons, 2012a). The inquiry 
recommended that in order to improve communication with disadvantaged groups, CPD should 
reduce the number of tickets issued for minor offenses. It identified that tickets and warrants for 
transgressions such as breach of probation further marginalize those in question. The inquiry 
advised that,      
One important avenue for reform is to reduce the likelihood that a vulnerable 
[individual] will be subject to a court warrant by minimizing ticketing for minor 
offenses and bail conditions that are difficult to live up to… This could be achieved 
first, by using police discretion during the charging phase to reduce the number of 
tickets handed out; and secondly, by making greater use of existing diversionary 
measures to deal with minor offenses (Parsons, 2012a: 131) 
Improving relations between the police and vulnerable groups was recommended in order to 
promote reporting in the future. Incessant ticketing was cited as jeopardizing trust and thus 
reducing the likelihood of attaining valuable information from vulnerable populations.  
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The inquiry concluded that the department lacked proper internal and external 
accountability mechanisms to assign responsibility and monitor performance (Parsons, 2012a). 
The errors and oversights outlined above were enabled by a failure to review and correct both 
case management and individuals’ practices (Parsons, 2012a).  
At the time of the report, the city of Crypton was set to host a major upcoming 
international sporting event, and thus CPD had an opportunity to rebuild trust and credibility in a 
highly publicized manner. Since 9/11, responsibility for maintaining security during high profile 
events has involved an increased pressure to anticipate domestic or international terrorist threats 
(Murphy, 2007). When it comes to counter-terrorism efforts, police are considered to be a 
frontline defense in detecting and investigating suspicious activity (Murphy, 2007; Boyd-Caine, 
2007). The department found itself under pressure to ensure adequate public safety measures 
were in place for the event. The impending responsibility of hosting this event, I argue, 
accelerated the resourcing and implementation of ILP in the department (Crypton Police 
Department, 2008). In what follows, I examine the organizational claimsmaking activities 
surrounding ILP adoption. I argue that the organizational claims focused on demonstrating 
rationality and accountability as a means to acquire social legitimation.  
 
Organizational Presentation and Rationalization of ILP 
A significant part of acquiring legitimacy depends on how new policies, programs or 
tools are perceived by those external to the organization. Given that most of what occurs within 
an organization remains out of public sight, it is the claims made about such organizational 
endeavours that shape the understandings of how a given organization operates (Weick, 1976, 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In this section, I explore how CPD presented and rationalized their 
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adoption of ILP practices and the organizational interests served by this claimsmaking. First, I 
describe how CPD positioned itself as an organization at the forefront of ILP innovation, 
committed to organizational development and change. I then illustrate how organizational 
claimsmaking, such as claiming worth, distancing, and purporting professionalism, were used as 
a means to acquire social legitimation.      
 
Discovering and Claiming Worth: CPD as Leaders in Innovation  
A predominant theme found within the organizational claimsmaking was that of 
‘claiming worth’ by identifying CPD as an international leader in police innovation. In fact, the 
organizational claimsmaking provided an opportunity for CPD to identify how their 
organizational reforms address previous technological, procedural, and cultural failures.  
On a technological front, the department recruited a number of industry "high flyers" to 
design and develop a database system to support their analytical capacities (Allen, 2013). This 
interface is used to extract incident data from the department’s records management system 
(RMS) which can then be drawn upon for analysis. This advancement earned CPD “an honorable 
mention...for outstanding technical achievements” from a prominent technology innovation 
awards committee (Brewer, 2008: 1). CPD has since gone on to licence this software to other 
departments, fostering an image as a leader in police innovation and suggesting other “police 
agencies should take note of the system and strive to head in the same direction” (Chang, 2013: 
10). Entering industry competitions and making claims about promoting these technologies to 
other police departments cultivate an image of prestige for CPD. 
Further, in conjunction with this software, CPD designed a graphic mapping interface, 
allowing officers to  
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pull up any quadrant of the city [and] enter search parameters…so their first day 
back on shift, they wanted to see what happened over the last 4 days that they’ve 
been off, they can pick all the crime categories that are offered, they can pick one 
crime category in particular, they can set a time frame, they can look at the district 
and see where that crime happened, and they can drill down specifically and pull 
up each individual report of those crimes happening in the district to get more 
information (I4, District Inspector).  
 
This technology is available in both desktop and mobile format, granting officers the ability to 
use the program directly from a patrol car. CPD claimed that this ability "offers field staff some 
GIS-based crime analysis and query capabilities" while on the street (Allen, 2013: 6). Such 
claims about technological innovations in policing convey notions of social capital, and provide 
an aura of prestige for the organization, given the wider cultural confidence in the promises of 
technology (Manning, 1992; Leman-Langlois & Shearing, 2009).   
The significant publicity surrounding the forthcoming sporting event provided an 
opportunity to highlight and showcase “the value of an analytics-driven approach to policing” 
(Prox, 2013: 2). To support their analytical capacity, the department developed a database system 
to extract data from the larger RMS that CPD reports are initially inputted. This database system 
was claimed to provide an ‘early warning system’ during the event and claimed an ability to 
identify indicators or incidents that may foreshadow an intensification of concerning behaviour. 
Predictive analytic technologies were also employed to anticipate time lapse and severity if 
various explosive substances were to be discharged (Chang, 2015). A public declaration by an 
FBI member overseeing these security measures exclaimed that, with the intelligence-gathering 
and advanced warning systems in place, “if something is going to happen at [the event], the 
police already know about it” (Plecas, Dow, Diplock & Martin, 2010: 20). After the event 
concluded without incident, the department was praised by government officials and other 
agencies for the planning and execution of these security measures, with a CPD executive 
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claiming that the agency “won gold” for their successful operation (Plecas et al., 2010). An 
industry article bolsters this claim, stating that CPD “used GIS analysis to ensure the safety of 
millions of people” during the event (ESRI Canada, 2011). Technological advancements are 
framed as an integral tool for maintaining community safety and preventing harm.   
  In addition to investing in technological development, the department hired 25 new crime 
and intelligence analysts, which set them apart from other departments of similar size in the 
nation (Chang, 2013). With one analyst assigned to each of the four patrol districts in the 
operations division, these individuals are responsible for tracking crime trends within district 
boundaries. The creation of a centralized crime analysis unit provides additional support for 
monitoring crime statistics across the wider jurisdiction. Those designated as 'crime analysts' are 
assigned to report on a broad range of crime types, while 'intelligence analysts' are stationed 
within speciality investigative units to assist in a focused, crime-specific manner. For example, 
district crime analysts track occurrence rates and types in a designated quadrant of the city, 
creating reports which highlight patterns and hot-spots. Intelligence analysts, on the other hand, 
provide assistance to a specified unit (for example the Gang Crime Unit), and assist with 
collating data, such as wireless tower pings to track the location of a particular suspect (Field 
notes #1, Meeting with CPD Analytic Services Coordinator).  
Complementing a commitment to data-driven methods of police management, CPD 
implemented an “intelligence-led CompStat policing model” ([Crypton] Police Department, 
2013: 1). CompStat is designed to promote accountability by requiring each district inspector to 
explain crime trends, justify strategic responses, and illustrate accomplishments. In CPD, each of 
the four patrol divisions holds weekly meetings to compare and discuss crime statistics, and a 
department-wide CompStat meeting is held every 28 days (I1, I4). Although not open to the 
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general public due to confidentiality concerns, a superintendent explained that “key stakeholders 
from the community” are regularly invited to sit in and observe CPD CompStat meetings 
(Fieldnotes #3, CompStat meeting). The following excerpt from my field notes outlines the 
CompStat approach: 
Each district inspector takes a turn stepping up to the podium, facing a large table 
of police executives and representatives from each investigational unit. Beyond the 
table sits the audience of approximately thirty individuals from throughout the 
department. Everyone at the meeting is given a handout detailing the monthly and 
year to date statistics for each division. A superintendent seated in the middle of the 
table is chairing the meeting. The inspector is questioned about each major crime 
category individually, including robbery, assault, sexual assault, theft of auto, and 
theft from auto. Three large projection screens stand next to the podium, two 
screens contained maps indicating incident locations from the current and previous 
month. The third displayed a bar graph with month-by-month incident rates for the 
last twelve months of the crime category at hand. For each crime category, the 
inspector describes a few select cases, explaining the incidents that occurred, and 
the response, or planned response, to address the issue. The inspector is praised by 
the superintendent when numbers are favourable, and must provide a justification 
and plan of action when they are not. For example, district one faced increased rates 
for commercial break and enters. The superintendent called upon the inspector to 
‘tell us what you’ve been doing about commercial break and enters’. The inspector 
acknowledged the increase, citing a known offender who had been operating in the 
area but had since been arrested. He went on to discuss the steps he has taken, such 
as consulting with the Business Improvement Association of the area to promote 
education programs about target hardening and encouraging businesses to install 
security cameras. He asserted that commercial break and enters would remain a 
‘priority’ for next month. The superintendent nodded along as the inspector 
outlined these remedial approaches. After each crime category is covered, the 
district is assessed based on number of tickets issued, street checks written, and 
number of ‘call outs’, or sick days taken. (Field notes #3, CompStat meeting) 
 
As the first law enforcement agency in the nation to implement this performance gauge, the 
organization aligns itself with the formalized, accountability-centred values of CompStat-style 
management. In the example above, we see these elements of accountability as the inspector is 
obligated to justify his approach. He is expected to provide an explanation for current rates, and 
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an action plan to control next month’s outcomes. As a superintendent explained after the 
meeting, the CompStat model was appealing to the organization because, 
...it’s about instilling layers of accountability. It forces inspectors to stay on top of 
what’s going on in their district. It’s been very effective in the United States, and 
the department was inspired by the results in New York and LA (Superintendent, 
Field notes #3, CompStat meeting)  
  
Thus, CPD is among the first to claim the worth of CompStat in the Canadian policing 
sphere. The notion of being first and leading the way emerges as a prominent theme throughout 
the organization’s presentation of ILP. Organizational claims include citing CPD as “Canada’s 
leader in innovative policing” ([Crypton] Police Department, 2012b: 7), and “one of the 
Canadian leaders in using intelligence-led policing methods” (Chang, 2013: 10). The department 
highlights that they are “pushing institutional boundaries”, incorporating analytics in a way that 
has yet to be seen across the policing sector (Allen, 2013, emphasis added). Further, CPD has 
claimed immunity from challenges reported by other prospective intelligence-led departments. 
Common challenges to ILP implementation include a lack of training for management and 
officers, ongoing resistance to information sharing, inadequate technologies, ambiguous roles of 
analysts, and organizational cultural apprehension toward the introduction of civilian analysts. 
However, CPD claims to have overcome these barriers and claims to be embracing ILP across 
the organization (Ratcliffe, 2007; Prox, 2013). 
Organizational claims around ILP are used to claim organizational worth as a leader of 
police innovation. The department presents itself as having more sophisticated technology, 
infrastructure, personnel and procedures to carry out ILP than other police organizations in the 
nation.  Such active attempts at claiming worth are used by CPD as a means to acquire social 
legitimation. 
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Distancing: Rationalizing New Methods, Improving on the Past 
In order to generate support for their new organizational reform, CPD engages in 
processes of distancing by presenting ILP as distinct from their previous management 
philosophies, as well as those of other Canadian police departments. The public inquiry itself 
played a significant role in discrediting the adequacy of past practices and provided an 
opportunity for CPD to claim that such weaknesses have been remedied by new technology and 
procedures.   
The technologies of ILP, such as advanced records management systems, geographical 
information systems (GIS) and analytic capabilities are touted as superior to previous 
technologies.  As the following organizational document claims,  
There were too many silos of information ... There was a clear need to collect, 
collate, evaluate and analyze information in a timely manner with the greatest 
impetus being the overwhelming volumes of evidence and information (Brewer, 
2008: 2). 
 
The investment in technological development by the organization is cited as a solution:  
[The department] developed and deployed a sophisticated crime and intelligence 
analysis system ....[and] using GIS mapping plus spatial, temporal and link 
analyses, [this] solution helps the department’s crime analysts make sense of 
location and event-related data. By tracking and mapping crime events and its 
movement over time, the department can better identify and understand any 
underlying patterns and trends common to a crime series... (Prox, 2013: 2) 
 
Organizational claimsmaking of ILP touts that “web-based crime mapping and analysis 
capabilities provide considerable improvements over previous paper based methods of 
information dissemination” (Herchenrader & Myheill-Jones, 2014: 146). According to the 
organization, the development and use of new technologies promises a way of detecting patterns 
in a more systematic, efficient way. According to the organization, this “early detection of crime 
trends leads to preventing crime from continuing as opposed to simply reacting to crime trends 
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after they have occurred” (Brewer, 2008: 1, emphasis added). By leveraging technology, it is 
suggested that the early identification of trends will detect risk, ignite action and even reduce the 
degree of harm. The organizational claims concerning leveraging technology address 
technological failure and provide distance from previous organizational practices.  
Technologies such as those developed and implemented as part of ILP are sold on the 
basis that the potential downfall of not using them exceeds the possible implications which 
accompany them (March, 2006). The organization credits ILP infrastructure and new technology 
with the apprehension of a serial child sex offender. The organization posits that “without the 
system it is possible [perpetrator’s name] would have never been caught” (Chang, 2013: 11). 
This claim evokes fear that dangerous predators may roam free without assistance from 
advanced analytical technologies. Engaging the highest level of sophistication possible is viewed 
as the most responsible choice. Framing these technologies as the key to solving this case creates 
distance between present investigative capabilities and those that would have been employed 
before such technology was developed.   
The CPD publicly credited the inquiry for identifying failures related to information 
sharing. The organization cited that “the aftermath of the inquiry and the public backlash against 
what had happened ... was critical .... as one of the issues it raised was the lack of multi-
jurisdictional analysis capability” (Allen, 2013: 1). The department acknowledges that during the 
case, they “were operating in a... department bubble, as were other jurisdictions… the [CPD] 
opted for development of analytics capability that could ultimately scale province wide” (Allen, 
2013: 1). Technological improvements are argued to enhance information sharing processes, thus 
ameliorating this problem. According to the organization, the development of ILP technologies 
in the organization “has truly revolutionized the way police officers in [the province] use 
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technology to share critical information in real time from their police vehicles” (Brewer, 2008: 
2). The use of advanced technology is framed as a remedy to the failures of the past, facilitating 
sharing and access that was not previously available.   
In addition to distancing itself from old and inept technologies, the organization also 
portrayed present management personnel as more innovative and forward-thinking than 
executives of the past:       
Current executive level deputy chiefs are also more inclined towards “risk taking in 
this area” ... or at least more determined to leverage technology ...This top-down 
cultural shift really had an impact on the organization’s approach to the use of 
technology (Allen, 2013: 2). 
 
The claim above clearly demonstrates processes of distancing as CPD actively distances its new 
reform from the past management ideologies and circumstances. Specifically, the above claim 
purports that the CPD is being run under management which supports innovation. Such 
claimsmaking provides a means to acquire legitimacy by bringing the past into disrepute.  
Further, establishing distance from practices which may be susceptible to bias or 
discrimination was also pivotal for the CPD following the inquiry. Discriminatory views of the 
individuals involved and the nature of their lifestyles were shown to have contributed to 
decisions regarding the lack of resource allocation and investigation (Parsons, 2012a). In 
contrast, ILP, as one superintendent describes “is a philosophy that is the use of information to 
guide the deployment of resources” (I4, District Inspector). As another officer puts it, under ILP 
“what we do comes from statistics that we develop” (I3, Constable). CPD frames information as 
the catalyst for decision-making and organizational action under an ILP approach. ILP is claimed 
to provide an assessment which relies on information and technology, and is presented as a more 
objective tool, a safeguard against human biases. This is believed to allow CPD to develop 
policies driven by “data, information, and evidence” (Garrett, 2011).     
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   Information management and reporting procedures were cited as flawed by the 
inquiry. When working under an ILP framework, the organization directly acknowledges 
the need for adequate report taking on the part of officers, as  
system integrity hinges on quality information submitted by front-line officers and 
investigators. The old adage “garbage in, garbage out” has never been so true. 
Front-line officers who are tied to a radio and typically run off their feet need to 
understand the necessity of complete and accurate information for initial 
reporting (Brewer, 2008: 3, emphasis added). 
 
Employing a system which relies upon the collection of detailed information and intelligence 
communicates an organizational commitment to adequate report taking measures. The 
organization outwardly acknowledges a need to ensure frontline officers fulfil these duties.   
In order to acquire legitimacy, CPD engaged in claimsmaking that asserted distance from 
previous technologies, procedures and practices and provided a picture of a rational and 
accountable organization. 
 
Professionalization and Formalization: Taking Responsibility by Assigning Responsibility   
While CPD engaged in processes of claiming worth and distancing, they also put forth 
claims of professionalization and formalization. Professionalization involves assigning clear 
responsibilities, standards and expectations to each role (Strauss, 1967; Scott, 2003). For 
example, as the number and function of analysts has expanded in recent years, the role is 
predominantly filled by civilian staff. In the past, sworn officers on modified duty frequently 
filled analyst roles in the department. The decision to civilianize the analyst role was advocated 
by the organization to allow for cost-saving and expertise-garnering; analysts are now civilians 
educated in analysis rather than officers with ground-level experience (Griffiths, 2006). Claims 
about the professionalization of crime analysis cultivates perceptions of competence in the work 
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of these new civilian analysts (Hass & Shaffir, 1977). Professionalization also involved 
implementing CompStat – a formal evaluation procedure which claims to provide internal 
accountability by strictly monitoring and coordinating police resources. As an inspector is quoted 
on a publicly accessible CPD document, CPD looked to “new ideas and better ways to solve 
crime”, and CompStat provided a means of “policing smarter” ([Crypton Police Department, 
2005: 1)  
The integration of CompStat and its reliance on analytics allows the organization to 
invoke the rhetoric of accountability through claims about implementing benchmarks, goals, 
evaluation, and oversight measures. As an organizational document explains: 
Analytics have provided the basis for monitoring key performance indicators, 
such as solve rates, 911 response times, the achievement of department delivery 
goals, resources for patrol units, measurements that can serve as the basis for 
performance improvements (Allen, 2013: 1, emphasis added). 
 
The quotation above illustrates how evaluation measures are promoted within the framing 
of ILP. Achieving specific goals and seeking improvement upon performance are 
indicative of a rational, accountable organization (Scott, 2003). Middle-managers must 
justify their targets to executive management and then encourage their patrol teams to 
impact the identified problems.  
 CompStat embodies an explicit evaluation mechanism, and district inspectors are 
called upon to address output expectations: 
Following a review of District One’s crime statistics, a chart displaying the number 
of tickets issued and number of street checks written is displayed on the screen. The 
superintendent called attention to the fact that ticket numbers were down and 
reminded the room that they were to focus on distracted driving tickets this month, 
and went on to say ‘consider this a gentle reminder, or a not so gentle reminder’ 
that they need to be issuing these tickets (Field notes #3, CompStat meeting)  
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Management personnel in charge of patrol units must illustrate accountability for how their 
resources are being used. They are assigned responsibility for encouraging proactive policing 
behaviour from officers tasked with impacting ‘their’ problem areas. Problematic areas flagged 
through crime analysis are translated into targets and goals for officers to address. As the 
following sergeant explains, 
    
We’re going to develop [and] propose the weekly priorities to our executive, and I 
will articulate why, and this is something that I will have worked through with the 
analyst. And we’ll say for our ...shift projects and weekly priorities we have 
commercial break and enters, and we’ve identified that they’re all happening 
between say 9pm and midnight …. We want to give that special consideration. As 
well as we have a string of indecent exposures ... So we want to make those our two 
weekly priorities, and our analyst will be able to paint the box. We will create a box 
for the officers to be working towards.... So we have an electronic parade briefing 
board, so that’s gonna be posted for them. And we’re gonna be posting hard copies 
on there as well (I1, Sergeant). 
 
The Sergeant’s claims above identify several ways in which crime analysis is used within the 
operations division to display professionalism and accountability. First, it provides middle-
managers with an account for their superiors. It enables middle-managers to show and articulate 
why the weekly priorities have been chosen. Second, it allows managers to communicate 
expectations and goals to patrol officers under their command, both electronically and in parade 
briefing rooms. Beyond the common goal of keeping wider trends in the district under control, 
patrol teams are each assigned designated areas within the district.       
I have divided the district into geographic areas of responsibility, so there’s 4 
quadrants, and each quadrant has a team... So they are assigned specifically 
sometimes a crime category based on the analysis that’s happened of where we 
need them to focus, what time frame the crime is happening, what type of crime it 
is, what objects are being stolen (I4, Inspector, emphasis added). 
These ‘geographic areas of responsibility’ instill notions of ownership over specified quadrants 
of a district, and patrol teams are tasked with addressing problems that occur within their areas. 
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The up-close and regular monitoring of statistics and incident rates forms a measurement gauge 
for how teams are performing. As the following sergeant explains,     
...you can go back to a team and you can say look, this is a snapshot of the analyst’s 
map prior to your project, the week prior... and this is a snapshot happening after 
your project.... so they get to see some positive outcomes, and there’s a bit more 
positive reinforcement there. So you get to kind of see some effects of your work 
(I1, Sergeant) 
 
Officers are shown the outcomes of their own quadrants, as well as the larger picture of 
crime rates in the district:   
there’s a section for parade briefing… that allows them to view the crime maps and 
that sort of thing. There’s a whole section in our intranet on CompStat and reports 
for CompStat and the maps associated with CompStat and statistics for the 7 crime 
categories that we report out on. So that is all readily available for [patrol] (I4, 
District Inspector). 
 
Performance evaluation hinges on numerical outcomes; officers are positively 
commended for reducing the number of incidents or the degree of ‘hotspots’ on crime 
maps. Conversely, increased rates become equated with blame toward the officers 
‘responsible’ for addressing the affected area. Furthermore, there is an expectation that 
patrol officers are in-tune with running crime trends and statistics, and these measurement 
outcomes are regularly posted for their consumption. The CompStat process, therefore, 
conveys notions of strict managerial oversight to both external audiences subject to 
claims about CompStat, as well as officers working within the service. As one 
superintendent explained, patrol officers are encouraged to attend CompStat so that “they 
can see how much the inspector knows about what’s going on in their district” 
(Superintendent, Field notes #3, CompStat meeting). This reasoning suggests that making 
officers believe they are being closely monitored will improve behaviour and 
performance.  
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Technological advances, such as the crime mapping dashboard, are purported to be 
accessible tools to assist officers in achieving favourable outcomes. The organization 
claims that with the dashboard,   
...officers will have more ubiquitous access to data and crime analysis capabilities. 
Once a user-specified crime analysis query is completed, the results are presented 
alongside a standardized set of charts. A benefit of this simple, pre-defined interface 
and analysis capability ensures that users require little to no training in order to 
submit relevant crime analysis queries, create charts and view pertinent crime data ... 
Removing barriers to real-world use and making it as easy as possible for officers to 
access relevant data and crime analysis serves the overarching goal of helping 
[officers] become more proactive in their policing workflows (Herchenrader & 
Myheill-Jones, 2014:  145). 
 
The distribution of crime analysis reports and maps to officers, as well as the capability of 
officers to access and query information on the road creates the impression that officers are 
entering the field equipped with real-time intelligence. It is argued that this intelligence allows 
officers to engage in more proactive police work. Further, officers are expected not only to 
consume the information that is provided to them before their shift, but to conduct ‘crime 
analysis’ on their own while on the street:  
It was hypothesized that by providing basic crime analysis capabilities to the patrol 
officer they could combine bigger picture data with their own instincts and 
experience to be more proactive in their patrol...[and] Crime analysts would be freed 
to pursue more complex crime analysis rather than responding to routine inquiries 
(Herchenrader & Myheill-Jones, 2014: 143). 
 
Moreover, responsibility for conducting these inquiries is redirected to the patrol officer. 
The installation of this technology accompanies the perception that officers are equipped 
on the road with up to date ‘intelligence’. Thus, organizational claimsmaking about the 
implementation and enactment of ILP places increased responsibility on patrol officers.  
 In an attempt to acquire social legitimation through processes of formalization and 
boundary setting, CPD is presented as a leader in proactive and predictive policing.  
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Proactive work, a keystone of ILP, sees efficiency of patrol resources to be best realized 
when officers are doing more than simply reacting to calls. Under the new organizational 
reform, frontline officers become responsible for controlling and reducing crime rates 
within their district as well as their ‘geographic areas of responsibility’. Such proactive 
practices, I argue, passes responsibility down through the ranks, suggesting an onus on 
officers to pre-empt and prevent crime. Claimsmaking around this increased 
responsibility presents the organization as making better use of all of their resources – 
notably, patrol time – in order to prevent crime.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The sociopolitical climate surrounding the implementation of ILP created a situation in 
which CPD needed to rebuild trust and acquire social legitimation. The organizational 
claimsmaking surrounding the adoption of ILP, I argue, illustrates an effort to acquire 
legitimacy. For example, organizational claimsmaking framed the department as leaders in 
policing innovation by distancing the organization from past practices and failures. Further, 
claims surrounding professionalization and responsibilization presented CPD as a rational and 
accountable organization.  
Drawing upon and reconceptualising Garland’s (1996) concept of ‘responsibilization’, I 
argue that the organizational framing of ILP serves to ‘responsibilize’ patrol work as an adaptive 
response to contemporary law enforcement pressures. Garland (1996) describes the 
responsibilization strategy as exerting crime control influence through non-state agencies or 
organizations, assigning responsibility for crime control to individuals, groups, and institutions 
whose primary purpose is not traditionally law enforcement. Given the organizational 
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claimsmaking of ILP, I argue that ILP co-opts the responsibilization strategy, directing an 
increased responsibility toward patrol ranks. Patrol officers have been ‘responsibilized’.  They 
are equipped with expectations, tools, technologies, and resources which aim to extend their 
ability beyond merely responding to crime, but pre-empting it. Rather than using ‘governance-at-
a-distance’ to increase power through non-state agents of crime control (Garland, 1996), ILP’s 
performance measurement facets facilitate management-by-objectives (Vito & Vito, 2013). This 
management philosophy joins hand-in-hand with the responsibilization of patrol. Under 
CompStat, the organization is able to redefine success through the close monitoring of internal 
performance measures (Garland, 1996).  Further, by redefining success, the organization claims 
to have redirected responsibility toward frontline officers, making patrol both better equipped 
and more accountable for addressing crime.   
Thus, in the face of considerable scrutiny, CPD responded with a number of claims 
regarding ILP’s technological and procedural superiority.  Yet, while inept reporting structures 
and technological capacities may bear some blame for past mistakes, the ability of informal 
police cultures to dictate decisions was also made glaringly clear in the inquiry (Parsons, 2012a). 
For example, the systemic bias which discouraged resource investment to pursue the missing 
individuals is the product of a culture built from shared beliefs and experiences among officers 
(Chan, 1996). Further, the lack of inter-jurisdictional information sharing is attributed not only to 
inadequate technology, but also to a culture of secrecy among police services (Manning, 1992, 
Parsons, 2012a; Sanders & Henderson, 2012; Sanders et al., 2015). Despite official programs or 
policies, the way that organizational actors understand and enact police reform is of critical 
importance as this is culturally influenced (Manning, 1992; Chan, 1996; Chan, 2001). I now 
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move to a micro-level analysis of ILP to better understand how patrol officers’ make sense of 
ILP reform. 
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Chapter Five: Intelligence-led Policing and Patrol Work 
 Having explored the organizational claimsmaking regarding ILP, I now move to an 
analysis of patrol officers’ perceptions and understandings of ILP. As illustrated in Chapter Four, 
ILP is presented as a strategy which enhances patrol work to be more purposeful and proactive. 
Patrol officers are equipped with intelligence and innovative technologies, and tasked with the 
responsibility of impacting crime in a measurable way. Although organizational claimsmaking 
may suggest that an innovation has been enacted in a certain way, practical outcomes of reform 
often differ from official claims (Weick, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Crank & Langworthy, 
1992; Manning, 1997; Maguire & Katz, 2002; Chapell, 2009; Sanders et al., 2015). As such, 
police organizational change is best understood through an ethnographic approach which 
captures the natural setting of policing, and provides access to conversations and casual 
exchanges (Marks, 2004). It is within these social settings that meaning is constructed and 
understandings are shaped. Drawing on in-depth interviews with ten patrol officers, five middle-
management personnel, and fieldnotes from five police ride-alongs, I explore how patrol officers 
have made sense of ILP reform and the integration of crime analysis in the department. I analyze 
how the ‘responsibilization’ of patrol occurs in practice, and how officers make sense of this 
responsibility.   
I begin with a review of the research on ILP and the identified barriers to implementation 
(Ratcliffe, 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2008; Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001; Cope, 2004; Sheptycki, 
2004; Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005; Taylor, Kowalyk & Boba, 2007; Carter & Carter, 2009; 
Sheptycki, 2013; Sanders et al., 2015). I then outline how and why formal rules and policies may 
differ from actual organizational functioning. Consistent with existing research, I identify a 
number of situational, organizational and cultural barriers to the implementation of ILP. Using 
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sensemaking as an analytic device, I build upon past analyses of ILP in practice by exploring 
how these barriers shape patrol officers’ perceptions of ILP’s purpose and value. I demonstrate 
how patrol officers’ daily experiences remain disconnected or ‘loosely coupled’ (Weick, 1976; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977) from the ‘responsibilized’ patrol work described in organizational 
claimsmaking. Moreover, I suggest that this discrepancy may not be a failure to fully implement 
ILP, but rather a strategic state of organizational affairs. I argue that ILP’s present 
implementation in CPD functions as a rationalized institutional myth, allowing the organization 
to acquire legitimacy while minimizing cultural resistance or ‘turmoil’ (Hallett, 2010).  
 
Rationalized Institutional Myths and Loose Coupling 
Formal rhetoric regarding organizational behaviour, as illustrated in Chapter Four, is used 
for the purposes of acquiring legitimacy, securing resources, and promoting survival of the 
organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, institutionalized policy seldom translates 
directly into practice (Weick, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Thus, these official claims become 
“rationalized institutional myths”, conveying an image of organizational functioning regardless 
of whether these processes are enacted on the ground. Further, official rules or processes often 
run counter to actions that allow efficiency under present organizational conditions. Actual daily 
work activities often vary, or are “loosely coupled” to the formal rhetoric surrounding 
organizational practices (Weick, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In order to navigate the tensions 
between an image that ensures survival and the processes that could create contradictions if 
applied literally, institutionalized environments may intentionally and strategically maintain 
gaps between formal structures and daily work activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In practice, 
“rules are often violated, decisions often un-implemented...have uncertain 
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consequences...problematic efficiency, and evaluation and inspection systems are...rendered so 
vague as to provide little coordination” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 343). For example, Hallett 
(2010) found that an attempt to more strictly coordinate activities in order to facilitate a closer 
degree of “coupling” between formal programs and daily work activities led to a state of 
“turmoil” among organizational actors. Turmoil invokes feelings of epistemic distress for 
workers when organizational changes disrupt established routines, expectations, and challenge 
situational limitations. In response to this uncertainty, workers establish a collective 
understanding which stands in opposition to new policies or protocols (Hallett, 2010). Hallet 
(2010) found that this turmoil created such disruption within the organization that the 
efficiencies promised by the reform could not be realized in practice (Hallet, 2010).   
Changing organizational behaviour requires more than introducing new rules or practices. 
These changes intersect with individuals and groups working in established and familiar 
structures and practical consequences are contingent on how those on the ground respond.  For 
example, research on policing has identified the powerful role occupational culture plays in 
shaping, altering or resisting organizational reform (Manning, 1992; Chan, 1996).   
To date, there is only a small body of qualitative or ethnographic literature that examines 
the integration of ILP as it relates specifically to patrol policing. Deficiencies in training 
(Ratcliffe, 2004; Cope, 2004), concerns regarding quality and functionality of analytical products 
(Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001; Cope, 2004), and a lack of “fit” between crime analysts and 
existing police culture at the patrol level have been uncovered (Cope, 2004; Innes et al., 2005; 
Sanders et al., 2015). Manning (2008) found that the implementation of information technology 
and crime mapping in three US police forces elicited little change among the daily routines of 
police work. Ratcliffe & McCullagh (2001) revealed that many issues exist regarding the 
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dissemination of intelligence information to patrol officers, finding that this information often 
failed to reach officers, or failed to attract attention in a way that could meaningfully impact the 
way officers conducted their day-to-day activities. In another UK study, Cope (2004) 
qualitatively explored the integration of crime analysis in policing, finding that analysts felt they 
“were not integral in practice” and “had become relatively ‘silent partners’...theoretically 
essential, but their products were often overlooked” (Cope, 2004: 192). Taylor et al. (2007) 
provide support for these findings, arguing that analysts felt resistance from patrol officers 
regarding acceptance and use of crime analysis.  It appeared that officers continued to favour 
“constructed experiential knowledge” (Cope, 2004: 199) over approaches or strategies 
recommended by crime analysts. Such research identifies the importance of attending to the way 
in which patrol officers make sense of ILP.  
 
Sensemaking and the Role of Police Culture 
 During periods of organizational reform, those whose occupations fall under the purview 
of new rules, policies, and practices must negotiate and ‘make sense’ of what these changes 
mean for their daily work. This sensemaking process involves interpreting how and why 
practices or expectations have changed, and how these changes intersect with existing structures 
(Choo, 1996; Chan, 1996; Manning, 1997). These interpretive processes are shaped significantly 
by the social, as well as the cultural contexts in which they occur (Chan, 1996; Manning, 1997). 
It has been asserted that police culture plays a critical role in influencing, or obstructing, the way 
in which innovation is realized (Chan, 1996). Police occupational culture(s) can be understood as 
the widely held yet informal routines, cognitions, attitudes and behaviours shared among 
officers, which assist with and emerge from the shared experiences of their day to day role 
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(Manning, 1997; Chan, 1996). It has been suggested (Manning, 1992; Chan, 1996) that multiple 
cultures exist within the police force and these varying cultures may understand and adopt 
innovation differently. Similarly, the degree to which new technologies impact policing routines 
is highly dependent on the “existing cultural values, management styles, work practices and 
technical capabilities” of the organization (Chan, 2001: 147).  
Of unique interest to ILP innovation is the role that civilian analysts have been assigned 
within an ILP structure. Civilianization within police forces has elicited notable tension 
surrounding the acceptance of civilian employees among sworn members (Wilkerson, 1994; 
Murphy & McKenna, 2007). ILP places analysts in a position where theoretically, they are 
embedded in intelligence-sharing and tactical and strategic planning (Ratcliffe, 2008). This 
intersection of cultures provides an intriguing point of analysis when exploring the way in which 
patrol officers, embedded in their own occupational cultures and values, make sense of and 
respond to civilian analysts taking on this role. 
In what follows, I explore the implementation ILP as an organizational philosophy from 
the perspective of patrol officers in CPD. Of particular interest is how the responsibilities which 
emanate from organizational claims intersect with the pre-existing structures and conditions of 
patrol work. A number of situational, organizational, and cultural factors influence how officers’ 
make sense of ILP reform and how it impacts their daily role. Officers’ understandings and 
experiences with these organizational changes influence their uptake of tools and practices. From 
this, I illustrate how officers make sense of crime analysis as a tool to appease external 
accountability requirements, rather than for their own use. Given that daily organizational 
practices remain ‘loosely coupled’ to ILP’s official mandate, I argue that ILP serves as a 
rationalized institutional myth in the department.    
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Situational Elements 
 Introducing new programs, changing processes or responsibilities, and implementing new 
technologies inevitably interacts with existing occupational expectations. Patrol officers have 
established routines for carrying out their jobs and a close familiarity with the behavioural 
routines of their occupation. Changing or shifting established norms without changing the pre-
existing situational context of the role creates a conflict between ongoing expectations and new 
responsibilities. Patrol officers must make sense of these contradictions in order to navigate how 
ILP adoption relates to their occupation.  
  
Information Overload 
 Many officers discussed how information consumption and information gathering 
requirements associated with ILP take away from the everyday requirements of patrol work. The 
move towards ILP and the integration of crime analysts into each patrol division has meant that 
patrol officers face a substantial increase in the amount of information that is disseminated to 
them. Officers are sent bulletins, reports, diagrams and charts with particulars such as recent 
incidents and trends, district hot spots, crime statistics, and persons of interest. These reports are 
disseminated through email, departmental intranet bulletins, and through printouts and posters in 
patrol briefing rooms. Patrol officers acknowledge that there is an organizational expectation that 
they consume the information that is provided. As one patrol officer explains,  
…the way it’s tasked down, is most patrol members don’t have time to check their 
email prior to being told to get out on the road and do stuff. So I mean there’s an 
expectation, not an expectation, but there’s a, I guess a want by upper management to 
have patrol members come in early before shift, check their emails, check their 
voicemails... in addition to prepping your stuff for your equipment, grabbing your 
car, trying to find parking, and pretty soon you’re out of time. And then there’s the 
demands of the call board and the demands of dispatch... So for everybody to 
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effectively get the intelligence by email, I don’t think it’s entirely realistic 
(Constable, I5) 
 
The officer above describes how the organization has placed an additional responsibility 
upon officers to adapt to an increased circulation of information. Patrol officers must 
continue to accomplish all of the existing preparatory and situational requirements of patrol 
work, while also finding time to satisfy the administrative requirements of ILP. Officers 
rationalize that it is ‘not realistic’ to keep up with information from the analyst prior to 
beginning shift. These expectations conflict with the responsibility to be active on the 
street and responding to calls. Another officer explains,    
We get quite a few emails, you know, almost daily from our analysts… they fan 
emails out to us, and then also to our sergeants…[the organization] wants us to check 
our email at least once a day…but you know, some days it just doesn’t happen, cause 
we don’t have email access in our cars, so we have to actually like go, park the car, 
go to the station, log-in, and meanwhile we’re not very operational (Patrol officer, 
I2, emphasis added) 
 
This quotation draws attention to the fact that while organizational policy may suggest that 
intelligence is consumed in a timely manner to inform and guide frontline practices, the 
experiences of patrol officers paint a different picture. Information from the analysts is most 
frequently communicated through email or hard copy briefing in parade rooms, yet retrieving 
this information becomes impractical for patrol officers who are primarily operating outside the 
station. Further, this quotation provides additional insight into how officers’ reluctance toward 
this abundance of information is rationalized. Emails from the analyst are ‘fanned’ out at a 
frequency that officers cannot keep up with. This information is sent to everyone of varying 
squads and ranks, it is not exclusive or privileged. Moreover, spending time completing 
administrative tasks such as reading emails is considered non-operational, it is a task that takes 
away from patrolling, not one that is part of it.  
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Given that more information is compiled than can be practically consumed, determining 
which information is worthy of attention becomes “a balancing act of what’s the most important 
information for the guys” (Constable, I5). Considering the impossibility of consuming all data, 
onus is directed to officers who become responsible for determining priority. The organization 
“put[s] out a lot of information, essentially it’s up to us to review and take what we need from it” 
(Constable, I2). Under the situational limitations, officers understand that they can consume as 
much or as little information from the analyst, depending on its perceived relevance to their 
immediate needs. 
Officers also conceive information gathering requirements as detracting from patrol 
work. Administrative expectations have increased in order to supplement the amount of data 
available for analytic purposes and, as such, officers find report writing to be increasingly 
demanding. One officer shares,  
when I go out on the road on patrol, I'm going from call to call to call to call, writing, 
writing, writing, writing, writing, and we are so bogged down with so much writing 
and filling out templates and doing paperwork (Constable, I13) 
 
The above quotation identifies how documentation practices are understood by officers as a 
hindrance to patrolling. Officers feel ‘bogged down’ or burdened by informational requirements 
which have heightened under ILP. The following officer describes how collecting information 
for analysis purposes has meant significant increases in reporting content:    
The report writing tool that feeds into [the records management system] has 
hundreds of fields. And some of them are mandatory and some of them aren't. And at 
some point, someone had a genius idea of adding this field so that they could use it 
for analysis. It'd be really interesting to know what fields are redundant and aren't 
being accessed or aren't being used for any sort of analysis, and what fields are… if 
you sat down and you actually went to fill in every single box of every single thing, 
we would see productivity drop huge because you'd be spending so much more time 
on reports, and everyone would be busy writing reports if we were entering every 
single field… [Officers] won't fill in all [the fields], I mean maybe someone right out 
of the academy, but then they'll start wondering why it takes them an hour and a half 
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to do a report that takes someone else 15 minutes to do, and it's because they're 
sitting there entering these fields that no one’s actually looking at. And I really 
genuinely believe that no one's looking at those fields. (Constable, I9) 
 
The officer above identifies several important implications of expanding information 
gathering requirements for patrol. First, he identifies how the size and scope of reports has 
the potential to be time consuming and jeopardizing otherwise ‘productive’ time spent on 
the road. Second, he identifies how officers have responded to increased reporting 
expectations, circumventing any information that is not flagged as mandatory in the 
system. The existence of ‘optional’ fields sends a message to officers that this particular 
information is unnecessary or extraneous. Further, he identifies that neglecting fields to 
save time is an understood and socially acquired occupational norm among officers. Only 
officers who have not yet learned short cuts or efficiencies on the job (‘someone right out 
of the academy’) are perceived to complete all requested information, and once they realize 
that this is a burden on their time they will no longer be bothered. Finally, this officer 
offers important insight into how patrol officers rationalize skirting data collection 
procedures. Officers perceive that additional information will remain unused even if 
collected, operating under the conclusion that no harm is done by taking a shortcut. 
 
The Reactive Reality   
 One of the most prominent claims surrounding ILP is a promise that analytics 
promote a more ‘proactive’ policing approach. Not only does gathering and consuming 
additional information conflict with the situational realities of patrol work, officers find that 
time on the road offers little space to engage in targeted behaviour. Officers’ experiences 
suggest that responding to calls remains the most significant and consuming responsibility 
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for patrol. Above all, “as a first responder, we’re responding to any sort of calls for service, 
right. So the priority is in-progress calls always. If something’s happening, we’re going to 
that” (Constable, I2). Rather than an increase in proactive behaviour, many officers felt that 
unassigned time was increasingly scarce. During a ride-along, an officer shared that “the city 
has been holding vacancies since the [international sporting event] ended, so we’ve got fewer 
officers on the street, [which] leaves less time for projects” (Field notes #4, Ride-along). In 
the eyes of the officers interviewed, reducing manpower in order to conserve resources has 
left officers scrambling to keep up with calls for service. Moreover, officers felt that these 
cuts occurred in a strategic manner to protect against public scrutiny. As a second officer 
explained,  
these vacancies are positions that have opened up - whether it be from retirement, 
resigning, personal leave, etc. - which they are not hiring officers to fill. He 
described how this is politically strategic on the part of the city. The mayor promised 
during the election that there would be no cuts to policing, and this was a popular 
promise with the public. Holding these vacancies allows less money to be spent on 
policing without formal cuts or layoffs occurring. This way [the mayor] is able to say 
that there were no cuts made. (Field notes #4, Ride-along) 
 
This officer identifies the vested interest in maintaining public approval, even when the 
material realities contradict organizational claims. Further, the excerpt above highlights an 
inherent contradiction between claims that ILP facilitates a more efficient use of resources, 
and the fact that reducing resources has meant that officers remain “tied to the call board” 
(Constable, I10) and too busy to take interest in new tools. While discussing whether the 
district crime analyst is used as a resource, one officer commented,  
to be 100% honest with you, I think that the direction that we’re in right now with 
policing is that it’s so reactive… going to my crime analyst to talk about how 
information could better serve me on the road to be more proactive is not at the top 
of my priority list (Constable, I13) 
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For patrol officers, crime analysis remains of minimal concern because it is not usable 
under the situational expectations of their role. Existing expectations of patrol take 
precedence over new responsibilities, such as conducting their own crime mapping on the 
dashboard in the cruiser. With regard to this recently installed technology, one officer 
stated, “you can’t have your head buried in your laptop all day long. That’s not what we’re 
here to do” (Constable, I2). Patrol work is understood by officers as being engrossed with 
responding and reacting – ILP tools and technologies are considered extraneous to patrol’s 
central purpose. Although more information is theoretically available to officers under ILP, 
the enduring reactive essence of patrol work negates perceptions of value for officers. As 
another officer explains,  
you can have all the intelligence in the world, but if you’re running from call to call 
it’s not going to be put to use, and you’re likely to miss everything that comes across 
your path. (Constable, I11) 
 
In contrast with the organizational claims of proactive, intelligence-led patrol work, from 
the perspective of the officers, the situational conditions of patrol work do not allow for 
much unassigned time.   
 
Organizational Factors 
 In addition to the influence of situational occupational elements, decisions made at the 
organizational level about how to implement change or reform also play a significant role in 
shaping the way that workers interpret and respond to new rules or processes. Organizational 
resource decisions and oversight signal what is and is not important. If workers recognize that a 
program or strategy is not prioritized by the organization, this will influence their understandings 
about its necessity and significance.  
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Lack of Training and Follow-up 
Although crime analysis has been built into the organizational structure there has been 
little training provided to patrol officers concerning the purpose, value, and use of crime 
analytics. For example, formal training has not been built into initial police academy training, 
nor does the organization directly train patrol officers how to leverage crime analysis as part of 
an ILP approach. Interestingly, many officers became aware of analytics through trial and error.  
As the following officer explains,  
You know what, there’s not [training on using crime analysis]. It’s something that, 
it’s there in front of you... to figure out for yourself. Sometimes a senior officer or 
somebody who was in an investigative area before will take 15, 20 minutes or even 
an hour to show other officers and newer people, um, how to go about using the 
tools. But unfortunately a training module or training course, there’s nothing that I’m 
aware of (Constable, I12) 
 
The organization has not prioritized training patrol officers on how to benefit from the 
analytic information that is available to them.  
 Officers describe the absence of a formal introduction to the mapping software 
developed by the organization: 
There’s times where I remember it would just pop up on our laptop before I knew 
what it was, and I was like oh this is just a map, close…I think it’s important that 
it’s brought forward and the training is informed to the police officers, but it’s a 
matter of allocating time and resources for it (Constable, I12).  
 
The quotation above identifies two significant themes. First, it illustrates that without training to 
accompany new processes or technologies, they may remain largely overlooked. Lacking context 
for why the mapping program had been installed, officers infer its value, or lack thereof, based 
on present occupational schemes. This officer rationalized that this was ‘just a map’ and thus not 
worthy of further attention within the usual patterns of his role. Second, it identifies how ILP has 
been implemented without prioritizing resources to promote its execution. Instead, routines have 
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continued as per usual, with the increased presence of information stimulating minimal change in 
approach:  
My partner and I participated in the [Dashboarding] introductory study so we, as far 
as formal training, there was like a 5 minute video on how to use it, sort of thing. 
But not so much, right. Like we’re, you know the information’s there, we’re just the 
worker bees, we kind of just go out there and do our thing (Constable, I2) 
 
Even though organizational claims suggest that the mobile dashboard technology was developed 
and installed predominantly for use by patrol, it appears that little investment has been made to 
promote its use in practice.  Many officers had not used (I7, I8, I10, I11, I12, I13) or even heard 
of (I14) the dashboard mapping program which was developed and implemented by the 
organization. Regardless of mobile accessibility, the context of patrol work limits officers’ 
ability to take advantage of such technological infrastructure. Instead, making it accessible to 
officers allows for the appearance of officers who are conducting their own analyses right from 
their cars.  
Moreover, training around proper data collection processes to support ILP also lacks 
standardization. Even if patrol officers are not actively using crime analysis themselves, it is their 
reports which are drawn upon as ‘intelligence’ by the analysts. However, the organization has 
not provided support or training to stress the importance of proper reporting practices:  
We haven’t been trained on what types of details would be most useful to the analyst. 
So um honestly it’s kind of trial by fire. You just work with it and you learn by 
reading other people’s street checks… In terms of actual training on how to write 
street checks, there hasn’t been any protocol in terms of that (Constable, I14) 
     
I’ve never been formally instructed as to what is useful to the analyst, but I mean as 
your police years add on you, you know, become aware as to what’s pertinent and 
what isn’t… So it’s basically intuitive learning. But there is no formal training in 
terms of this is what the analysts want… And some people are more detail-oriented, 
some people are less (Constable, I11) 
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As illustrated in the quotations above, report writing remains largely uncoordinated, with the 
degree of detail varying widely among officers. The need for high quality information for 
sufficient analysis it not ingrained in the practices of officers. Officers continue to write for the 
practicality of one another, not the utility of a crime analyst:   
We write reports based on our perception of what’s relevant. So we’re not writing 
necessarily that report for the analyst… so if we’re writing a street check or an 
intelligence report, …[it]… is based on what we perceive to be relevant to other 
police officers (Constable, I9) 
 
Data and intelligence gathering practices do not appear to have meaningfully changed 
despite organizational rhetoric surrounding the importance of thorough reporting practices for 
usable intelligence. In fact, officers believe that there is little effort on the part of the 
organization to encourage or coordinate ILP procedures.  For example, when discussing the 
information needed for a street check or intelligence report to be useful, one sergeant commented 
that, 
Nobody makes [patrol officers] do it. It’s really funny, ‘cause I bug guys all the time 
right. You know, like you said details details details… you’ve got a guy’s name but 
you don’t have a physical description… Nobody makes anybody do it… in policing 
they talk accountability but they won’t walk it. And you only get in trouble when it 
hits the front page of the paper. And then everybody points at everybody else, who 
can we blame? (Sergeant, I6)  
 
The Sergeant above calls attention to the lack of organizational concern for ensuring that report 
writing procedures are followed. Rather, he illustrates that officers understand requirements as 
flexible and unenforced, aware that the organization is more concerned with assigning 
responsibility than following up on it. There is a lack of coordination for daily practices, and 
report quality only becomes a concern when there is a need to assign blame for a mistake. 
Reporting expectations – even when largely unenforced – allow an individual to be held liable 
for neglect, rather than an absence of organizational procedures.    
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Interestingly, it appears that officers have come to understand analytic reports as 
discretionary and avoidable. As one officer explains, the choice to use crime analysis “all comes 
down to the individual user, if they see a merit, or if they determine that there’s any merit in 
using it” (Constable, I10). Even during unassigned time, officers may choose to avoid the 
administrative burden of analytic reports because “sometimes it’s just easier to drive around in 
the car and wait for something to come across the board” (Constable, I11). Officers have 
identified that keeping up with communication from crime analysts is left to their discretion, 
with processes loosely implemented and weakly enforced: 
 I mean … there’s as much or as little use as you wanna do with it. If you just wanna 
come to work and just respond to the board and not, I mean, nobody hounds you, 
nobody says you know, ‘have you checked those recently?’ A lot of it is self-
generated (Constable, I10)  
 
The lack of organizational concern as to whether or not officers are actually consuming 
information from the crime analyst leads officers to understand these reports or bulletins as 
optional rather than integral.  
Moreover, officers described how even during ‘project’ shifts, when there is allotted time 
for proactive police work, it remains unlikely that they would draw upon the analyst as a 
resource for project decisions. A patrol officer identifies that when the crime analyst  
 
should be [utilized] is when it comes to projects. That should be what’s happening is 
we should be going to [the analyst] to say you know, this is the type of information 
that we need that could be more useful to us, are you able to give it to us? That 
should be happening” Yet when asked if it does, the officer replied “No for me 
specifically, no. And I don’t think anyone else in my squad does it” (Constable, I13) 
 
 
The quotation above strongly communicates patrol officers’ disinterest in using the analyst as a 
resource. The ability of crime analysis to facilitate proactive policing is a predominant argument 
in support of ILP. Yet even when there is unassigned time, officers do not perceive crime 
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analysis as valuable for supplementing proactive work. Rather, officers continue to pursue 
proactive projects based on their own interests. In addition, this quote draws attention to the 
social nature of organizational sensemaking, wherein justifications and rationalizations are based 
on perceptions of what others are doing. If patrol officers as a group overlook the analyst, this 
becomes the socially acceptable occupational approach. Operating against official processes does 
not seem defiant because no one else is doing it either.     
Furthermore, officers who do engage with the analyst are perceived as an exception rather 
than the norm. As one officer shared, “I’m probably the only person who emails our analyst 
(laughs). Which is probably why I’m here [participating in the interview], but that’s okay” 
(Patrol officer, I3). It is understood among officers that this is not usual practice. As a second 
officer describes,  
I probably email back and forth at least 2 or 3 times a week, based on if, so for 
example if I gather intel or if I take photographs of any known suspects, cause 
clothing is always important, I'll uh, email it to her just to maintain that continuity. 
But I would say that I'm the exception to the rule. (Constable, I11)  
 
These two examples identify how interacting with the crime analyst has not been accepted 
as part of the role, but rather distinguishes select ‘others’ who differ from the norm of most 
officers. Without formal training or coordination, officers are left to navigate the use and value 
of ILP based only on existing conceptions about occupational norms. Further, lack of 
enforcement communicates organizational indifference for coordinating patrol officers’ 
behaviour and engagement with analytics.   
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Situating the Analyst 
 The introduction of civilian crime analysts into the operations division has meant that 
officers must make sense of the purpose and function of this role in relation to their own. The 
organizational structuring of district crime analysts affects the way that they are perceived and 
integrated into existing patterns. Organizational placement and the accessibility of analysts affect 
patterns of interaction and subsequently how officers understand their role in the department. 
 Although located within the operations division, the analysts are positioned on a 
separate floor from the patrol briefing rooms, working in closer proximity to management 
than to patrol (Constable, I7). Much of the communication between crime analysts and 
officers consists of email briefings disseminated by the analysts. There is infrequent face-to-
face contact, and infrequent reciprocal communication. This distance has meant that analysts 
remain disconnected and unfamiliar to officers. When asked about their interactions with the 
analysts, several officers were not able to identify where the crime analyst for their district 
was located within the service:   
Ummm…. this is probably gonna answer the question - I don't… he's within our 
station, I think he's on the 6th floor, I'd have to look it up, exactly where he is. But I 
know he's in our same building that patrol works out of. Pretty sad eh? (laughs) 
(Constable, I13) 
I don't even know where their office is actually. (Constable, I9) 
 
I wouldn't say there's much contact. And to be honest I don't even know where they 
are (Constable, I10)  
 
The remarks above illustrate the lack of integration and interaction among the district crime 
analysts and patrol officers. It further illustrates a lack of interest in seeking out the analyst for 
information or assistance. This organizational separation has limited interpersonal relations 
between the two groups. As another officer explains,    
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I know if I wanted to look for them and I wanted to email them I could certainly 
email them, and I know who the analyst is, but I don't often see her, like I wouldn't 
have a lot of face time with her. (Constable, I14) 
This physical separation promotes an understanding that the role and tasks of the analysts are 
distinctly removed from that of patrol officers:    
So like I know that they’re on the 5th floor in this building. So they’re nearby but I 
think they have their own office where they all kind of hang out and do their thing. 
….So I know they’re there. But you know, 75% of our shifts start after 2 in the 
afternoon so we’re just not around to see them lots. But they’re nearby (Constable, 
I2) 
The quotation above conveys a perception that analysts’ responsibilities are symbolically 
distanced from the work of officers – they do ‘their thing’ and patrol does their own. This 
understanding promotes separation rather than collaboration. Further this officer identifies how 
organizational shift structures contribute to the separation between officers and analysts. As 
another officer describes,   
We don’t work closely whatsoever. You know, they’re on a day shift schedule, they 
work you know, Monday to Thursday or Tuesday to Friday sort of thing, our shifting 
is all different hours all different days, so we don’t see them often. You know, we 
know who they are, they know who we are, “hi, bye, nice to see you”, that kind of 
thing. Um, but for the most part the communication we have with them is just via 
email, um, and yeah they’re spamming out those emails to the entire district, it’s not 
on any sort of a personal level or anything like that. (Constable, I2) 
 
The officer above draws attention to the weekday, dayshift schedule of the district crime 
analysts. In contrast with the 24/7 nature of police work, analysts’ schedules align with 
administrative and management positions, and suggests a non-essential function. This 
example also highlights the lack of personal relationship that is cultivated among officers and 
the analysts – a factor which plays into building credibility. Further, this officer’s language 
describing the analyst (‘spamming out those emails’) indicates that these reports are equated 
with junk mail rather than valuable information. Officers do not frequently interact with the 
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analyst in a manner which allows for the building of informal personal relationships, and 
thus, rapport. As I will illustrate in the following section, this lack of interaction 
consequently contributes to a rift between patrol and analytic cultures.   
 
Clash of Cultures 
  Occupational culture influences how organizational actors respond to changes in their 
environment. Establishing ILP has involved introducing an analytic culture that must operate in 
relation to existing police cultures in the department. In this section, I illustrate how the cultural 
understandings of patrol have shaped perceptions of the credibility of crime analysts and the 
products they provide. From here, I illustrate how a cultural divide exists between patrol’s and 
middle-management’s perceptions of crime analysis. Further, I demonstrate how this divide 
contributes to patrol’s understanding and selective adoption of ILP.    
 
Devaluing the Analyst 
Informal social interaction among officers shapes the way officers make sense of crime 
analysts, including their function, abilities, and their value. During interviews and field 
observations, officers often spoke of the analysts in a sarcastic way. As illustrated above, 
interactions are infrequent, and jokes emerge on the basis of infrequent contact or unfamiliarity 
with who they are.    
‘[Name] is our analyst… is she here today?’ one officer laughed. ‘Who’s that?’ 
another officer asked jokingly. I looked to the officer beside me who said, ‘we like to 
give her a hard time because we never see her… she hates us. One time we hadn’t 
seen her in a couple months and she came to parade and we were like ‘who are 
you?’’ (Fieldnotes #2, Ridealong) 
 
At dinner break with the patrol squad, I asked who the analyst for their district was. 
They looked around at each other and didn’t know. The officer to my right said ‘oh is 
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that that model who walks around acting like she’s better than everyone else?’ The 
others laughed. The officer continued, ‘but really, the one with her hair always all 
done up and curly?’ The others chuckled, and one replied that they thought that was 
someone different, but none were sure, and none of the officers were able to name 
the analyst. I asked if the analyst ever came to their parade briefings, and they said 
she did not. (Field notes #4, Dinner, Ride-along) 
The examples above illustrate how officers have come to understand the analyst as an 
infrequent and insignificant presence. The sarcastic and even demeaning jokes suggest that 
officers do not hold much respect for the analyst and her role within the organization.    
 Another recurrent factor regarding analyst credibility stems from a shared 
understanding that information from the crime analyst is less reliable and less accurate than 
information from other officers. Analysts are perceived to lack the knowledge or insight that 
real cops possess, and their products are treated with skepticism as a result. During a ride-
along on a patrol shift,   
I asked the officer I was riding with if he often used products from the analyst in his 
proactive time to determine projects. He said no, that he prefers to use his own 
information. He described his information as current, and he gets it at ground-level 
from talking to people. He stated that he preferred to use his own information 
because he knows the source of his information. He has his informants from working 
in the area. He does not know the source of the information coming from the analyst, 
or if it is reliable. He discusses how ‘credibility and trust must be earned. And 
there’s a level of credibility among officers that is not applied to the analyst’ 
(Constable, Field notes, Ride-along) 
The analysts’ disconnection from the street and the source of information serves to 
reduce trustworthiness of the intelligence they provide. As another officer admits, “I’m old 
school, I have trouble accepting that a person in an office is going to tell me what to do” 
(Constable, Field notes, Ride-along). Officers rely heavily on relationship building to attain 
information, cultivating interpersonal relationships with informants to garner intelligence. 
Street credibility and experiential knowledge is situated as more valuable than analytic data. 
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In the words of another officer, “if you want to know what’s going on in the district, asking 
members of the squad will produce more information than crime analysis can tell you” 
(Constable, Field notes, Ride-along). 
 When analysts make recommendations or assessments that officers do not agree with, 
officers often attribute these to the analysts’ perceived deficit in knowledge that a police officer 
would possess. In the following example, an officer expresses skepticism for the analyst’s ability 
to accurately identify and rank prospective targets: 
There was a call, an arson call I think a couple years ago, and an analyst had, they 
had 4 suspects. One of them was a kid that was sitting on the sidewalk and they were 
setting fire to some papers on the sidewalk. They weren't consistent with the arson 
crime that was happening, it didn't really match… And so, in that case once you start 
digging as a police officer you're like oh wait a minute, out of these 4, 2 are pretty 
weak and 2 are really good (Constable, I7) 
 
This example suggests that officers feel that experience facilitates a level of knowledge - and 
an ability to rank suspect likelihood – that is not possessed by non-police personnel. A 
similar view is shared in relation to understanding why crimes or trends are occurring:  
I remember being at a CompStat and they were talking about robberies right. And 
they were saying robberies had gone up significantly in this district. And they were 
also talking about how assaults had gone up in this district in this specific area. So 
this analyst... she sort of gives the explanation to the inspector and the inspector 
presents it, right. And later on the inspector says to me, what'd you think? I said I 
think you need to start getting better advice. And he said what do you mean? I go 
well, any street cop worth his salt knows the reason why street robberies have gone 
up is because there's a new crew of guys selling dope in district 1, and if you don't 
pay your dope deal, they'll torture you... (Sergeant, I15) 
 
There is a perception that the experiential knowledge developed on the ground leaves officers 
with a thorough understanding of the conditions which produce various crime trends. 
Officers consider themselves most qualified to not only select targets, but to explain why 
incidents are occurring. This knowledge is taken for granted by ‘any street cop worth his 
salt’, but is something an analyst is less equipped to advise upon.    
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 When sharing their experiences with crime analysts, officers frequently referenced times 
when their analysts had made mistakes. Stories of analyst errors are passed along among officers 
as anecdotal support for discrediting information provided by the analyst. Crime analysts are 
ridiculed among officers, and stories of failure promote the devaluing of their abilities among 
officers. While chatting with a squad of officers in the parade room, discussing my interest in 
their use of crime analysis, one officer critiqued that,  
The analyst approached me earlier asking who the persons of interest should 
be…like isn’t that your job’ (laughs). Shaking his head, one officer stated, “some of 
them, the things they say, it’s like, we don’t know how they got hired (Fieldnotes #2, 
Ride-along).  
 
These stories and attitudes, when shared among officers, breed a culture of skepticism toward 
the capabilities of the analyst. Officers learn from one another and trust the opinions of one 
another. These social contexts and sharing of stories facilitate sensemaking about the 
analysts’ role and reliability. Another story that was repeated on separate occasions described 
an uninformed recommendation on the part of an analyst:       
 
At parade, the platoon discussed how the analyst had once given them a person of 
interest to focus on. They hadn’t heard this name in a while, so they looked him up 
and it turned out he was in custody, and had been in custody for months. They 
laughed about how the analyst had encouraged them to focus on someone and not 
checked to see if they were in custody (Field notes, ride-along) 
These stories of failure may hold significant sway when officers have little else from which 
to develop opinions about the crime analyst. Officers develop and perpetuate the 
discrediting of analysts among themselves in a social context, sharing stories of analysts’ 
inaccuracies. Given the minimal interaction that officers have with the district analysts and 
subsequent lack of rapport, these stories of mistakes have greater power to define 
perceptions of these individuals and their competence.   
92 
 
Perceptions of Analytic Products 
 The cultural understanding that analysts possess inferior knowledge about the realities of 
policing has meant that officers are distrustful of the content of the reports that they receive.  For 
example, persons of interest recommended by the analyst are perceived as uninformed 
guesswork. One officer shared that he feels as though “they throw out 10-12 persons of interest, 
probably just based on who was in the area, they just shotgun a bunch of random POI’s” (Field 
notes #5, Ride-along). Another officer expresses similar concerns:  
She’ll [the analyst] come out with a list of potential suspects. Um, for me, I think the 
suspects are kind of out of date, and I think they kind of just shotgun a whole bunch 
of people. … I don't really know where those targets come from... I don't find those 
helpful. But I know who's out there and I know kind of who's active. Like we'll 
monitor who's in jail and who's not, and if somebody's getting out, you know, I'll run 
him before I ever see him, just so I know his conditions. So if I see him I don't have 
to like put my hand on the computer and look him up…. I'll just know (Patrol officer, 
I7) 
 
The quotation above highlights concerns regarding the currency, accuracy and source of 
information from the crime analyst. Further, this officer contrasts the analysts’ information 
against his own street knowledge, which is suggested as more reliable and more useful. 
In addition to issues of credibility, officers expressed that the type of intelligence that 
they receive from the analyst provides little utility for them. Officers frequently conceptualize 
crime analysis as a post-hoc briefing or “history report” (Sergeant, I6), not tactical information 
from which to act pre-emptively. Put bluntly, “crime analysis is regurgitating numbers back to 
us. The idea was to regurgitate it in a meaningful way, but it’s really not all that meaningful” 
(Patrol officer, Field notes, Ride-along). Officers describe how analysts’ reports offer a bird’s 
eye view of incidents, but lack both timeliness and an analysis of why certain crime types or 
hotspots may be occurring:  
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The way that it comes through, I don’t find it particularly useful… I think [we need] 
a lot more useful information. Like…a couple variables to make the information 
more complete, if that makes sense. So not just the, what type of crime, where it’s 
occurring and when it’s occurring, But also um, variables such as why it might be 
occurring, who may be involved in it, and more current up to date information 
(Constable, I13) 
 
Officers state that the analytic reports they receive are lacking actionable information. In order 
for the analysis to be deemed worthwhile, officers argue that the analyst must be able to add 
value above and beyond a summary of events. As one officer explains,   
 
The biggest problem is that the analyst isn’t providing information that we can do 
anything with. It’s usually just regurgitating street checks that were done the night 
before, for example, I’ll take a street check and I’ll see the intel in the bulletin the 
next day. Anyone can InDesign me a brochure of what I do, a secretary can pull the 
information from the overnight reports. What I need is for them to tell me what I 
don’t already know – to use their connections to get information that I don’t have 
access to. Tell me why people matter or why things are important, if I checked 
someone last night, why do they matter? (Constable, Fieldnotes, Ride-along) 
 
This officer reiterates the missing actionable component within the information provided by 
crime analysts. He identifies a recurrent complaint that analytical reports are largely a 
summary of past events, and do not provide anything of use to officers.  
Realistically, it can be frustrating sometimes because it takes 30 seconds to break 
into a car, 5 minutes to break into a house. We can’t see through walls, if they’re 
already inside we might be driving by and we have no idea. Catching these guys is 
the hard part, knowing that it’s happening is the easy part (Constable, I2) 
 
The above quotation identifies the frequent challenge of operationalizing incident or occurrence-
based analysis. Further, it alludes to the perception that patrol work is much more complex and 
challenging than following trends of reported incidents.  
Beyond a perception that statistical reports provide minimal practicality, officers also 
expressed difficulty with using pictorial data in a meaningful way. Data displayed in parade 
rooms is inaccessible on the road, and station-based intelligence is impractical for officers 
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because “you see this picture for 10 seconds, and then you’re driving around for the next couple 
days and uh, things like that doesn’t make it easy to identify someone” (Patrol officer, I2). In 
fact, many reports were perceived as inaccessible and impractical.  As the following officer 
describes, 
in our squad room there’s posters that have gotta have probably 200 faces on them. 
So you know it’s, some people are gifted at facial recognition and some aren’t, and 
sometimes it just becomes information overload (Patrol officer, I11). 
 
This example illustrates how disseminating information is one thing, but communicating it 
in a digestible manner is another. More information does not mean officers are better 
equipped if it cannot be absorbed and utilized.   
A notable exception to patrol officers’ attitudes towards reports from the crime analyst 
involves the receipt of information about recent offender releases. Analysts are repeatedly 
credited for being “extremely valuable in digging up who’s been released from jail” (Sergeant, 
I1). A number of officers reiterated this point, noting “they do a little report that says 'this 
person's out, this person's out'. That's useful.” (Patrol Officer, I9). Officers are able to choose the 
aspects of ILP that they find useful, and are not bound to practices which may contradict their 
usual routine. The potential implications of this selective use of crime analysis will be discussed 
in depth in Chapter Six. Officers are able to circumvent aspects of ILP that do not fit with their 
chosen policing style.  
For the most part, officers appear to ascribe little credibility to both the analyst and the 
information they disseminate, stating that analytical products show the lack of street knowledge 
possessed by analysts. Further, officers rationalize that many of the analysts’ products provide no 
utility or basis for action.   
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Making Sense of Crime Analysis: “It’s Not For Us” 
As I have illustrated above, officers working under an ILP framework are inundated with 
information, tools, and reports that they perceive to hold little value within their present 
situational, organizational, and cultural contexts. Officers must make sense of the organizational 
presence of these phenomena and rationalize their resistance to engage with new processes.    
Rather than a tool for patrol, officers have come to perceive analytic products as tools for 
middle-management. As the following officer explains,       
We get emails to our district, from our district analyst [...] the information that we get 
is, my honest opinion, is that the information is more tailored to the management 
team, to be able to focus on crime stats. (Constable, I9) 
 
Patrol officers have reasoned that the information distributed by the analyst is catered to the 
interests of management personnel. This understanding provides officers with a rationale for why 
emails are not prioritized, as illustrated previously. Officers believe their requests for 
supplemental information come second to the analysts’ primary purpose of providing statistics 
for CompStat. While waiting in the parade room before one ride-along shift, an officer described 
an instance when he tried to request a change to the crime maps which were regularly posted in 
their briefing room: 
I’ve been fighting to get more detail, like the MO [modus operandi], added to the 
maps. They did it for a couple weeks and then stopped... It’s too labour intensive I 
guess... It’s well known that the analyst is for CompStat, not for us. The analyst 
doesn’t [adjust the map for us] because CompStat is what matters, it’s bullshit. It 
doesn’t help us catch bad guys... it’s about CompStat, not about us (Constable, Field 
notes #2, Ride-along) 
 
This officer identifies how the needs of patrol are not prioritized when it comes to resourcing of 
the district analyst’s time. He also states that this is a shared understanding among patrol officers 
– that the analyst is not there for their purposes. A district inspector affirms the sentiment by 
stating, 
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I don’t think they [patrol officers] generally understand the full capacity of what [the 
analyst] can do for them... Quite frankly I don’t want them going to her with 
individual requests for analysis... She’s busy enough with our everyday crime 
analysis happening in the district. (District Inspector, I4)   
 
This viewpoint of management contributes to shaping officers’ perceptions of crime analysis, 
discouraging rather than encouraging patrol’s interaction with the analyst. Finally, the 
constable’s remark above draws attention to the perspective that the CompStat process is 
disconnected and irrelevant (“bullshit”) in relation to the policing mission of patrol. Instead, 
CompStat is understood as a process used to “justify what the police are doing and the 
management is doing” (Patrol Officer, I12) and to “build accountability into crime management” 
(Sergeant, I15). The organizational interests served by CompStat are described by the following 
officer.  He explains how   
The logic behind it has a lot to do with funding. It’s money and budgets. If we wanna 
get more money, well then we need to keep statistics to explain to our city council 
why we need more money. So I think that’s the primary purpose behind it, is it’s for 
funding (Constable, I13) 
The quote above draws attention to patrol officers’ understanding of CompStat as a 
political manoeuvre - a reaction to political and economic pressure rather than a practical 
strategy: 
There’s a divide between the management and the worker bees ... I guess the upper 
management talks about the intel-led policing and blah blah, it’s funny because they 
react to political pressure, and what’s topical (Sergeant, I6) 
 
The notion that officers perceive ILP as a reaction is made more interesting by the sociopolitical 
context (See Chapter Four). Based on the experiences and perceptions of patrol officers, ILP 
appears to be understood more as a trend than as a meaningful shift in police work. Several 
officers explained how the targets and expectations that are assigned by this policing-by-
outcomes perspective make little sense in regards to patrol capabilities. For example, the 
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following officer describes how responsibilities are assigned based on trend spikes, regardless of 
their feasibility to be addressed by patrol units:   
Domestic violence went up one month. And they told us to bring it down. I thought, 
how are we supposed to bring domestic violence down? Like we can't patrol 
apartment buildings, like listen in, knocking on doors and all that. So they really 
hammered home that we need to get the numbers down for domestic violence. And 
they didn't care that we... at a patrol level we really can't do it, but they didn't really 
care about that, they just wanted it done. And … I think it went down the next 
month. We didn't do anything, we're just kind of doing our job and it went down and 
they were all happy about it. So, as long as the numbers reflect… what they want us 
to do, they're happy. But it doesn't really, I personally don't really change the way I 
do things based on what they want. (Constable, I7) 
As illustrated by the officer above, there is a substantial disconnect between management 
objectives and patrol practices. Such assignments produce distance between patrol and 
management culture, and allude to contradictions between the organizational expectations of 
each group. Regardless, officers are tasked with the responsibility for impacting a crime category 
that they may be unable to act upon. If subsequent rates are favourable, officers are praised 
absent of any concrete change in policing behaviour. Patrol officers may not be able to alter their 
approach, as in the case of domestic violence, yet they become responsible for the outcomes.  
 Officers readily identify the ambiguous nature of statistical reporting. The following 
sergeant describes an instance of statistical ‘accountability’ deemed to be devoid of meaning, and 
even humorous: 
This morning we released stats for our district... theft from autos, and night time 
commercial B&E’s have gone up. But it’s like, what’s ‘gone up’? Funny thing...the 
guys up in district four... The bar [graph] says 28 incidents and the bar next to it 
was 38. So increase of 10. But that’s 30%. So he’s getting yelled at, ‘He had a 30% 
jump in theft from autos! What is he doing about it? What’s the plan? This is a 
huge jump in crime in his neighbourhood!’ Then it’s my turn our district, well I’ve 
got the same size lines except the numbers beside mine, one is 394 and one is 412 
or something. More than his 10. But percentage wise, miniscule. So he’s praising 
me. And I’m trying not to laugh, cause he got yelled at because one guy went into 
one parking lot and whacked 10 cars, so somehow he’s ‘not addressing crime’ 
(Sergeant, I6)  
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This quote draws attention to how the statistical understanding of management fails to 
contextualize rates relative to the larger picture. Rather, notions of accountability – or lack 
thereof – are reduced to anomalies such as an individual spree of ten incidents. Further, these 
remarks suggest that officers do not buy-in to the idea that such measurements are indicative of 
successes or failures, and do not believe that such gauges exemplify ‘good police work’.  
Under present situational, organizational, and cultural contexts, officers have come to 
understand that ILP is not fully operationalized at the patrol level because in fact, it was not 
intended for their use. Rather, officers perceive ILP and crime analysis as a tool for management 
personnel to demonstrate accountability for crime control.     
 
Navigating the Clash: Patrolling By Numbers 
 As I have shown, the ‘loosely coupled’ state which characterizes ILP in the CPD has 
meant that patrol officers remain largely disengaged from ILP practices. However, 
organizational pressure on management personnel has led selective aspects of ILP to penetrate 
patrol work. Using ticket and street-check counts as CompStat success indicators has translated 
into pressure on patrol to achieve desired counts. Officers face reviews such as, “how many 
violation tickets did you write this month? Okay well you only wrote x amount so okay well 
that’s gotta increase” (Constable, I12). Patrol sergeants and officers express apprehension toward 
these practices, feeling that they are disconnected and at times inappropriate in relation to the 
demands of the job. As one Acting Sergeant explains,  
After CompStat yesterday the inspector comes back and says we need to increase 
tickets. This month there’s a focus on distracted driving tickets, so I’m told as 
acting sergeant to let the guys know that ticket numbers are low. I’ll pass along the 
information, but I filter some of it from the supervisors. If the guys have had a 
hectic shift like they did yesterday and then I go to and say ‘we need more tickets!’ 
they won’t respond well (Field notes #4, Ride-along) 
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Officers make sense of these responsibilities by acknowledging them but not internalizing them 
as deserving such importance. Nevertheless, complying with expectations for output 
measurements illustrates an example of how ILP has been selectively embraced by patrol.   
While on a call in an apartment building, a few officers were standing around waiting in the 
hallway while two others were inside speaking with the tenants. One officer exclaimed,   
‘Guess what? I got a distracted driving ticket biiiitches!’ as he gestured in a 
celebratory, fists-in-the-air motion - his voice enthusiastic but sarcastic. Another 
officer laughed and turned to me and said, ‘the corner office wants to see more 
tickets’ (Field notes, Ride-along) 
 
The fieldnote example above illustrates how officers can respond to ticketing requirements in 
order to appease management, although responding to these tasks can become a joke among 
officers. Moreover, the quotations above illustrate the disconnected and clashing expectations 
between patrol culture and middle-management.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion: ILP as a Rationalized Institutional Myth 
As illustrated throughout this chapter, a number of situational and cultural barriers have 
shaped the way that patrol officers have made sense of ILP and its relevance, or lack thereof, to 
their daily practices. The conditions under which ILP has been organizationally implemented 
have ultimately led officers to understand that crime analysis was not predominantly intended to 
be an operational tool for them. The organizational emphasis on intelligence-led practices and 
data analysis is instead understood by officers to be a trend, a tactic by management to align with 
growing public calls for police transparency and accountability.   
Institutional theory provides a means to understand reform not as a failure to 
operationalize the philosophy, but as a strategic state of operating. Organizational claimsmaking 
may support a process of acquiring and maintaining legitimacy, while internal operations may 
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remain largely unaffected. A disconnect, or ‘decoupling’ of rhetoric from practice allows for the 
production of legitimacy without the investment, complication or resistance of forcing drastic 
change upon the status quo (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The degree to which practical changes 
occur rests on understanding “how people in organizations construct meaning and reality, and 
then exploring how that enacted reality provides a context for organizational action (Choo, 1996: 
337). Although the organization has implemented both personnel and technological 
infrastructure to support analytical capacities in the operational patrol division, these practices 
appear to be largely ‘decoupled’ from officers’ perceptions, understandings, and practices.   
Despite how the role of IT in guiding decision processes is championed in the rhetoric of 
would-be “knowledge organizations”, its practical capabilities and uses within the organization 
have shown to be largely symbolic. Ground-level functioning often appears contradictory to the 
aim of investing in these technologies (Brown & Brudney, 2003). Feldman & March (1981) 
identify that the mass collection of information by organizations surpasses what can realistically 
be used or considered in decision making processes. This holds even greater relevancy as 
technological advancement has magnified the ability to both gather and store data. Despite 
impracticality, “the gathering of information provides a ritualistic assurance that appropriate 
attitudes about decision making exist” and are held by the organization (Feldman & March, 
1981: 177). The significance of external perceptions about processes surpasses the importance of 
their literal translation. CPD is able to benefit from ceremonially equipping officers with 
intelligence, maintaining the appearance of an intelligence-led patrol team, regardless of whether 
officers actually engage with the material. The tools have been provided and responsibility for 
leveraging them is thus placed upon patrol.  
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Institutional theory posits that institutional programs and policies - when applied literally 
- create contradictions and inconsistencies which can undermine rather than promote efficiency 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Instead, organizations operate in a ‘loosely coupled’ state to allow the 
organization to benefit from the legitimating features of organizational change, while not 
sacrificing efficiency to enact literal coordination (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Coordinating patrol 
work in a way which forces the consumption of all information that is provided would, as 
demonstrated above, decrease the amount of time officers are on the street fulfilling the 
emergency response role of patrol. As illustrated throughout this chapter, the dissemination of 
intelligence does not ensure consumption or use by the end user - nor would this consumption 
appear to breed increased efficiency if it were to occur. Given the reactive nature of patrol work 
which leaves little time for proactivity, there may be minimal return for enforcing the 
consumption of analytic data. The lack of actionable information contained in crime analysis 
reports for patrol officers further negates the value of strictly coordinating this behaviour. 
Similarly, the decision not to invest in training may have been made in the interest of using 
resources efficiently, given present organizational conditions. Rather, it appears that ILP has 
affected patrol work most notably through output evaluations, such as ticket or street check 
counts.     
Interestingly, it is this emphasis on outputs that allows ILP in its ‘loosely coupled’ state 
to ‘work out backstage’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Officers do not need to accept the analyst as 
part of the team or pay attention to analytical reports in order to issue tickets and write street 
checks for CompStat counts. Management may leverage crime analysis for accountability 
purposes, while officers can rationalize their minimal engagement because the situational, 
organizational, and cultural conditions have led officers to believe it’s “not for them”. Officers 
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work within ILP requirements by achieving numerical expectations without fundamentally 
changing their approach. As a result, the challenge of trying to change patrol culture and 
attitudes toward the analyst is avoided. Information from the analyst which suits their existing 
occupational schemas and activities (for example, the ‘recent release’ reports) is acknowledged, 
while the remainder can be overlooked. The organization is able to benefit from the legitimating 
processes of ILP claimsmaking while not producing turmoil by exerting drastic change upon 
patrol officers. Instead, officers selectively embrace aspects of ILP which do not disrupt 
established occupational or cultural norms.  
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of how officers have made sense of ILP, and 
how this sensemaking process has shaped perceptions of ILP’s purpose and value. In Chapter 
Six, I move to an analysis of how officers enact ILP on the ground.  
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Chapter Six: Intelligence-led ‘Proactive’ Patrol Work  
In this chapter, I explore the reported and observed practices of patrol officers operating 
under an ILP framework. Despite patrol officers’ resistance toward engaging with ILP 
innovation and crime analysis on the front end (as illustrated in Chapter Four), they have 
embraced select aspects of ILP. For example, patrol officers engage in a number of practices 
which fall under the banner of ‘proactive’ police work.  These include collecting street check 
reports, achieving output expectations assigned by management, and leveraging select 
information from the analyst which fits with their established occupational routines (such as 
‘recent release’ reports). In what follows, I explore patrol officers’ reported experiences and 
observed practices engaging with ‘intelligence’ and ‘proactive’ approaches as part of ILP. I then 
analyze how these practices may impact police-public interactions, raising several concerns 
about some of the ‘proactive’ patrolling approaches occurring under an ILP framework.  
 I begin with a discussion on ILP and CompStat policing.  I outline existing literature on 
the adoption and implementation of ‘intelligence practices’ on the ground, including the socio-
political concerns which have been raised in relation to these practices. I then move to an 
empirical analysis of ‘proactive’ patrol practices in the CPD, the organizational pressure to 
conduct street checks and an occupational emphasis on ‘recent releases’. I argue that the reported 
experiences and observed practices of CPD patrol officers raise concerns about the policing of 
the usual suspects and identify the need to be attentive to how risk is constructed under an ILP 
model. I conclude with a discussion of the potential socio-political implications of these 
‘intelligence practices.’      
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Partnering ILP and CompStat 
Although ILP and CompStat are frequently implemented together - as they have been in 
CPD - the problem focus of each approach is distinct (Ratcliffe, 2008). Combining the two 
ideologies has resulted in a policing strategy which is concerned with targeting specific types of 
offenders, as well as certain criminal events. As outlined in the literature review, ILP places its 
emphasis on repeat and prolific offenders (Ratcliffe, 2008; Leman-Langlois & Shearing, 2009). 
It operates from the perspective that a small number of individuals contribute to a large portion 
of incidents, and that targeting select individuals through increased surveillance and monitoring 
will effectively disrupt crime (Ratcliffe, 2008).  
As opposed to a focus on specific offenders, CompStat policing takes interest with 
criminal events, identifying and addressing clusters and hot spots, and tracking crime statistics 
by incident type (Ratcliffe, 2008).  CompStat frequently targets “minor quality of life offenses in 
the neighbourhoods where violent crime occurs” (Fabricant, 2011:373), working from a belief 
that addressing less serious crimes will help to reduce overall criminal occurrences, including 
those which escalate to more serious crime. The emphasis on proactivity as part of ILP, and the 
targeting of crime types associated with CompStat has meant that “proactive approaches 
previously applied to major and organized crime have moved into realms of petty, persistent 
offending, low-level drug dealing, [and] public disorder” (Maguire, 2000: 318). The focus on 
clusters and hotspots within the CompStat review system has meant that intervention becomes 
targeted geographically, which “inevitably leads to ‘over-policing’ of selected areas, while 
others, given limited resources, are ‘under-policed’” (Leman-Langlois & Shearing, 2009: 37). 
Ratcliffe (2002b) has identified concerns regarding accuracy and anonymity in crime mapping 
that is released into the public domain and discusses the risks of labelling certain areas as 
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dangerous or undesirable. Hotspot policing strategies have evoked concern surrounding the 
disproportionate targeting of lower socioeconomic areas, and potential consequences for police-
community relations and legitimacy (Kochel, 2011; Weisburd, Hinkle, Famega and Ready, 2011; 
Neyroud & Disley, 2008).  
Additional research on the integration and utilization of information technologies and 
crime analysis have uncovered that although these tools provide pre-interaction access to 
intelligence information, they are often “used in line with traditional modes of policing” (Innes, 
Fielding & Cope, 2005: 39). Technologies that were intended to increase the delivery of 
‘intelligence’ information to officers for real-time decision-making did not appear to increase the 
rationality or objectivity of decisions, but instead provided a means of “technologically 
augmenting” the policing of “usual suspects” (Sanders & Hannem, 2012: 402). Similarly, crime 
analytic reports have been found to provide “a way of claiming ‘scientific objectivity’ for police 
actions” without actually changing such practices (Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005: 39). As such, 
proactive policing measures have ignited concern about the potential for discriminatory profiling 
and civil liberty infringement (Mythen & Walklate, 2006; Phillipson, 2011; Ferguson, 2012). For 
instance, labelling processes employed by analysts to ascertain gang members have come under 
scrutiny for their subjective nature and residual implications to the “life chances” of those 
erroneously identified (Fraser & Atkinson, 2014: 158). Thus, such practices risk becoming 
legitimized as an “objective science” (Sanders & Hannem, 2012).  
Finally, research surrounding intelligence-led policing raises important questions about 
what constitutes ‘intelligence’. For example, do street checks (also referred to as ‘carding,’ ‘stop-
and-documents,’ ‘field information reports’ etc.) constitute intelligence?  Street checks are police 
stops during which officers collect information about persons not engaged in a criminal incident. 
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These stops are utilized by police departments across Canada, including CPD, to gather 
information for the purpose of intelligence-led policing (Fabricant, 2011). Brown (2007) 
identifies that while there is little consensus on what is meant by ‘intelligence’ within law 
enforcement, there is a common sentiment that ‘mere data’ or raw information, such as street 
checks, are not intelligence in and of itself. Rather, data becomes intelligence when it is made 
significant or actionable through an analytical or methodical process (Brown, 2007). Manning 
(1992) defines intelligence as “information gathered for anticipated events, rather than gathered 
in response to an ongoing event” (p. 352). This definition appears better suited at least to the 
rationale behind street check practices. As I illustrate in this chapter, street checks need not be 
analyzed or collated prior to behaving as a catalyst for subsequent assumption or action. In what 
follows, I provide an empirical account of proactive patrolling practices occurring under an ILP 
framework.  
 
Proactive Policing Under ILP 
Proactive approaches carried out by patrol officers in CPD emphasize data-collection 
practices such as street-check and ‘intel’ reports, as well as a concentration on pursuing known 
offenders. In what follows, I provide an analysis of the street check practices of CPD patrol 
officers, including a discussion of data collection processes, and how these processes may 
contribute to the construction of risk. Next, I explore officers’ prioritization of ‘recent releases’ 
within their unassigned or ‘proactive’ time. Both of these practices are examined in context with 
organizational performance measurement procedures in place under an ILP CompStat model. 
From this, I argue that the reported experiences and observed practices of CPD patrol officers 
raise concern about the policing of usual suspects. Moreover, I argue that present conditions may 
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encourage information gathering which poses concern for problematic constructions of risk. I 
end with a discussion of the potential socio-political implications of such ‘intelligence practices’.  
 
Street Checks and the Construction of Risk  
 Officers put in street check reports after interacting with a citizen wherein no criminal 
offense occurred, but an officer - for any number of reasons – may decide to complete a report 
which documents the interaction. Street check reports become sources of intelligence that are 
drawn upon by crime analysts, and are used to inform potential suspects or persons of interest. 
As an inspector describes, 
What crime analysis allows you to do then is to look at for example the street checks 
of individuals that were made in the area where all of these crimes are taking place. 
So the crime analysis would involve looking at the crime, looking at the checks of 
persons in the neighbourhood where the crimes are taking place, and trying to merry 
the two together to give us a list of possible suspects that we could focus resources 
on. (Inspector, I4)    
 
The decision to complete a street check is left up to the officers’ discretion, however, street 
check quantities per district are tracked for monthly CompStat review. Thus, inspectors must 
encourage their squads to input street checks in order to meet this monthly quota.   
Given that street checks occur amidst interactions where no criminal offense has taken place, 
gleaning data, such as personal identification, is not always a straightforward process. 
Individuals engaging in casual interaction with officers are not obligated to provide information, 
and officers must navigate this challenge in order to collect the data that they are seeking. A 
sergeant explains,     
Oftentimes we want to be able to stop them through lawful means, right. So um, and 
that’s where we can use some of the city by-laws, you know, like the jaywalking, the 
riding their bikes without helmets, we’re able to kind of you know, think outside the 
box a little bit to you know, give us a chance to stop and talk to them. But you know 
108 
 
we’re able to stop and chat with somebody, not everyone has to give us their 
information, right, just normally. (Sergeant, I1) 
Officers are able to utilize minor, procedural or quality of life by-law offenses in order to 
glean personal identification from citizens. Using by-law enforcement as a means to collect 
data provides officers with some protection from accusations of arbitrary detention or 
violating privacy rights. Another officer shares his similar approach to street checks, 
All I'm doing is I'm painting a picture. At some point, once I've got enough tick 
boxes, you know, check check check check check, okay that's enough to at least, I 
now have a suspicion. I don't have any grounds for anything. Like I could stop him 
and talk to him and say hey how's your day going if I was working, but if he said 
pound sand, I can't do anything other than say alright, see ya. You know. I might 
wait until he j-walks, and then now you've committed an offense, so now I can do 
something. Now I can identify you. (Constable, I10) 
 
First, the remark above identifies the propensity to street check on the basis of suspicion, 
challenging claims of rapport-building as the driving force. Second, it identifies how 
officers may find ways to force an individual to provide identification if they are initially 
uncooperative. As I observed in the following excerpt from ride-along field notes, Motor 
Vehicle Act offenses are also used to instigate searches and garner information to complete 
street checks or ‘intel reports’: 
The call board was quiet, so we were unassigned and driving around the district. 
[The officer] told me that in this down time, he often runs plates to try and find 
gangsters to do checks. We drove around running plates for any cars we passed that 
the officer thought may belong to a gang member. As we headed back toward the 
centre of downtown, he entered the licence plate of a black SUV which was parked 
outside a drugstore. The RMS search indicated that this vehicle was linked to a 
known gang member. The officer noted that the vehicle was missing a front licence 
plate, giving reason to pull the vehicle over. We waited in the car until a man and a 
woman exited the drugstore and headed towards the SUV. The officer then turned on 
the cruiser lights and approached the male. The officer confronted the man about the 
missing plate, requested identification, and requested to search the vehicle. The 
officer called for backup, and three officers conducted a thorough search of the 
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vehicle. Following the search which yielded nothing of interest, the officer 
completed a ‘gang intel’ report on the interaction. (Field notes #5, Ride-along) 
 The scenario described above illustrates how information technologies, such as the RMS, 
shape the way that officers respond to minor offenses. In this case, a missing plate yielded 
a vehicle search because of RMS information about an individual, not because of the 
offense itself. The policing of offenses has become the policing of individuals, with 
enforcement acting as the means rather than the end. Interestingly, this particular officer 
shared his aspirations to work in the gang unit, telling how this personal interest is what 
drives his unassigned time (Field notes #5, Ride-along). Rather than proactive time which 
is strictly coordinated by an analysis of needs, patrol officers appear to pursue proactive 
projects which fit their individual motivations.  
As described in the previous chapter, the information captured in a street check varies in 
detail between officer and circumstance. At the very least, it provides a documented account that 
an individual was at a specific location at a specific time. As one officer explains,   
…Street checks are interesting because, a street check, all it is it’s a report that just 
says at this place, at this time, I spoke to this person, what he was wearing, and 
depending on what's relevant to you. So if you think that this person was involved in 
crime, maybe you give a very detailed description of what he was wearing, so that 
later, someone says well this crime happened, we found out about it a week later, and 
then they search the street checks. It's just a way of documenting interactions 
(Constable, I9) 
The quotation above identifies the variance, and more importantly, the subjective nature of how 
much detail is collected when conducting a street check. The officers’ perception of the 
individual and their potential criminality can greatly impact whether or not time is taken to 
collect details, such as a clothing description. A record of past criminality also shapes officer 
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suspicion, as well as the level of detail warranted in a street check. One constable reflected on 
what might trigger him to conduct a street check, stating 
Um, [a] person's background. Potentially could be because they're flagged as being 
of interest. So like on CPIC, somebody could get flagged as having a special interest 
police flag. So this person is known, or is a high risk sex offender, please document 
all details about the stop… so you would just, alright, well he's wearing blue pants 
and black shoes, and, write it all down. Cause you might not have thought to do it on 
him until you see it on CPIC and then you say oh geez, turns out he's a much worse 
guy than I thought, so you'll go into a lot of detail on that. (Constable, I10) 
 
Above, the officer identifies how the construction of an individual and the ‘type’ of person 
they are plays an important role in how much data is collected and stored within a street 
check. Another officer reiterates the discretionary process by which information may or 
may not be documented and entered into the system:  
 …We do quite a few street checks. … we definitely check a greater percentage of 
people than we document. And that’s, you know, if there’s valuable information in 
the check then we’ll put in the street check, but you know we’re constantly checking 
people. You know whether it’s vehicle checks, pedestrians or cyclists, you know, 
we’re constantly dealing with people. (Constable, I2) 
 
This officer identifies the selective nature of whether or not a check becomes formally 
documented as a street check. An officer may interact with an individual, check their 
identification or run them through the system, but this may only be documented if that person 
triggers suspicion for the officer. Thus, the street check data entered in the system consists 
largely of people categorized as warranting documentation, and is not a comprehensive snapshot 
of the people who may have been in any given area. Officers may deem an individual suspicious 
if their behaviour or whereabouts do not match what the officers perceive as ‘normal behaviour’.   
As the following sergeant explains,  
we have a lot of stones getting unturned, and a lot of people who need to be checked 
at 2:00 in the morning, so it’s not a lot of regular people out… these people are all 
being identified (Sergeant, I1).  
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Officers create typifications about the behaviour of law-abiding versus problematic citizens, and 
categorize people on the basis of these perceptions. The following officer describes how he 
determines whether to put in a street check on someone:     
If it's just a, hey this guy's here all the time and he's, he looks shady, he looks like 
he's doing shady things, he's giving off all the shady flags, but he hasn't done 
anything wrong yet, yeah then you'll put in one. Um, a lot of what we do really 
comes down to discretion though. I mean a huge amount of what we do is discretion, 
where, it'll be like my own personal experiences and my kind of background and my 
life will tell me that like, you know… the age, the facial expressions, the clothes that 
you wear, they matter. I mean if you're wearing the typical ‘I'm a criminal’ you 
know, Dussault hoodie, um, and all these things, middle of the afternoon walking 
with your hood up, it's not really all that cold outside right now, you know, the baggy 
sweatpants, and then has a flip phone (Constable, I10) 
 
The remarks above describe how officers use a number of demographic and physical indicators 
to infer whether an individual warrants suspicion. This officer rightfully alludes to the subjective 
nature of such interpretations, acknowledging that such perceptions are a result of an officer’s 
personal experience over a calculated assessment of risk. Additionally, suspicion may be inferred 
from past documentation about an individual. One officer provided an example of how decisions 
regarding street-checks are determined:           
…If we had something like… we stop a guy, maybe he's been involved in a prowler 
call a year ago or 3 years ago, and he didn't really have a good reason for being there 
and he was really nervous and jittery, suddenly we're like oh this is interesting. Um, 
if we don’t have anything in terms of any crime at that time we might put in 
intelligence information that says, this person was checked near a bus stop, he was 
checked because of these high incidents of sex crimes at this time, there's no 
evidence to link him to those crimes, however he's a person of interest…So what 
happens is the next police officer that runs into him will read that intelligence and go 
hmm, and might pay a little bit more attention…. Because he's read the report. 
(Constable, I9) 
This officer describes how prior recorded interactions with the police may change the way that 
present officers perceive the individual (‘suddenly this is interesting’). This may pertain to 
involvement in past incidents, but also to the existence of previous street checks. This officer 
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identifies the potential for street-checks to act as a catalyst for future suspicion. Suspicion by one 
officer which led to a street check may trigger further interest and subsequent street checks. 
Further, the fact that this officer regards previous checks as ‘intelligence’ identifies the 
credibility ascribed to previous checks.   
The proactive collection of intelligence information through street-checks is 
intimately linked to notions of targeting and saturating specific areas of concern. It is 
within these hot spots that officers are especially encouraged to conduct street checks. Both 
street checks and violation tickets are tallied for CompStat purposes. Officers are assigned 
responsibility for engaging in these ‘proactive’ tactics while management interpret their 
execution as indicative of good police work. An inspector describes how they designate 
specific geographic locations for officers to complete street checks, and is able to follow-
up and track if this assignment is accomplished:  
We’ll often ask a team to go and increase the number of people they check on the 
street in order to identify persons of interest for particular crimes. Um, if we’ve had 
an increase in a geographical area of residential break and enters and we don’t know 
who it is […] We’ll ask the members to go and do some … street checks or person 
checks, and so I can see overnight if they’ve done 5 or 6 street checks in that 
neighbourhood, and I can see that because they’re reported in [our records 
management system], then I know that they’ve gone out into that neighbourhood and 
they’ve done their job that we’ve asked them to do (Inspector, I4) 
The number of street checks that an officer collects in an assigned area is used to asses an 
officer’s level of performance (“it tells me they’re doing a lot of work” (Seargeant, I1)). For 
management, addressing trends and patterns involves instructing their squads to pursue street 
checks in the area. Achieving sufficient street check numbers allows management personnel to 
illustrate that they are actively working to impact the hotspot.  
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 On the ground, patrol officers are expected to comply with numerical output expectations 
assigned by management. This often results in an abundance of street checks, as one constable 
explains: 
Our inspector who runs our district, a lot of his philosophy is saturate the area and 
check people, identify people who are walking around, identify people who are up to 
no good, well okay that's great and all, but what is that gonna do? It's either gonna 
shift the problem somewhere else, or, a lot of the time what's happening is because 
they want us to build statistics, they want us to do street checks, they want us to be 
on people and checking them. So a lot of time's what's happening in a night is, I'll 
check John Doe and put in a street check report on him, and an hour later my squad 
mate will check John Doe and put in a street check on him, you know what I'm 
saying? We're just checking people and putting in check reports on them because 
that's what our inspector wants or that's what our supervisors want, well they want 
stats, they want us to saturate an area, they want us to check anyone and everything. 
Okay we'll that's great and everything but we've just checked the same guy in an hour 
and gotten two reports out of it, but we're no closer to resolving the problem 
(Constable, I13, emphasis added) 
The officer above identifies how quantifying street check goals may appease quotas, but 
questions the utility of such practices. Repeatedly checking the same individuals does not yield 
new or actionable intelligence. Further, this raises concern about the assignment of risk to 
individuals who are repeatedly checked, given that prior street checks may trigger greater interest 
in an individual.  
The relationship between street checks and perceived risk raises concern about how 
intelligence practices are contributing to risk construction. The street check expectations in CPD 
create conditions where an abundance of street checks may be conducted as a formality for 
management. One constable identifies how a heavy emphasis on street check quantities may 
jeopardize information quality: 
…Last year they tried to get us to write more street checks, as a whole district right, 
because we were falling down in our numbers. So they said write more. So we did... 
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people are just throwing intel reports, that's a criminal, I'm gonna check him. Just to 
get the numbers. So my partner and I, we kind of, made a point of showing how 
ridiculous it is. We left the station to go and get coffee, and every person we saw that 
we knew we wrote a street check on. And so we saw like 40 people we knew. So we 
just wrote it down, we wrote them all down, went back to the office, and they loved 
it…  I had nothing to add on any of them… they like to think that we're gathering all 
this intelligence on people. When they weren't gathering shit. But that's what they 
like right, numbers are up, so it's fine (Constable, I7) 
 
First, the excerpt above identifies that assessing street checks by quantity does not mean 
that new or useful information is contained in each check. This remark insinuates that 
management regards street checks as ‘intelligence’, regardless of their content or quality. 
Second, the quote raises concern about the policing of usual suspects and known offenders 
(‘every person we saw that we knew’). Although this officer identifies the erroneous nature 
of conducting street checks of this manner, his actions illustrate that officers are appeasing 
their supervisors and contributing to vast ‘intelligence’ stores. An abundance of street 
checks constructs notions of risk about an individual and their perceived behaviour. As one 
officer describes,      
…You start building this information and intelligence about this individual that 
might be relevant down the line, because maybe he isn't doing anything criminal 
now, but his behaviour is escalating. And that's where it really is, that information 
becomes useful. Sometimes that information does get out of hand, with gang 
intelligence. So for example this person was checked with a gang member in this bar, 
okay, he was checked again with this gang member in this other bar. Well the guy 
might be a law-abiding citizen that has really terrible friends, and we see that all the 
time. This guy's got like 15 intelligence gang information, you're like oh this guy's a 
pretty big gangster, but then when you start actually reading the intelligence 
information, yeah, he was just talking to gangsters, and he's associated with those 
type of people, but he's never been involved in any sort of crime and he's never been 
a suspect in any sort of crime. So that's the only time it can get a little bit, at first 
glance you might think this person's worse than they are. (Constable, I9) 
The officer above identifies several critical concerns related to street check ‘intelligence’ 
and the construction of categories of risk. First, he identifies that street checks are 
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understood as a pre-emptive indication that an individual may become problematic or 
engage in criminal behaviour (‘his behaviour is escalating’). Second, he identifies the self-
fulfilling nature of street check ‘intelligence’, identifying that the existence of a street 
check or gang flag itself stimulates officers’ interests which often results in subsequent 
checks. Third, he identifies concerns about street check ‘intelligence’ and the associations 
it creates. Street checks link people to one another when they are checked together, which 
results in the potential for someone to appear to be involved in activities that they are not.  
 Crime analysis also creates the potential for the misattribution of risk to people. 
Analysts disseminate bulletins with persons of interest which officers are encouraged to 
pay attention to.  During a patrol ride-along shift, the two officers I was riding with 
discussed how, 
...Often, the analyst is ‘going on a hunch’. One officer stated, ‘the thing with crime 
analysis is that it can be skewed by poor policing’. He described how the analyst may 
definitively say to focus on one person, but it doesn’t always make sense or isn’t 
always supported. The officers discussed how emphasizing focus on a certain person 
leads to repeated street checks on that person, which can create a ‘paper gangster’. 
An individual comes to appear to have significant interest and gang links based on 
street checks, leading officers to check the individual every time they run into them. 
The individual becomes a ‘paper gangster’, but does not actually warrant that level of 
interest. (Field notes, ride along) 
The excerpt above identifies how an individual may appear to be a significant concern on 
paper or in the system based on street check documentation. However, the reality is that 
they are perpetually checked based on the existence of an initial interest or check. The 
process can become cyclical, where identifying a person of interest stimulates street 
checks, and street checks are used to identify persons of interest. Further, one can become 
a ‘paper gangster’ through association with someone who is flagged as a ‘known gangster’. 
Those who are stopped or checked with other individuals become linked to one another in 
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the system. These associations are used to draw inferences about the risk and behaviour of 
others. As I learned during one ride-along: 
Following a vehicle search of a known gang member, the officer I was riding with 
was writing a ‘gang intel’ report regarding the search. The individual’s girlfriend had 
been in the vehicle with him, and the officer linked the report to her name as well. 
We discussed more about how gang associations were linked in the system. I 
mentioned that it was unfortunate for the girl that was with him, as she would always 
be flagged as linked to a gang whenever she was pulled over in the future. The 
officer replied that was true, but that she should be. He then described that these sort 
of links do have the potential to cause ‘paper gangsters’, for example, ‘if the 
girlfriend’s nephew had been in the car as well, and had given attitude or done 
anything for which the officer decided to put in a check for him, he would then be 
linked to a gang member’. This would mean that every time he was stopped in the 
future this association would lead to continued street checks on him, when really he 
may not be involved in the gang at all (Constable, Field notes #5, Ride along) 
The quotation above raises further concern about the construction of risk through associations. It 
identifies how a youth only vaguely connected to a gang member may face incessant surveillance 
after being documented in the same vehicle on one occasion. The collection of street check and 
‘intelligence’ data which occurs as part of ‘proactive policing’ under ILP poses significant 
concerns regarding labelling practices and the attribution of risk or criminality.  
Conducting street checks based on geographic areas of concern also contributes to 
construction risk of an individual. As another officer describes, an individual may become a 
person of interest based on a wide net of street checks in a specified area. The following 
quotation illustrates how location-driven checks can result in a number of ‘suspects’ that may not 
warrant substantial interest.  
[W]hen we get information, often I find that out of four suspects in the area, when 
you actually start to dig to see if um these are viable suspects, you find that well, 3 of 
them they were checked in the area and one of them was binning, or they're not really 
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viable suspects. But they're part of this whole catch of people that were checked or 
live in that area (Constable, I9) 
Given that officers may be assigned to conduct street checks in specified geographical 
locations such as frequent hotspots, residing in a ‘risky’ areas can increase the chance of 
being designated a ‘person of interest’.  
 
Policing the Usual Suspects 
 Tasking officers with the responsibility for controlling crime rates under a CompStat 
model has facilitated the selective adoption of intelligence information which assists officers in 
the policing of usual suspects. Although the practices of patrol officers have remained largely 
unchanged under ILP (see Chapter Five), officers show enthusiasm for a report document which 
provides information about individuals who are being released from incarceration. As one 
officers outlines,  
The crime analyst keeps track of who's been put in jail, who's been checked with 
who, who's getting released from jail… a hard copy and an email copy of a poster 
will come out saying they're being released, this is where they usually target, be on 
the lookout for them (Constable, I11) 
 
Officers are provided information and pictures of known offenders who will be re-entering 
the community, and are advised to keep a heightened watch for these individuals while on 
patrol. In addition to information about the individual’s offense history, officers are 
provided with addresses and community supervision conditions: 
So there's photos, there's grids, grid patterns, and there's usually the photos of 
potential suspects and names and the information of where they live, their conditions 
that they are to abide by within all these fan outs, and these posters and 
emails.(Constable, I12) 
 
Providing officers with probation or patrol conditions allows officers to target known offenders 
based on minor breaches, rather than wait for an individual to actively commit an offense. 
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Several officers referred to this approach as a staple of their unassigned time. One constable 
described how,   
[The analyst] tell[s] us about recent releases, so, like there’s a guy who every time he 
gets released, me and partner arrest him within 2 days for breaching, right. So we 
just found out that he’s out, which is great information, because you know, telling us 
who’s out is great because otherwise we’d have to run them and kind of see what 
they’re up to and have they been checked. Now that we know he’s out, now we’re on 
the hunt for him again, so that’s good information. (Constable, I2) 
The officer above identifies how information from the crime analyst is employed to aid in the 
‘hunting’ of usual suspects. This tactic moves beyond the pursuit of ‘known’ individuals who are 
wanted for crimes. Instead, hunting for community supervision breaches (which may be 
instances such as missing an appointment with a parole officer or interacting with others who 
have criminal records) is an attempt to pre-empt crime by re-arresting and detaining individuals 
before criminal events are necessarily occurring. Further, this officer stresses that in contrast to 
other information provided by the analyst, bulletins containing recently released individuals are 
useful. Another officer shares this sentiment, explaining how the analyst provides them with “an 
updated list of fresh warrants, which is probably the only thing that I use that’s extra [from the 
analyst]” (Constable, I7). Officers’ positive regard for this specific tool from the crime analyst 
indicates that this tool is actionable. Providing conditions and addresses of known offenders 
allows officers to actively ‘hunt’ these individuals. The following two interview excerpts 
illustrate how officers use such information in their everyday practices: 
…If we knew exactly where they were gonna be residing once they were released, 
let's say they're going to a halfway house or if they have an apartment, and we know 
if they're a chronic offender [….] if there’s time we would set up on the residence 
and see if we could follow them leaving the residence and see what they do, is 
usually one approach. Or another approach is our patrol unit may see this person 
walking about and call in a plain clothes unit to follow them and see what they do. 
(Constable, I11) 
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I can see who was arrested over the last 4 days, and I get a brief synopsis of what the 
events were… if I see a major file or a prolific offender or a good target, oh okay, he 
did this at this location, and he’s gonna be out again so, I’m gonna be in that 
location too looking for him (Constable, I10) 
Above, the officers describe how proactive time may be used to monitor individuals with 
criminal records. This monitoring is supplemented by information provided by the crime analyst. 
Interestingly, the ‘recent release’ report does not constitute an ‘analytical product’ in any regard. 
Information about releases is provided to the analyst by correctional services, with the analyst 
acting as a middle-man disseminating these bulletins to the officers.    
 A focus on repeat offenders, I argue, is reinforced by a policing model which assigns 
pressure to prevent increases in incident rates. Repeat or prolific offenders wreak havoc for 
inspectors who must justify crime trends. During a CompStat meeting, 
The inspector from District One was called upon to explain a string of break-ins. He 
noted that although the numbers were up, the ‘silver lining’ is that a prolific offender 
had been caught – he recognized members of his district who had played a part in 
securing evidence which had resulted in a conviction – and they were now ‘free from 
him’ for a while. He noted ‘the difference that one individual can make to the 
numbers’ (Field notes, CompStat) 
CompStat’s performance measurement approach, I argue, perpetuates the persistent targeting of 
known offenders, and securing re-incarceration thus ‘frees’ the district from the individual while 
they are detained. Later in the same meeting,  
The inspector for District Four stood at the podium while his monthly rates for 
property crimes were depicted on the projector screens. While addressing clusters 
and changing patterns, he noted several names in relation to the property crime 
occurring in his district, commenting that ‘those are names you don’t want in your 
neighbourhood’ (Field notes, CompStat)   
 
Both of these examples serve to illustrate how under the CPD’s implementation of ILP and 
CompStat-style management, repeat offenders become known threats to favourable 
statistics which must be addressed. Further, the individualized responsibility attribution is 
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highlighted in the comment by this inspector regarding ‘names you don’t want in your 
neighbourhood’. Interest becomes focused on district-specific results - perhaps at the 
expense of the larger picture – while known offenders are ping-ponged between districts.  
The pursuit of known offenders, however, is not a practice that is triggered by crime 
analysis, but is rather a routine patrolling practice that becomes enhanced by information 
from the crime analyst. Officers are able to seek out this information on their own initiative 
through the RMS. One constable shares his approach, describing that       
 I know who’s out there and I know kind of who’s active. Like we’ll monitor who’s 
in jail and who’s not, and if somebody’s getting out, you know, I’ll run him before I 
ever see him, just so I know his conditions…that’s something I personally look into, 
cause I like to know who’s out there (Constable, I7)  
 
The officer goes on to describe how this practice is passed down through senior officers: 
 
…The senior guys when I first came out, they showed us how to do that. It wasn’t 
like, it’s not part of our training, it’s just like peer guidance. And so we try and 
pass that on when we work with other people, because…most people arrest, like a 
partnership would arrest maybe 40 people in a year, my partner and I arrested 300 
last year… And that’s because of, like we’ve been guided to do that. Know 
people’s conditions, know who’s wanted, know where to look (Constable, I7) 
The quotation above identifies that ‘hunting’ known offenders, equipped with a knowledge of 
their restrictions, is a culturally transmitted practice among frontline officers. Further, the quote 
draws attention to the significance placed on making arrests. When asked what the purpose or 
value of crime analysis is, one officer stated, “trying to identify criminals responsible for specific 
crimes, and trying to keep them in jail. Yeah, simple as that” (Constable, I5). Pursuing recent 
releases provides officers with a good chance for a catch, an arrest, a win.  Further, this 
‘intelligence practice’ aligns with culturally accepted ideas of ‘proactive policing’ and is 
legitimized by the distribution of recent release information from the crime analyst.    
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Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored patrol officers’ observed and reported experiences with 
proactive policing approaches and ‘intelligence practices’ under an ILP model. I illustrated how 
street check practices and an emphasis on ‘recent releases’ risk becoming legitimized by their 
function as performance indicators under an ILP CompStat model. In Chapter Three, I illustrated 
how ILP rhetoric is used as a means of acquiring legitimacy for the organization. This rhetoric of 
rationality and accountability legitimizes both the organization and the practices which occur 
under the purview of ILP. However, as Willis (2013) warns, “measuring the quantity of police 
work an officer performs tells us very little about its quality” (p. 9). A call to increase street 
check quantities may contribute to problematic risk construction, while the selective adoption of 
crime analysis information by patrol officers has the potential to promote the policing of the 
usual suspects.  
The social costs which may result from such practices have the potential to damage the 
legitimacy that is sought by CPD. For example, in Canada, street check practices are under 
scrutiny for discriminatory behaviour, racial profiling, and privacy violation (Oleynik, 2008; 
Fabricant, 2011). The Toronto Police Service in particular is facing significant criticism for 
street-check practices perceived as racially-driven and discriminatory (Rankin & Winsa, 2012). 
Visible minorities and those in marginalized neighbourhoods experience a disproportionate 
number of stops as compared to the general population (CBC News, 2015a; Cole, 2015). 
Concerns have also been raised about the power dynamics at play when officers engage citizens 
for the purpose of street checks (Winsa & Rankin, 2013). In the instance that no offense has 
occurred and the individual is not under investigation, there is no obligation for citizens to 
provide information or identification to the officer. Several Toronto communities have alleged 
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that street check practices are ignoring individuals’ rights, accusing officers of using intimidation 
or threats to elicit cooperation for street checks (Rankin & Winsa, 2012). Street checks have also 
been challenged for Charter rights violations including section eight rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure, and section nine rights against arbitrary detention (Stuart, 2008). For 
example, a street check conducted in Toronto in the name of ‘proactive policing’ in a known ‘hot 
spot’ was found to have resulted in the arbitrary detention of a youth, violating both sections 
eight and nine of the Charter (R. v. D. (J.), 2007; Stuart, 2008).   
Yet, police departments defend street check practices as a way to “build rapport” with the 
community through these interactions (Bennet, 2015). Negotiating lines of appropriation for 
street check practices has been an ongoing challenge for the courts as they work to keep up with 
changing contemporary police practices (Stuart, 2008; Oleynik, 2008). There has been a recent 
call to standardize carding practices across the province as a response to damaged trust between 
the public and the police (CBC News, 2015b). Mistrust of police was cited as a significant factor 
which inhibited at-risk individuals from seeking police assistance or sharing information in the 
early days of the serial murder case (Parsons, 2013a). The inquiry stressed that the CPD work on 
building trust and rapport with marginalized groups in order to promote open communication in 
the future. Despite recommending that CPD “minimiz[e] ticketing for minor offenses and bail 
conditions that are difficult to live up to” (Parsons, 2012a: 131), the practices which define ILP 
on the ground appear to not be conducive to this recommendation.  The present exploration into 
intelligence practices of CPD patrol officers raises two significant concerns. First, the 
organization may risk damaging trust with marginalized groups if they become 
disproportionately subjected to street check practices. A heavy emphasis on ‘recent releases’ 
through the targeting for minor offenses can further marginalize groups who already face 
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disadvantage (Parsons, 2013a). If the department wishes to do everything possible to reduce 
future risks to public safety, concerns about legitimacy and trust must extend to the populations 
who face the most risk.   
Second, the storage of data or ‘intelligence’ about individuals raises concern about how 
this information may be used to construct risk. There remain unanswered questions about who 
may have the potential to access ‘intelligence’ such as street check reports, and in what format 
this access may be provided. For example, a growing number of citizens are reporting that 
erroneous associations documented by police – with no official charges ever laid – have 
tarnished record checks resulting in lost jobs and blocked opportunities (Cribb, 2014; Cribb & 
Rankin, 2014). The use of technology for information management has the power to transform 
the meanings attributed to the information which is stored, collated, or retrieved through its use 
(Manning, 1992). Under ILP, ‘raw information’ and ‘intelligence’ are at risk of being conflated, 
and subsequently contributing to the construction of risk categories. As demonstrated in this 
chapter, this ‘intelligence’ has the potential to misconstrue risk, as in the case of ‘paper 
gangsters’. These designations are not necessarily checked for accuracy or subjected to a formal 
review, and thus labels may be assigned with no means of contesting them. As instances emerge 
of informal or unconfirmed ‘intelligence’ resulting in risk constructions which block opportunity 
and impact the lives of those who are labelled, we must be attentive to the material consequences 
of the way that data is collected, stored, and managed by law enforcement (Cribb, 2014; Cribb & 
Rankin, 2014). 
Organizationally, CompStat policing fits well with the traditional and accepted pursuit of 
known and repeat offenders (Herbert, 2001). The performance objectives of CompStat are suited 
to the ‘proactive’ approaches identified in this chapter. ILP legitimizes policing approaches 
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which define success in terms of quantitative outputs, such as the policing of the usual suspects. 
Chambliss (1995) discusses the systemic targeting of the police toward marginalized individuals 
(be they marginalized based on race, socioeconomic status, offender status or a combination). He 
asserts that these practices act to appease public opinion, as it is “organizationally effective” for 
the targeted population to be “relatively powerless” (Chambliss, 1995: 191). In contrast with 
more powerful groups, whose opinions hold political sway, and who have the means to legally 
challenge the behaviour of the police, disadvantaged groups hold no such weight (Chambliss, 
1995). Thus, it is in the interest of the service to target the least powerful of the publics they 
serve. In light of the CPD’s interest in acquiring legitimacy in the eyes of the public (see Chapter 
Three), the targeting of ‘usual suspects’, it seems, may contribute to acquiring this legitimacy 
among some stakeholders.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion   
 In recent years, police organizations have been called upon to be more accountable to the 
public(s) they serve. Contemporary economic conditions have challenged law enforcement to 
provide justification for the significant amount of public resources they receive. Police are 
looking to new and innovative approaches in order to maintain services while decreasing 
operating costs (Public Safety Canada, 2013). In addition, police are being held accountable for 
heightened public safety expectations. Rampant fears of radicalized behaviour and large scale 
violence have tasked police with the early identification and mitigation of risk (Ericson & 
Haggerty, 1997; Murphy, 2007; McCulloch & Pickering, 2009; Zedner, 2007). The expansion of 
police powers in recent legislation such as Bill C-51 cements the expectation that police be 
attentive to pre-crime conditions and take pre-emptive action. Meanwhile, enforcement actions 
face escalating levels of public scrutiny as citizens grow increasingly intolerant of police 
decisions that appear to be subjective or discriminatory in nature (Choudhury, 2014; Taibbi, 
2014). Police must be able to justify finance, safety, and enforcement decisions to the public in 
order to maintain the appearance of a just and legitimate organization. The ILP philosophy 
provides a strategy that addresses the intersection of these needs.    
ILP is based on the principle of information-driven decision making. The collection, 
storage, and analysis of large amounts of data using sophisticated technologies is believed to 
allow for the most informed and responsible approaches. ILP promises a method of resource 
distribution which is targeted to the problems and areas that need it most (Ratcliffe, 2008). It 
advocates for focused resource management through the monitoring of statistics and outcomes to 
illustrate the impact that resources have had on an area. Beyond economic reasoning, ILP’s 
emphasis on advanced technologies to detect patterns or trends promotes the idea that such 
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innovation improves and enhances the ability to pre-emptively identify risk. Further, the use of 
advanced technologies and analytics communicates notions of objective decision making. In 
contrast with human decisions which may be impacted by prejudice or biases, ILP boasts a 
neutral means of storing and categorizing information from which ‘rational’ decisions can be 
made and justified. In this theoretical form, ILP addresses the confluence of accountability crises 
faced by contemporary police departments. This thesis contributes to policing scholarship by 
providing a theoretical, as well as empirical, analysis of the adoption and utilization of ILP as it 
is translated into practice.    
CPD, a large urban police organization, has publicly attested their commitment to 
becoming intelligence-led. CPD has made significant investments in infrastructure and 
technological development to support an ILP framework. This thesis provides a case study of 
CPD’s adoption of ILP with a specific focus on how ILP has been understood and enacted on the 
ground by patrol officers. In addition to the wider institutional pressures for increased 
accountability, CPD was the subject of a significant amount of negative publicity in the years 
preceding ILP adoption. The organizational presentation and rationalization of ILP provided a 
way for CPD to acquire legitimacy and rebuild public trust. A significant element of acquiring 
this legitimacy involves ‘responsibilizing’ patrol officers, raising expectations around patrol’s 
ability to impact and prevent crime. However, implementation on the ground was met with a 
number of situational, organizational, and police cultural barriers which influence ILP 
actualization. Thus, ILP takes the form of a rationalized institutional myth in CPD, maintaining 
appearances without meaningfully changing daily practices. In order to maintain this myth, 
patrol officers engage selectively in ILP practices such as appeasing calls for tickets and street 
checks, without meaningfully changing their everyday approach. This selective adoption, I 
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argue, raises a number of sociopolitical concerns – specifically, the policing of the usual suspects 
and low-level offenses. In what follows, I outline a number of practical and theoretical 
contributions made by this study. I conclude with a description of research limitations 
encountered in the present study, and provide a program of research to guide future inquiry and 
empirical assessment of ILP.    
 
The ‘CompStat’ Phenomenon and the Responsibilization of Frontline Workers 
The move toward performance management programs similar to CompStat has 
permeated a multitude of sectors. Micro outputs are increasingly individualized and tracked to 
illustrate organizational accomplishment and justify funding (Eterno & Silverman, 2012). Thus, 
placing increased responsibility and expectation upon lower level organizational actors for 
purposes of organizational accountability and liability may be evident in several contemporary 
organizational structures beyond law enforcement. This study identified how this responsibility 
was largely rhetorical in nature as practical limitations prevented officers from utilizing many of 
the tools provided. However, the provision of this responsibility raises questions about how 
issues of responsibility or ‘blame’ may be handled if a future incident - such as that which 
sparked the public inquiry into the CPD - were to occur again. In a climate where someone must 
take accountability for mistakes, organizations may be trying to protect against the reputational 
costs of an inability to individualize blame or determine responsibility (Parsons, 2012a). The 
ability to assign blame to a specific individual or unit may be far less scathing than a finding of 
systemic bias in an entire organization (Parsons, 2012a).      
This study builds theoretically upon Garland’s (1996) concept of ‘responsibilization’, 
demonstrating how organizational rhetoric redirects notions of responsibility for crime control 
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toward frontline officers. Rather than enlisting those external to the organization, CPD, through 
the implementation of ILP processes, has responsibilized patrol officers to take a more active 
role in crime control and prevention (Garland, 1996). Garland (1996) identifies that non-state 
organizations or businesses are motivated to engage in crime control efforts as a means of 
protecting private interests, as street crime such as theft threatens profits and viability. For patrol 
officers, the motivation to achieve ticket and street check requirements of ILP may in fact share a 
similar motivation. If management has come to define success as incurring desired quantified 
outputs, it is the officers who adapt to this responsibility who will receive favourable 
performance reviews. These performance reviews will contribute to subsequent promotion and 
individual success. Thus, the motivations which encourage non-state entities to engage in crime 
control practices under Garland’s (1996) conception share similarities with how motivation may 
be leveraged among patrol officers. Future inquiry may examine whether the responsibilization 
of frontline workers is occurring beyond the policing sphere in order to further develop this 
analytic concept.     
 
Reforming Police Organizations: Intelligence-led Policing as a Rationalized Institutional 
Myth 
 This study contributes theoretically to the micro-level application of institutional theory 
(Hallet, 2010). The concept of rationalized institutional myths originated as a macro-level theory. 
Establishing credibility for this concept requires an inhabited approach through which ground 
level functioning may be compared with organizational claims. This study affirms the value of 
rationalized myths as an analytic concept, illuminating how the sociopolitical context of CPD 
motivated the adoption of ILP. This study also identifies intricacies in how organizational actors 
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maintain the appearance of reform in order to avoid ‘turmoil’ (Hallett, 2010). Patrol officers and 
middle management both acknowledge that ILP is not enacted in the way that official claims 
may suggest. However, the selective adoption of ILP practices allows these discrepancies to 
‘work out backstage’ in order to maintain appearances (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These findings 
also affirm the value of institutional theorizing for understanding police reform (Willis et al. 
2007). Rather than accepting organizational claims at face value, institutional theorizing 
highlights the need to empirically examine the efficacy of reform initiatives.   
   
Organizational Change and the Role of Police Culture(s) 
 The findings of this study highlight the significant role of police culture in shaping how 
organizational change is perceived and enacted. Patrol officers make sense of ILP in relation to 
existing occupational norms and schemas. The role of culture in shaping officers’ perceptions 
and enactment of ILP makes a significant contribution to the value of ethnography for 
understanding police organizational change (Marks, 2004). Ethnographic approaches such as this 
case study reveal cultural influences on sensemaking which may not be uncovered through other 
methodologies.  
Findings of this study also draw attention to the complexity of organizational cultures, 
and how differing cultures within an organization (patrol, middle-management, civilian) have 
different needs and goals which may shape how change is enacted. Chan (1996) demonstrates 
that police culture is not monolithic, but rather multiple cultures exist within the police 
organization. As civilianization is increasingly leveraged to reduce operating costs, civilians are 
taking on a number of roles which move beyond administrative functions (Griffiths, 2006). The 
role of civilian crime and intelligence analysts is one prominent example of how civilianization 
is expanding within Canadian policing. The analytic culture which has been incorporated under 
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ILP has not only brought ideological changes, but an additional culture which interacts with 
multiple existing police cultures in differing ways.     
Amidst evident tension between the varying cultures within the operations division, this 
study highlights concerns about the lack of credibility ascribed to civilian crime analysts. 
Manning (1992) identifies how the source of information shapes its meaning, and citizen 
information is the least trusted form within police organizations. Interestingly, patrol officers 
shared that they trusted information garnered from their own street sources above and beyond 
that of the analyst. In this case, citizen information appears to rank higher than information from 
the crime analyst – possibly as a result of the officers receiving the information directly rather 
than through ‘spam’ email. Both the analysts’ status in the police department’s hierarchy and the 
technologically mediated means through which information is distributed may influence how 
officers regard this information. The present study draws attention to the importance of 
examining how patrol officers make sense of an analyst’s credibility, as this becomes a critical 
part of whether they value the crime analyst as part of the team.   
 
Overcoming Barriers through the Eyes of Patrol Officers 
 This study also sheds important light on barriers that patrol officers perceive as limiting 
the enactment of ILP. Identifying reasons why officers do not perceive ILP and crime analysis as 
actionable tools provides insight into how structures or processes may be changed in order to 
make crime analysis a relevant resource for patrol. Officers identified how reducing the number 
of officers on the street is not remedied by ILP, but rather prevents them from engaging in 
proactive patrol time. Vacancies held by the municipality have contributed to the predominant 
reactive responsibility of patrol, negating information which may only be useful in a proactive or 
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unassigned context. Resourcing of patrol personnel remains crucial under the present situational 
context, and ILP does not appear to have alleviated the pressure felt by officers during this time 
of fiscal restraint. 
Officers also offer insight as to how the content of analytic reports may be altered to 
become more actionable. Adding detail to crime maps, such as identifying the MO for a string of 
break-ins, is one example that officers cited which would make information more actionable. 
Further, the lack of organizational investment in training and oversight is identified by officers. 
Without training or encouragement to utilize new technologies, many officers disregard the new 
tools at their disposal. Police departments may seek to invest in training for officers regarding the 
use and function of crime analysis in order to promote an active interest in utilizing crime 
analysis as part of patrol work. 
Finally, a number of officers drew attention to the lack of interaction or face time that 
occurred between themselves and the analyst. In an era when communication is increasingly 
mediated by technology, this study draws attention to the importance of interpersonal 
communication for information dissemination and establishing credibility. Email is a prominent 
means of organizational communication across sectors, but it seems that face-to-face 
interpersonal communication may remain a stronger and more impressionable way of 
communicating within police organizations.   
 
Sociopolitical Concerns of “Pre-Crime” Policing 
 Finally, this research contributes a preliminary analysis into proactive policing practices 
occurring under an ILP framework. The pre-emptive targeting of known offenders, such as 
seeking breaches of probation in the interests of re-incarcerating before offending occurs reflects 
the growing shift towards ‘pre-crime’ policing, and “earlier and earlier interventions to reduce 
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opportunity” (Zedner, 2007: 265).  The notion of prevention has become “co-opted and 
distorted” within contemporary policing practices (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009: 640). 
‘Prevention’ is now understood as incessant targeting and detainment, moving further and further 
from a discussion of systemic contributors to criminality. Intelligence-gathering practices touted 
as motivated by ‘prevention’ raise concern about the labelling and further marginalization of 
entire communities (Fabricant, 2011).  
Patrol officers “screen people and events for further processes; that is, their decisions 
differentiate between people, leading to a decision to do nothing or a decision to proceed further. 
Screening… enables police to manage justice and to conserve organizational resources” 
(Manning, 1992: 357). These decisions shape the information that is available to other officers, 
and on a larger scale, shape the information that the organizations know (Manning, 1992). 
Decisions made from an analysis of existing information are contingent on the content of the 
information that is available (Manning, 1992). The selective process by which information is 
documented and retained necessarily influences that which is available to inform decisions. This 
subjective process raises concerns about the framing of ILP as an ‘objective’ approach. While 
negotiating appropriateness of police responses is an ongoing challenge, a rhetoric of objectivity 
or neutrality raises concerns about how discriminatory behaviour may become rationalized or 
justified by a veil of scientific language (Sanders and Hannem, 2013; Sanders et al., 2015).    
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Despite the theoretical and practical contributions made by this study, I acknowledge that 
several limitations exist. The sample size for both interview participants (N=15) and observation 
hours (N=55) are relatively small. The experiences of the officers in this study cannot be said to 
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represent the perspectives of the majority of officers in CPD. This study is also limited by its sole 
focus on one organization. The state of ILP implementation may vary between police 
organizations of different sizes, different locations, or with different management styles. Further, 
this study rests on the perceptions of patrol officers and does not provide perspective from the 
crime analysts within patrol districts. Future areas of inquiry should provide a more holistic 
organizational perspective of ILP and involve organizational actors from a broader range of 
levels and positions. They should move beyond a singular focus of one organization and study 
ILP implementation across several police services in order to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of ILP in Canada. 
 This study is also constrained by the timespan over which it occurred. Although 
interviews and observation took place during two weeks of intensive data collection 
approximately one year apart, organizational change is a slow and ongoing process. While the 
present enactment of ILP may be ‘loosely coupled’ from its philosophical claims, there is 
potential for practices to become more ‘closely coupled’ over time as ILP becomes further 
embedded within the organization. Future research should examine ILP implementation in 
various stages in order to provide insight as to whether enactment changes over time. 
    At present, discussion of potential socio-political implications of proactive policing 
approaches and street check practices remain largely theoretical and preliminary in nature. An 
empirical examination involving individuals and communities affected by these practices is 
needed in order to understand their impact on police legitimacy and trust. Future inquiry into 
street check practices is required to provide a thorough assessment of how information and 
intelligence practices impact police/pubic interactions. Further research is also needed in regards 
to how street checks are utilized by police personnel to inform risk assessment. 
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 Finally, technological advances, such as the crime mapping dashboards developed and 
installed by CPD, continue to grow in capability and sophistication. Increasingly, analytics are 
promoted for their ability to not only identify but predict trends that may occur in the future. ILP 
innovation is rapidly moving toward an emphasis on predictive analytics; crime mapping 
dashboards which indicate locations of predicted rather than reported crime are undergoing 
installation. As technology rapidly expands there is a pressing need to continue assessing how 
these tools are shaping police work on the ground. Moreover, the role of these technologies in 
constructing risk of people or locations remains pertinent as we begin to react to ‘predicted’ 
rather than concrete incidents.   
The challenges faced by contemporary police organizations continue to intensify. 
Meanwhile, innovation is occurring at a rapid pace, often implemented before any assessment of 
its efficacy is conducted. It is vital that amidst alluring claims of new efficiencies and capabilities 
we remain attentive to how organizational context may shape the practical adoption and material 
consequences of institutional reform.    
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APPENDIX A: Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
 
Interview Guide 
(i) General Introduction Questions 
1. Could you start by telling me a little bit about your career in policing and how long 
you’ve worked in policing? 
 (ii) Knowledge, Training, Understanding of Crime Analysis 
1. What would you say is the philosophy, or the approach to policing that is adopted by 
your service?  
2. Are you familiar with the term ‘intelligence-led’ policing? How would you define an 
‘intelligence-led’ policing strategy? 
3. Can you define crime analysis? What comes to mind when you think of crime analysis? 
4. Is there a difference between crime and intelligence analysis?   
5. What do you see as the purpose and value of crime analysis? For example, is its value 
largely connected to strategic, business or tactical decision-making in your service? 
6. Have you received training on crime and intelligence analysis? What type of training did 
you receive and when did you receive it? Have you received any training in relation to 
report writing or gathering data during occurrences that will be useful for the needs of 
analysts? 
 
 (iii) Constructed Perceptions of Value, Organizational Fit 
1. How would you describe the use of crime analysis in your service? How is it used?  
Who are the main users of crime analysis data in your service? 
2. Are you familiar with the crime analysts who work in your service? How often would 
you say you interact with them?  
3. How is contact with the crime analysts initiated? Do they pass information along to you? 
Would you seek them out if you have a question? E.g. Would they come to parade? 
Would you go to their office? 
4. Where are the crime analysts positioned in your service? Are they easily accessible to 
you? 
5. Are the analysts in your service sworn members, former police officers? Or are they 
civilians? 
6. Does crime analysis impact policing strategies? If so, how?  If not, why not?  
7. Is crime analysis (and analytical products) a useful tool for patrol officers?  
8. Is crime analysis a useful tool for the police service as a whole?  Can you explain how, 
and in what way, it is useful?  
(iv) Current uses/Hot-spot perception/Impact on Strategy 
1. How is the crime analyst’s data communicated to you? Weekly reports? Do you receive it 
electronically while out on patrol?  
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2. What kinds of things are they normally communicating to you? Do you find it helpful? 
3. Are the analytical products you receive from your analyst easy to understand?  If so, what 
makes them easy / challenging to understand? 
4. Are there areas of your regular beat that you would describe as ‘hot-spots’, or more 
problematic areas? 
5. What might occur in an area that may lead you to define an area as a hot-spot? How do 
you decide which areas in your beat are your hot-spots? 
6. Does the information that comes from the crime analysts / crime reports ever suggest 
which areas of your beat are the hot-spots? Do you find it to be accurate compared to 
what you experience while actually on the street? 
7. Would you say crime analysis data impacts your day-to-say strategy? How? 
8. Can you describe a time where you may have changed your strategy, or gone to a 
different area, based on data from a crime analyst or crime report? 
9. Would you say the use of, or emphasis on crime analysis has changed over the course of 
your career in policing?  
(v) Comptstat  
1. Does your service work under a CompStat model? How does CompStat work in your 
service? 
2. What is the purpose or the logic behind CompStat? What is the goal of using a CompStat 
model? 
3. How does CompStat affect your patrol work?  
E.g. Street checks/measures of productivity? 
4. Where so compstat numbers come from? 
5. How does reclassification of call types get accounted for in the CompStat process? 
Does one crime override another? 
6. What is the relationship between crime analysis and CompStat? 
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